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The purpose of this study was to analyze the rhetorical strategies of the Open Convention Movement, a conglomerate of political mavericks who arose during the
Democratic Presidential primary campaign of 1980.

It

consisted of both supporters and antagonists of incumbent
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President Jimmy Carter, primarily because of opposition to
a proposed rule which would have required delegates to the
Democratic National Convention to vote, on the first ballot,
for the presidential candidate whom they represented in
their state-wide primaries.
It was hypothesized that certain rhetorical themes
repeat themselves within movement rhetoric.

It was further

hypothesized that Identification (unity) was impossible in
this context, owing to both internal and external factors.
This research sought to investigate the degree to which
Identification was achieved by the various spokespersons of
the movement, and the rhetorical strategies employed to
accomplish that Identification.

To do this, Kenneth

Burke's Dramatistic Pentad was utilized.
Fourteen representative samples of rhetoric were
selected, produced by eight major spokespersons within the
Open Convention Movement.

From these samples, seven rhet-

orical strategies were identified, and the rhetoric catalogued accordingly.

As repositories of data (information

and/or details), these samples were also analyzed to
determine what material was divergent and unique.
Chapter III dealt with the Open Convention Movement
as the Act.

The constituency of the movement was consid-

ered, the level of Identification inherent among participants examined, especially in light of personal goals and
ambitions, and finally, the actions of the participants
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and the influence of the media on the movement was
explored.
Chapter IV considered the 1980 Democratic National
Convention as the Scene.

Investigation was made into

audience make-up and homogeneity, the events and circumstances of the Convention itself, and the immediate effects
of the movement on the Convention.
Chapter V dealt with the spokespersons of the movement as the Agents, examining the major spokespersons, how
they viewed their roles, whether any significant rhetors
arose and, if so, what influence they exerted, and finally,
what alliances were formed.
Chapter VI analyzed the fourteen speeches, articles,
and interviews as the Agencies.

The rhetorical strategies

were examined, the rhetorical themes viewed, and divergent
information considered.
Finally, Chapter VII considered opposition to
Proposed Rule F(3) (C) as the primary Purpose of the Open
Convention Movement.

Some of the consequences of the

delegate vote on the proposed rule were exposed, and the
impact of the rhetorical medium on the delegate decision
was weighed.
Burke's Dramatistic Pentad proved to be a viable
method for the investigation of this movement.

Certain

rhetorical themes did appear to repeat themselves in the
rhetoric of the movement.

As a unique political movement,
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this hypothesis bears further investigation.
When pondering the possibilities for achieving Identification, internal and external factors were considered.
Internally, the movement divided into four distinct sub-groups, each displaying diverse goals and ambitions,
differing levels of Identification between themselves, and
fractured loyalties.

Only two spokespersons were active

for more than three months, and as a result there was heavy
reliance on media coverage and exposure.

Externally, the

general effect of the extensive use of the mass media
appears to have been to reinforce existing attitudes and
beliefs

(supporting Klapper's theory).

The level of in-

fluence and power available to an incumbent President are
considerable, and the delegates, as "king makers", chose
their candidate by securing the renomination of Jimmy
Carter.
The rhetoric of the movement did not persuade the
delegates to reject the proposed rule, but proved to be a
divisive element at the National Convention, and a contributing factor to the Democratic defeat in the November
general election.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Given the usual problems of estimating
the effects of a single speech . • •
it is not surprising that few rhetoricians have undertaken the more difficult
task of analyzing the role of persuasion
in social movements • • • • It is frequently impossible to separate detractors
from supporters, let alone to discern
rhetorical intentions, to distinguish between rhetorical acts and coercive acts,
or to estimate the effects of messages
on the many audiences.!
Nevertheless, this is our intention; to analyze the rhetorical strategies of the Open Convention Movement of 1980.
An open convention is one in which the delegates are
theoretically free to vote for whomever they wish on the
first ballot.

The Open Convention Movement was composed of

a loose-knit conglomerate of political mavericks who arose
during the Presidential primary campaign of 1980.

It con-

sisted of both supporters and antagonists of incumbent
President Jimmy Carter, primarily because of their opposition to a proposed rule which would have required delegates to the Democratic National Convention to vote, on the
first ballot, for the Presidential candidate whom they represented in their state-wide primaries.

This rule would

have virtually guaranteed the renomination of Jimmy Carter,
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inspite of his drastically diminishing showing in the polls.
Some simply opposed the rule because they felt it hurt party
unity, while many in the movement became popularly identified as the "Anybody-But-Carter" dissidents.

This group

and its varied constituency comprised the Open Convention
Movement of 1980.

Their identity, rhetorical strategies,

and the circumstances of these events will be the subject
of this research project.

The methodology employed will be

based on Kenneth Burke's formulation of rhetorical events
in the categories of Act, Scene, Agent, Agency and Purpose
( c • f • , page 34 ) •
In Chapter One, we shall examine certain key words
which require close scrutiny and definition:

Rhetoric;

Analysis (and Criticism); Movement; and Movement Rhetoric.
More specificially, we shall also glimpse the Open Convention Movement, as an historical entity; we shall briefly
consider the method of analysis to be applied, namely,
Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Pentad; and finally, we shall
expose the methodological operation to be utilized.
Chapter Two will present an historical perspective
of the Democratic National Convention of 1980, and the
Democratic presidential primary campaign.

Finally, elements

of the Open Convention Movement will be examined, such as
the origin of the term, the participants, and the rationale
behind the movement.
Chapter Three will consider the Open Convention
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Movement as the Act (in Burke's Pentad).

Here we shall

briefly state the purpose of the movement, consider the
constituency of the movement, examine the level of Identification inherent among participants in the movement,
especially in light of personal goals and ambitions, and
finally, view the actions of the participants and the
influence of the media on the movement.
Chapter Four will deal with the 1980 Democratic
National Convention as the Scene.

Here we shall examine

what audience was addressed, how homogeneous this group
was, including the level of Identification inherent among
the delegates, the events and circumstances of the Convention itself, and finally, the immediate effects of the
movement on the Convention.
Chapter Five will deal with the various speakers as
the Agents, examining who the major spokespersons were, how
they viewed their roles, whether any significant rhetors
arose within the movement and, if so, what influence they
exerted, and finally, what alliances, if any, were formed.
Chapter Six will deal with the various speeches,
articles and interviews of the movement as the Agencies.
Here we shall examine what rhetorical strategies were employed, and by whom, what rhetorical themes, if any,
repeat themselves, and finally, what information and details were divergent and unique.
Chapter Seven will deal with opposition to Proposed
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Rule F{3) {C) as the Purpose.

The primary and secondary

purposes of the movement will be exposed, some of the
consequences of the vote on F(3) (C) will be considered,
and finally, the impact of the rhetorical medium on the
delegate decision will be weighed.
Chapter Eight will present a Conclusion.

Here we

shall ask whether we now understand the rhetorical strategies of the Open Convention Movement, including the implications of choosing Burke's Pentad as the method of
analysis.

Also, we shall prove whether rhetorical

themes

did repeat themselves within the rhetoric of the movement,
and whether it was possible to achieve Identification among the delegates owing to internal factors within the
movement, as well as external factors.

We shall judge

the effectiveness of the movement in light of McBurney and
Wrage's quadrilateral criteria.

We shall also determine

what we learned from the study, what we did wrong, and
what should be looked to next.
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
It is the purpose of this study, as already mentioned,
to analyze the rhetorical strategies of the Open Convention
Movement.

The term Strategy (discussed in more detail be-

ginning on page34) is meant here to represent a choice of
the speaker.

These choices, apart from the discretion of

the individual speakers, can be identified as recurring

5

themes in a number of rhetorical events.

It is therefore

hypothesized that certain rhetorical themes repeat themselves within movement rhetoric.

It is also hypothesized

that Identification (by which we mean Unity) was impossible
in this context, owing to many factors, some inherent in
the movement itself, and others only indirectly related.
In order to understand the major rhetorical strategies of a movement, it must be understood:

Who the major

spokespersons are; What rhetorical acts they perform; How
they view their role as spokesperson; What audience they
are addressing; and finally, the rhetorical medium through
which they are operating.

This research seeks to in-

vestigate the degree to which Identification (unity) was
achieved by the various spokespersons of the Open Convention
Movement, and the Rhetorical Strategies employed to achieve
that Identification.

To accomplish this, it is proposed

that Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Pentad will best suit both
purposes of this study, and acconunodate the definitions of
Rhetoric and Movement, soon to be rendered herein.
JUSTIFICATION FOR STUDY
Having previewed the Open Convention Movement, a word
needs to be said here in justification of this study.

First,

it should be noted that the Open Convention Movement is
unique.

As mentioned earlier, its constituent make-up, its

rhetorical direction, its limited existence, as well as its
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rhetorical strategy all combine to make it unparalleled in
contemporary social and political history.

is worthy of study because it

~epresents

Therefore, it

such a singular

opportunity to rhetorical critics, but also because, to
date, no other attempts of this scale have been made to
research either the Movement or its abiding philosophy.
A review of the literature reveals no study having
been undertaken, and this includes the referenced areas of
Rhetoric, Rhetorical Analysis, or general Political Science.
Sources consulted were:

Master's Thesis In The Arts And

Social Sciences, 1980-1981 (Cedar Falls, Iowa.

Research

Publications), Volume No. 5, as well as Volume No. 6, representing the 1981-1982 edition; American Doctoral Dissertations 1980-1981 (Ann Arbor University Microfilms Publications, 1981); and The Comprehensive Dissertation Index,
1981 Supplement, Part 2 (Ann Arbor University Microfilms
Publications, 1982).

This scarcity of research, to date,

is unfortunate, because the Open Convention Movement provides the critic the opportunity to study, in depth, a
rhetorically prolific, inner-directed movement.

No previous

work having been done, this study will broadly consider the
rhetorical strategies of the movement, the role of the
various spokespersons, and the audience to which these
rhetorical efforts were directed.
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HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The Terms:

The tradition of rhetoric spans more than twenty-three
hundred years, with proponents and opponents relentlessly
suggesting definitions and methods.

Socrates said that

"rhetoric is the art of persuading an ignorant multitude
about the justice or injustice of a matter, without imparting any real instruction, 112 by which he meant instruction in an abstract, philosophical knowledge of the
nature of justice.

In contrast, Aristotle saw rhetoric

as:
the faculty of observing in any given
case the available means of persuasion
• • • • The duty of rhetoric is to deal
with such matters as we deliberate upon
without arts or systems to guide us, in
the hearing of persons who cannot take
in at a glance a complicated argumen5,
or follow a long chain of reasoning.
For Aristotle, the function of rhetoric is not simply to
succeed in persuading, but rather to discover the available means of coming as near such success as the circumstances of each particular case allows. 4
The word Rhetoric may be traced through several
etymological stages to its earliest Greek form, RHE'IORIKE.
Standing almost inseparable from this term is a second
word, EIREIN, which when transliterated becomes Oratory,
and means "To Speak".

Rhetoric then comes to mean The

Art of Speaking, for Rhetoric was, in Grecian culture, an
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oratorical form, originating in its practice through Corax
and Tisias (who instructed the residents of Syracuse on how

to present legal claims in court).
Among later classicists, Hermogenes, inspite of his
Neoplatonist tradition, concluded that the end of rhetoric
was not to persuade, but to use persuasive methods, accepting ultimately the definition of rhetoric as "an artistic faculty of persuasive speech on a political subject
having as its goal to speak well." 5
Inasmuch as another term, Persuasion, has come into
discussion, it behooves us to pursue it etymologically.
From the Latin, SUADERE, meaning to advise or to urge, or
to appeal to one's sense of morality, Persuasion has come
to be used by many contemporary "authorities" as synonymous
with Rhetoric, while others have even presumed to trace it
through an evolution to an eventual kindship with the term
Manipulation. 6 Clearly Manipulation was not the original
meaning (i.e., to appeal to one's sense of morality), and
even Webster's New World Dictionary-Second College Edition
currently defines Persuasion as "to cause to do something,
especially by reasoning, urging, or inducement: to prevail
upon."
Writing on "Later Greek Philosophy And Rhetoric" in
The Journal of Philosophy and Rhetoric, George A. Kennedy
asked himself of rhetoric:
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What is its cause or purpose? To
persuade, as the sophists had said?
To utilize available means of persuasion, even if they fail, as
Aristotle claimed? To speak well,
as Quintillian, for example, proposed?
It could also be applied to the EIDE, or
species, of the genus rhetoric: the end
of judicial is the just; the end of
deliberative is the expedient; the end
of epideictic is the honorable.7
Writing in 1963, Bryant offered this definition:
I take rhetoric to be the rationale of
informative and suasory discourse . • •
operating chiefly in the areas of the
contingent, its aim is the attainment
of maximum probability as the basis
for public decision.8
Simons, writing in 1976, uses the terms rhetoric and
persuasion interchangeably, and defines them as "human
communication designed to influence others by modifying
their beliefs, values and attitudes. 119

Scott and Brock,

in their Methods of Rhetorical Criticism, define rhetoric
as "the human effort to induce cooperation through the use
of syrnbols. 1110
In a 1977 article entitled "Dialectical Rhetoric And
Rhetorical Rhetoric", Holmberg attempts to define rhetoric
by tracing the concept of democracy.
The Greek word DEM)KRAT!Acan be
etymologically reduced to two parts,
DEM:lS and KRATIA. We usually translate
the two parts as 'people-power', where
DEM:lS means People, and KRATIA means
Power. However, the word DEM:lS at the
time of Solon was intimately connected
to the word DEME • • • suggesting a
Tribe. That is, the word IE«J<RATIA
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may not only mean 'people-power' as
we today mean it; it could also mean
"Tribe-power" • • • Persuasion as
conversion of value and belief would
have been anathema to DEME organization.
Instead, the appropriate way of legally
dealing with this sort of problem may
have been • . • a balancing of views.
In this way, the 'persuasion' would
occur as an admission that both ways
of life are important and viable (here
viable means livable), and that they
need to be balanced against each other.
This rhetoric of balance • • • is not
based upon correctness of one view or
the other, but upon a view which potentially and pluralistically includes
both.11
Among the ancient Greeks and Romans, rhetoric was
identified with speech-making in the performance of three
vital public functions.

Citizens argued their own cases

in the courtroom (forensic) , delivered orations on
ceremonial occasions (epideictic), and participated in
debates about matters of public policy (deliberative). 12
The very fact that Corax and Tisias acquired students to
instruct about legal matters, the funeral oration of
Pericles, and Athenian law itself, which demanded of every
citizen availability to deliberate on public matters, all
attest to the practical outworking of rhetoric in the
schemework of everyday life.
In coming to grips with an acceptable definition of
Rhetoric, these three elements must be kept in balance the etymological evidence, the historical context and
application, as well as contemporary usage.

Certainly

11
if one is to accept the term etymologically, Rhetoric is The
Art of Speaking.

Again, if we consider historical context,

Rhetoric is concerned with the creation, or genesis, of discourse, as well as its interpretation, or analysis, and both
of these are customarily based on the premise of probability.
This is consistent with contemporary thought, for even the
theory of Uncertainty would not beg the question of probability.
looked at?

Does the very act of "looking" alter what is being
Again, if reality is individually perceived and

couched in uncertainty, or at least individuality, one only
strengthens the argument for a basis in probability.

Ety-

mologically, we have demonstrated Persuasion to be an appeal
to one's sense of morality, and if contemporary rhetoricians
are correct in using the terms Rhetoric and Persuasion interchangeably, then one must assume that an ethical speaker is
motivated by his perception of truth to appeal to the
highest motives and values of his audience. 13 Further, if
Argumentation is the next logical consideration in a sequence of rhetoric, it can etymologically be understood to
mean to assert, or urge.

This "form", or element of

rhetoric, is not the whole of the picture but rather a
part, indeed a significant one, within the framework of
Rhetoric.

Its strength lies in the development of logical

proof, and certainly one major application involves the
forensic element of rhetoric.
Having gathered some small measure of the collective
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wisdom of twenty-three centuries of thought concerning
rhetoric, we must settle upon a definition.

This shall

serve as a foundation upon which one may operate to build
a rhetoric consistent with etymology, history and current
usage.

In recognition of all that has foundationally con-

structed this work to this point, then, Rhetoric may be
said to be:

The artful creation and interpretation of dis-

course, designed to appeal to the highest nature of man,
arriving at consensus on the basis of maximizing probability.
Having settled upon a workable definition of Rhetoric,
we next turn our attention to the term Analysis.

Webster

says that it is:
a separating or breaking up of any whole
into its parts, especially with an examination of these parts to find out
their nature, proportion, function, and
interrelationships.14
Therefore, by contemporary definition, Analysis refers to
the critical examination, separation, and investigation of
the component parts of a subject.

Implicit within this

process is also the work of criticism, wherein judgments
are rendered based upon an evaluation of comparative
15
worth.
Hence Rhetorical Analysis may be said to be:
The critical evaluation of discourse, whereby judgment is
rendered upon the final consensus, after careful examination
of the fitness of the constituent parts.
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While it is not our objective to settle the debate
over the question, "How do we judge what success is,
rhetorically?", a brief word needs to be addressed to the
subject at this point.

There are numerous arguments

concerning the best and most appropriate criteria for determining rhetorical success.

McBurney and Wrage, in their

book entitled The Art Of Good Speech, briefly delineate
four of the more-oft discussed theories, namely, the
Results theory, the Truth theory, the Ethical theory, and
the Artistic theory.

The Results theory reduces rhetoric

to a bottom-line approach; did the politician win votes,
did the lawyer win his case, did the entertainer win
applause?
In every speech situation, the causes
that operate to produce results are
extremely complex. These other factors
may be sufficient in themselves to
guarantee success or failure. • • •
In some cases they are largely beyond
the control of the speaker. Even though
the purpose of speech is response, the
failure to get the desired response is
not necessarily a sign that the speech
was bad, nor is a favorable response a
sure indication that the speech was
good. 16
The Truth theory.seeks to measure effective speech by its
concurrence with the truth.
One of the oldest and most profound
attacks on speech is that it can
delude the unwary by making false
causes appear true. There are unquestionably cases in which people
have been beguiled, misled, and
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cheated by speakers. It is equally
true, however, that speech can serve
to make sound causes appear true to
those who might not otherwise accept
them. • • • If the efforts of the
speaker are to be judged by the truth
of the cause in which they are engaged
(assuming the critic knows what the
truth is), we admit that the critic
has grounds for condemning rhetoric
which makes a bad cause look good;
but, by the same token, he is logically compelled to praise bungling and
incompeten9e which makes a good cause
look bad.l
This assumes that Truth, as an entity, is absolute and
knowable, and that the speaker, at the time of speaking,
was fully aware of the truth.
The Ethical theory would judge a speaker by his
motives and intentions, assuming these are knowable by
the critic.

Of course, that which is ethical is that

with which we agree, and which is consistent with our
perception of both truth and reality.

McBurney and Wrage

contend that this involves the critic in a hopeless confusion between ethics and rhetoric.

However, Aristotle

felt that the speakers character was the most potent of
all means of persuasion.

Indeed, his Ethics preceded his

Rhetoric for the very reason that he sought to establish
beforehand the character required of a rhetorician.
McBurney and Wrage continue:
Good men are not nessarily good speakers,
and bad men are not necessarily poor
speakers. We believe most emphatically
that goodness in a speaker works in his

15

behalf, and we prefer to see competence
in speech bestowed upon good men. But
neither of these positions justifies
the blind equating of good motives and
good speech.18
The Artistic theory, according to McBurney and Wrage,
is the only adequate means for judging effective speech.
The Artistic theory holds that speech
is an art reducible to principles • •
•• The opening lines of Aristotle's
Rhetoric identify speech as an art and
suggest the feasibility of formulating
the principles of the art: 'Everybody
makes some use of speech; all make attempts to sift or support the theses,
and to defend or attack persons.
Most people do so, of course, quite
either at random, or else merely
with a knack acquired from practice.
Success in either way being possible,
the random impulse and the acquired
facility alike evince the feasibility
of reducing the processes to a method;
for when the practiced and the
spontaneous speaker gain their end,
it is possible to investigate the
cause of their success; and such inquiry, we shall all admit, performs the
function of an art'. The speaker seeks
a response, and the nature of that response and our assessment of it do not
alter this fundamental fact; nor do the
methods the speaker uses or our assessment of these methods alter this basic
fact. • • • The Artistic theory differs
from the Results theory in one crucial
respect; it does not judge a speech by
its results • • • • The Results theory
ignores the very important and easily
demonstrable fact that factors other
than the speech are always operating
along with the speech to influence the
outcome.19
All this has been said because, in the end, we too,
must have some criteria for judging the Open Convention
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Movement as a rhetorical entity.

We have proposed a rhe-

torical analysis of this specific political movement, so
it behooves us to clarify our standard of judgment.

While

it may be possible to agree with McBurney and Wrage in
that establishing Results as the sole basis for judging
rhetorical effectiveness ignores other factors operating
upon the situation, we are a results-oriented society.
Also, our definition of Rhetoric as discourse designed to
appeal to the highest nature of man, presupposes that
Truth (as it can be known) will be of primary importance
to the Speaker, who should ideally exemplify Aristotle's
Ethical Man.

Therefore, while McBurney and Wrage discount

all but the Artistic theory, we shall use all four of
these, in balance, as we consider the rhetorical effectiveness of the Open Convention Movement.
Having proffered our own definition of the term Rhetoric, and having considered for a moment our criteria for
judging the effectiveness of the rhetoric engaged in by the
Open Convention Movement, we must now ask ourselves, What
exactly is a Movement?

Griffin illustrates the term this

way:
historical movement has occurred
when, at some time, 1. men have become dissatisfied with some aspect
of their environment; 2. they desire
change - social, economic, political,
religious, intellectual or otherwise
- and desiring change they make efforts
to alter their environment; and 3.

An
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eventually their efforts result in
some degree of success or failure;
the desired change is or is not
effected, and we say that an historical movement has come to its

termination.20
Inherent within this illustration is the premise of conflict - on however grand or limited a scale.

This premise

is carried another step forward by Cathcart, who considers
the creation of dialectical tension as essential, for his
perception is one of a conflict model of society, as
opposed to a consensus model.

Cathcart attempts to define

Movements rhetorically by presenting, on the one hand, one
or more "actors" who, perceiving that the "good order" is
in reality a faulty order, full of injustice and absurdity,
cry out through symbolic acts for immediate salvation.
On the one hand, there is a reciprocating act from the establishment which perceives these
calls from the agitators, not as
calls for corrections, but as
direct attacks on the foundation
of the established order. It is
this reciprocity, or dialectical
enjoinment in the moral arena,
which defines movements.21
This reciprocity is predicated on conflict, even more
heavily than the Griffin illustration, for Cathcart
presupposes a society in constant flux and social opposition.

As Cathcart develops his thesis it becomes

necessary to accept a society where conflict is the norm,
whereas Griff in presents a societal picture which paints
movements as arising in response to a specific, given
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conflict - not a norm, but an occurence.

However, for our

purposes, both serve to clarify how social movements arise,
and how they function.

Therefore, we may define a Movement

as a group of persons drawn together in response to a particular crisis, be it social, political, economic, or
religious, who attempt to alter their environment through
symbolic acts.
Ideally then, we might synthesize these two so that
Movement Rhetoric may be said to be the creation of discourse by persons drawn together in response to a particular crisis, designed to appeal to the highest nature of
man, in an attempt to alter their environment and arrive
at a consensus in settlement of their perceived needs.
This presumes an ideal situation, to be sure.

However,

just as Aristotle presented his thesis on Rhetoric based
upon conclusions and assumptions in his Ethics, so this
definition is rendered upon certain assumptions.

One of

these assumptions is that truth and virtue ultimately
triumph over deceit and evil.

Therefore, one need not

conform to this ideal definition in order "to do" movement rhetoric, but the greatest value and the most profound results

will be achieved when the definition is

personified.
Unlike rhetorical studies which focus upon an individual speaker, the analysis of a social movement
presents some unique difficulties.

By dealing with a
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multiplicity of speakers, it may be troublesome to discern
rhetorical intentions, for while the general goals of a
movement may be clear, individual personalities, personal
ambition, and speaking style may combine to cloud the
picture of a movement, as a whole.

Estimating the effects

of a particular message must be done in the light of a
multiple public--members as well as leaders, sympathizers
as well as opponents, the organized bureaucracy as well
as society, as a whole.

Internalized goals must be re-

cognized and dealt with apart from the more obvious external ones, for a:
major rhetorical process (for the
leadership of a movement) consists
of legitimizing the privately-held
feelings (of anxiety, hostility,
and wish-fulfillment) of its members
which they cannot say to others or
even themselves.22
This last consideration must not exclude the very deepest
internal goals of any movement, for "the ideology presented
to the mass of followers is a 'mask' for the real beliefs
of the inner core.

Its real ideology is hidden from all

but the initiated." 23

Our further investigation of the

Open Convention Movement will illuminate the significance
of these deeper, internal goals.

Finally, the effects of

the mass media upon a movement must be borne in mind.
Obviously, the effects of media represent a study in itself, which we shall not attempt to do here, yet the
significance of the media must be acknowledged.
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The Movement
As we address our attention to the Open Convention
Movement in particular, certain questions must be considered.

When and why did it arise?

What makes it unique?

Who was involved, and how did they operate rhetorically?
First of all, it must be remembered that the Open Convention Movement was a political movement which sprang up in
the Spring of 1980, as the Democratic Party moved toward
New York's Madison Square Garden and their selection of a
Presidential candidate.

Incumbent President James Earl

"Jimmy" Carter had won considerable support in the early
primaries, inspite of challenges by Massachusetts Senator
Edward "Ted" Kennedy and California Governor Jerry Brown.
Early in the primary race, Senator Kennedy called for an
open convention, in which delegates would be free to
abstain from casting their vote on the first ballot, thus
freeing them on subsequent ballots to vote for whichever
candidate they currently preferred.
The President's supporters had initiated Proposed
Rule F(3) (C), a 77-word resolution which would require all
delegates to the National Convention to vote, on the first
ballot, for the candidate whom they represented in their
home primaries.
However, President Carter's popularity was in serious
decline.

Conventional wisdom attributed the cause to the

Iranian crisis, where fifty-two American hostages were
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being held in captivity by the Ayatollah Khomeini, and the
Billy Carter affair, in which the President's brother was
under Senate investigation for having accepted more than
$200,000 from Libya's Khaddafi.

Carter was perceived as in-

capable of handling domestic economic problems.

For what-

ever reasons, President Carter's popularity dipped dramatically in opinion polls.

Indeed, one poll by Lou Harris

found Reagan leading in California by 51%, with independent
candidate John Anderson drawing 23%, while Jimmy Carter
gathered only 21%. 24 This decline began slowly, after the
first of the year, and continued through the end of the
primaries in early June.

Senator Kennedy told advisers he

was confident that public acceptance would continue to
decline, thus forcing the Democratic Party to find a
winnable alternative in order to avert political disaster.
It was this climate that spawned the Open Convention Movement, and in the course of approximately five months a
highly vocal collection of political dissidents waged a
rhetorical war to defeat Proposed Rule F(3) (C).

For five

months the battle would be fought, and while this was a
rather short-lived moment, the time demands placed upon
the dissenters, as well as the defenders of the President
and Proposed Rule F(3) (C), served to create a sense of
urgency which produced a great diversity of public rhetoric.
The Open Convention Movement is unique on several
counts.

As we have already mentioned, it was rather short-
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lived, by most standards of measurement.

Also, it had a

specific, predetermined termination date; namely, August
11th, 1980.

This was the date on which delegates to the

Convention would vote on whether or not they would support
Proposed Rule F(3) (C), thus binding themselves on the first
ballot and insuring the renomination of Jimmy Carter, who
had gathered more than the required 1,666 delegates during
the primaries.
It is also unique in that it developed rather slowly,
over a period of four months, while Griffin has noted that
movements most often are born at the movement of a rhetorical crisis (as, for example, the vast swelling of ranks of
the womens' movement after the arrest of Margaret Sanger).
However, the "offical birth" of the Open Convention Movement was heralded by approximately 40 Congressmen on July
25th, 1980, less than three weeks before its final hour.
Of course, the spirit of the movement had existed for some
months prior to July 25, with Senator Kennedy calling for
delegate abstentions on the first ballot as early as March
20, 1980.
Also, unlike most movements, which seek public support and often encourage mass participation (i.e., the
anti-Nuclear movement, the Nuclear-freeze movement, etc.),
the Open Convention Movement was rather elitist.

It con-

sisted of a handful of political mavericks who neither
_sought nor encouraged large scale participation, but
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rather sought to use existing public sentiment to sway the
opinions and allegiance of some three thousand Democratic
National delegates.

It was these delegates who would vote,

on August 11th, on the fate of Proposed Rule F(3) (C), and
it was these delegates that were the target group of these
political dissidents.
If we are to analyze the rhetoric of the Open Convention Movement, it is critically important that we understand "who" it is that makes up this movement.

In the

narrowest sense, of course, the 40 Democratic Congressmen
who spoke out on July 25th constitute the "body of believers" known as the Open Convention Movement.

These

would include Representatives Thomas J. Downey, Michael
D. Barnes, Toby Moffett, Fortney H. Stark, Jerome A. Ambro,
and Timothy E. Wirth, among others.

However, if we con-

sider that the primary goal of the Open Convention Movement
was the defeat of Proposed Rule F(3) (C), and secondarily
to provide an alternative candidate in lieu of the renomination of Jimmy Carter, then one must recognize that
this small band of politicians represent too narrow a
framework to constitute the entire movement.

Indeed, their

offical proclamation of intent, which gave formal recognition to the Committee to Maintain An Open Convention,
came less than three weeks prior to its most critical hour.
But what of others involved in the spirit of the movement?
Senator Kennedy was not only an early opponent of
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President Carter in the primaries but, as mentioned
earlier, had on March 20th called for delegate abstentions.
As he pursued the nomination, he also continued to press
for an open convention policy.

Meanwhile, on May 5th,

1980, Governor Hugh Carey of New York also called for an
open convention, and was to become the unofficial voice
of this challenge.

Edward Bennett Williams, celebrated

Washington attorney and owner of the Baltimore Orioles
baseball franchise, became the official chairman of the
Open Convention Movement on July 31, 1980.

Senator Robert

Byrd of West Virginia, himself a Carter supporter, also
called for an open convention.

Mayor Ed Koch of New York

City, also a Carter supporter, called for an open conven.
.
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on severa 1 occasions.
t ion

Governor Richard Lamm of

Colorado also publicly espoused the open convention concept, as did William Lemieux, an aide to Senator Henry
"Scoop" Jackson of Washington.

It is proposed that each

of these individuals, who gave voice to their support for
the intent and spirit of the movement, were as much
"members" as the forty who spoke out on that July afternoon.

It was the public pronouncements of these political

personalities that gave weight and credence to the development of the movement, and hence their rhetoric, in speech
and interview, before large crowds or in front of the
television cameras, must certainly be a part of the total
rhetorical picture of the Open Convention Movement.
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DIRECTIONAL OVERVIEW
Having thus developed a definitional framework for

Rhetoric, Movements, and Movement Rhetoric, and having
briefly surveyed the historical backdrop of the Open
Convention Movement, we now turn our attention to the
method of analysis to be employed in this study.

As

mentioned earlier, this is Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic
Pentad.
Certainly our choice was not made because of some
paucity of alternatives.

Leland Griffin had begun, as

early as 1952, to espouse his method of literary-historical investigation, a method which for twenty-five years
was to prove to be one of the main avenues of analysis
used by rhetorical critics.

However, as of 1980, the

Central States Speech Association Journal devoted itself
entirely to newer, and more-oft used methods of analysis
for movement studies.

These included James Andrews

method of Historical Perspective, wherein he advocates
searching for the uniqueness of events in quest of what
"really happened", avoiding an a priori interpretation.
Charles Stewart advocates a Functional Approach, viewing
rhetoric as the primary agency through which social movements perform necessary functions to enable them to come
into existence, to meet opposition, and to make efforts
at bringing about change.

Herbert W. Simons advocates a
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Situational Approach, very similar in type to that of
Bitzer and Black.

Simons sees movements and non-movements

confronting very different types of situational pressures,
which therefore compel them to exhibit different patterns
of rhetoric.

Robert Cathcart has also developed his own

method of analysis, based on his Confrontational Approach
to society.

Cathcart differentiates social movements as

objective phenomena, as opposed to language constructs,
an argument advanced by Michael McGee, who seeks explanations of "movement" in rhetoric, as opposed to persuasion
in "allegedly" discrete and objective situations.

Hence,

what was once a field with limited availabilities of methods
has now exploded with a proliferation of ideas and philosophies, some quite distinct and opposite from one another.
Actually, the choice of method was arrived at because
of three reasons:

1.

its flexibility; 2.

its adapt-

ability, in light of our afore-mentioned definitions of
both Rhetoric and Movement; and 3.

its history as a preferred methodology in previous studies. 26
Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Pentad had been gaining

popularity since the early 1950's.
Burke's rhetorical philosophy evolved
through literary criticism into social
criticism, with the result that his
dramatistic pentad has a markedly
socio-psychological tone. His rejection
of Aristotelian rhetoric differs from
the General Semanticists in that he
builds on the Aristotelian philosophy and
extends its range.27

27

Burke finds rhetorical motives at work in a wide variety of
literary forms, and he asserts that their purpose is to induce identification between individuals and groups.

By

Identification, Burke means Unity.
Identification is affirmed with
earnestness precisely because
there is division. Identification
is compensatory to division. If
men were not apart from one another,
there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity.28
This is consistent with our premise of conflict as a catalyst of movement conception and propulsion; individuals
perceive a need not being met, or a threat not being addressed, and they respond symbolically to that perception
through group action.

Yet their ultimate goal is met in

Identification (unity), and the perceived ill is redressed
not in conquest but in consensus.
An individual does in actuality compete
with other individuals. But within the
rules of Symbolic, the individual is
treated merely as a self-subsistent unit
proclaiming its peculiar nature. It is
'at peace', in that its terms cooperate
in modifying one another. But insofar
as the individual is involved in conflict with other individuals or groups,
the study of this same individual would
fall under the head of Rhetoric • • • •
One would not scrutinize the concept of
Identification very sharply to see,
implied in it at every turn, its ironic
counterpart: division. Rhetoric is
concerned with the state of Babel after
the Fal1.29
Burke defines his own pentad when he says:
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In a rounded statement about motives,
you must have some word that names the
act (names what took place, in thought
or deed), and another names the· ·s·c·e:ne
(the background of the act, the situation in which it occurred); also,
you must indicate what person or kind
of person (agent) performed the act,
what means or instruments he used
(agency), and the purpose. Men may
violently disagree about the purposes
behind a given act, or about the
character of the person who did it,
or how he did it, or in what kind of
situation he acted; or they may even
insist upon totally different words
to name the act itself. But be that
as it may, any complete statement
about motives will offer some kind
of answers to these five questions:
what was done (act), when or where
it was done (scene), who did it (agent),
how he 3ijid it (agency), and why (purpose).
Strategy is another Burkean term meaning a method or
plan of attack, which is intended to serve as:
an aid to discovering what is going
on in the total situation surrounding
the event, or act, under scrutiny.
The rhetorical nature of the act is
derived from man's attempt to identify
with his fellows • • • • This identification is possible because man shares a
common substance. Their division from
one another is an aberration of their
essential nature, and it is in bridging
this division that rhetoric is born.31
It is significant in that strategy serves as a bridge as
certain relationships in the rhetorical picture are exarnined, seeking to influence the state, or level, of
Identification.
One of the significant virtues of Burke's system
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is its fluid character.

It should be emphasized that a

major strength of Burke's pentad is that it allows for
the exploration of relationships between the various
factors named by the terms.

For instance, as we consider

the Open Convention Movement, we could divide the subject
into five main categories:
1.

The Open Convention Movement may be dealt with
as the Act.

2.

The various speakers may be dealt with as the
Agents.

3.

The various speeches/interviews/articles of
the speakers as the Ag·e·ncies.

4.

The Democratic National Convention (historically
and in the present) as the Scene.

5.

Opposition to Proposed Rule F(3) (C) as the
Purpose.

This division represents a very logical approach to
the analysis of material in light of the dramatistic
pentad.

However, it is also within the realm of possi-

bility to divide the categories as:

The Open Convention

Movement as Agency; the various speakers as the Agents;
the various speeches and interviews as the Act; the Democratic National Convention as the Scene; and Opposition
to Proposed Rule F(3) (C) as the Purpose.

The possibilities

might exceed these, certainly, but enough has been said to
demonstrate the flexibility, and therefore desirability,
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of Burke's method.

Further, one need not assume that to

define the categories by different labels would result in
different conclusions; rather, it would simply afford a
fresh perspective on the subject under consideration.

For

our purposes, the first division illustrated above shall
be used in this project as we seek to understand the
rhetoric of the Open Convention Movement.
METHODOLOGY
As we consider a methodological approach for this
study, three assumptions need to be stated, upon which
the structure of this study is constructed:
1.

Man creates his own reality through his
perceptions and reactions.

2.

Man acts with some purpose, consistent with
his subjective perception of reality.

3.

Man receives information from his environment selectively, and organizes it so as to
best fit his established perception of his
environment.

Methodologically, we have already established categories for study, and discussed those earlier in our consideration of Burke's pentad.

Of paramount importance

in a Burkean analysis are the concepts of Identification
(unity) and Strategy (methods).

Therefore, we shall expose

rhetorical strategies as they arise in the rhetoric of the
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spokespersons for the movement, determine the level of
Identification inherent among spokespersons for the movement, as well as the level of Identification among the
delegates, and determine the degree to which that Identification was enhanced by this rhetoric.
Fourteen representative samples of rhetoric have
been selected from the Open Convention Movement (specifically considered in Chapter Six), produced by eight
major spokespersons for the movement (specifically considered in Chapter Five) •

A review of these fourteen

samples provides seven identifiable rhetorical strategies,
as follows:
1.

The Strategy of Thwarting -- whereby Candidate
Carter is portrayed as beatable.

2.

The Strategy of Confrontation

whereby

President Carter is portrayed as incapable
of the demands of his office.
3.

The Strategy of Viability -- wherein alternate candidates are portrayed as acceptable.

4.

The Strategy of Unity -- wherein unity in
the Democratic Party is stressed.

5.

The Strategy of Precedence -- wherein
historical precedent and the Democratic
Party charter are cited in opposition to
the proposed rule.

6.

The Strategy of Principle -- wherein
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philosophical grounds are developed in
opposition to the proposed rule.
7.

The Strategy of Self-Esteem -- whereby
the delegates are asked to choose their
own roles within the Convention.

For example, nothing will be considered under the
Strategy of Thwarting except those remarks which actually
depict President Carter as being "beatable", either by
another Democratic nominee or the Republican challenger
(i.e. Senator Kennedy, referring to Federal budget deficits faced by officials, said, "Somehow they always
manage to close the gap, which is exactly what I intend
to do."}.

For the Strategy of Confrontation, only those

remarks which attack the administrative credibility of
Jimmy Carter will be considered (i.e., Governor Carey
listing categorically high interest rates, lay-offs, the
housing slump, skyrocketing inflation and general unemployment as the Carter legacy).

The Strategy of Vi-

ability will consider only those remarks which promote
the candidacy of a Democrat other than Jinnny Carter
(i.e., Representative Barnes said, "Jimmy Carter couldn't
beat Reagan today • • • • But I think there are other
candidates who could win much more readily.
like Muskie.

Some people like Mondale.").

Some people
The Strategy

of Unity will·deal exclusively with rhetoric directed at
maintaining or increasing Democratic Party unity (i.e.,
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Governor Grasso saying that Jimmy Carter should release
his delegates "in the interest of party unity.").

The

Strategy of Precedence will consider only that rhetoric
which refers to either historical precedent from past conventions, or to the then-current Democratic Party charter
(Albert Shanker said that "The Conunission on party rules
found a rich history of 'bound' delegates switching
their votes and of nominating conventions recognizing that
right.")

The Strategy of Principle will rest on philos-

ophical arguments against the binding of delegates (i.e.,
Albert Shanker, drawing on the illustration of Sir Edmund
Burke, who said, "Your representative owes you, not his
industry only, but his judgment, and he betrays instead
of serving if he sacrifices it to your opinion.").

Finally,

the Strategy of Self-Esteem will consider only those arguments which demand a choice of roles from the delegates
(i.e., Edward Bennett Williams argued that the proposed
rule would reduce the delegates to "nothing more than
robots or automatons.").
The proposed seven rhetorical strategies did not
"appear" but seemed rather to emerge after continued exposure to the various rhetorical products of the Open
Convention Movement, and while they are not "etched in
stone", they should serve to organize the material in a
logical and thorough manner.
One of our stated purposes is to determine whether
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any rhetorical themes repeat themselves within movement
rhetoric.

By "rhetorical theme" we mean recurring topics

or arguments which are evident within the rhetoric of the
movement.

At first glance this would seem to be an in-

vestigation into what was said repeatedly by the spokespersons of the movement, as opposed to "rhetorical strategies" which seek to categorize the rhetorical choices presented by the spokespersons.

In practice the two terms

overlap one another, defying discreteness.

As an example

of rhetorical strategies, the Strategy of Unity was employed by spokespersons in an effort to maintain Party cohesion.

Governor Grasso sought to avoid a political blood-

bath, while Senator Byrd asserted the President could have
a stronger vote of confidence by opening the convention
and uniting the delegates around the strongest candidate.
The Strategy of Unity was manifested as a theme in a
number of addresses illustrated, as when both Grasso and
Byrd were cited once again, and their remarks presented
as evidence of rhetoric which is repeated within the movement.

This is not contradictory, but rather is representa-

tive of the unique rhetorical situation in which the Open
Convention Movement existed.
The speeches and interviews considered in Chapter
Six will be dealt with as repositories of data.

By "data"

we mean information and/or details contained within the
rhetoric.

Therefore, each rhetorical sample will be
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analyzed to see what themes recur, or are common among them,
as well as what themes are unique.
Also, our purpose is to determine whether or not
Identification was possible in this context.

As we con-

sider these repositories of data in Chapter Six, we shall
ask what information was presented that was divergent and
unique.

This would include rhetoric which did not fall

within the prescription of the afore-stated rhetorical
strategies (i.e., as Governor Carey's call for a national
primary).

We shall also dissect the rhetoric according to

the strategies outlined, determining which avenues were
most often used by the spokespersons, and what rhetorical
themes, if any, repeat themselves.
In Chapter Five, as we consider the eight spokespersons for the movement, we shall identify them based
upon criteria established by this writer, as well as that
mandated by the media.

Personal goals of the spokespersons

shall be examined, as well as allegiances which they formed.
This examination will help to reveal how the spokespersons
viewed their roles within the movement.

In addition, it

will form the basis for a determination as to whether any
significant rhetors arose within the movement, and what
influence, if any, they exerted.
In Chapter Four, we will have considered the multipleaudience aspect, investigating its composition, and the
level of Identification inherent among the delegates.

This
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level shall be divided into the categories of Low, Moderate, or High.

By "Low" we mean less than approximately

thirty percent of the measured group; by "Moderate" we
mean something in excess of thirty percent but not exceeding
approximately seventy percent; by "High" we mean anything
in excess of seventy percent.

These categories are, by

their very nature, somewhat arbitrary, as statistical
sampling was not attempted.

More often random inquiries

were made, with inferences drawn from these inquiries, and
hence we have had to approximate our percentage ranges.
The work in Chapter Four will be related to Chapter
Three, in which we will have investigated the Open Convention Movement, as an entity, to understand its purpose,
composition, and level of Identification inherent among its
participants.

This will be done by tracing the development

of the movement, considering its constituent make-up, and
considering the effect which the mass media had upon the
movement.
In contrast to the Strategies, designed to enhance
Identification, we will consider factors which might have
been operative in precluding Identification.

For instance,

if Identification is compensatory to division, as Burke
stated, how was this division manifest?

To what degree

were the various audiences addressed homogeneous?

Was the

media, as a medium, helpful to the goals of the movement,
or harmful?
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With respect to the rhetorical situation, the effect
of the rhetors will be examined in light of inunediate and
long-range consequences.

This will be done by first as-

sessing whether the goal of the movement was attained,
estimating the future effects on up-coming conventions, as
well as considering the role of delegates at future
national conventions.

Judgment will be rendered as to the

level of Identification attained at the conclusion of the
movement.

This, combined with the Results, Ethical, Truth,

and Artistic theories of McBurney and Wrage, will provide
a set of criteria for judging the effectiveness of the
rhetors.
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CHAPTER II
THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTIONS
"It is an inhuman spectacle.

If the Democratic Con-

vention were a fight, it would long ago have been stopped
by a referee. 111

And so it was, after 17 days and 103

ballots, that the delegates to the Democratic National
Convention finally selected a presidential candidate.

It

was 1924, and Democratic delegates were meeting in New York
for the first time since 1868.

After they slugged their

way through the longest national political convention in
American history, it would be fifty-two years before they
would return to New York in 1976.

They would at that time

nominate Jimmy Carter, the only winner they have ever
chosen in New York.
In this chapter, we will sample the Democratic Conventions of 1924, 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972 in order to
gain a flavor for the typical character and workings of
previous Conventions.

Certainly other Conventions might

also shed some light on the traditions and history of
Democratic Presidential selections, but these were chosen
as typifying previous assemblies.

We shall also look at

the 1980 Democratic Presidential primaries and the campaigns leading up to the Convention, and consider the

42
Open Convention Movement, especially the origin of terms,
demographics of participants, and the rationale behind the
movement.
The Convention of 1924
On the second day of the debacle of 1924:
antagonisms had already reached the point
where the 13,000 gallery spectators (at
Madison Square Garden) were spitting on
delegates, who were screaming, jeering,
and waving their fists at one another.
And the balloting had not yet begun.2
The delegates arrived during a torrid heat wave, while
anti-Prohibitionists were fighting pro-Prohibitionists,
Catholics were fighting Protestants, city folk were
fighting country folk, and one thousand policemen were
needed to calm the furor between pro-and-anti Ku Klux Klan
supporters.
Will Rogers, reporting for the New York Times and
other newspapers, commented:
There is a society in this town that stops
us when we abuse or unnecessarily annoy a
bucking horse or wild steer • • • • Now
why in the world don't they get busy and
protect a delegate? No trained animal
was ever tortured like these delegates.3
On the 12th day, on the 78th ballot, Cordell Hull, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, fainted from the
heat, was revived, and then fainted again.

At one point,

a motion was made to adjourn, wait two weeks and begin the
process again in Kansas City, but this, too, was defeated.
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Finally, after 17 days, John W. Davis of West Virginia,
a former ambassador to Great Britain, was nominated--to
run against Calvin Coolidge.

Thus it was that the Con-

vention of 1924 slipped into the pages of political history.
The National Convention has two primary purposes:
a.) the construction of a national party platform, and b.)
the selection of a presidential team to carry this platform
to the general populace.

The candidate is supposed to

"sell" himself to the people, sometimes by emphasizing the
platform, at other times ignoring it (if it is felt to be
too controversial, or too much at variance with the candidates own political philosophy).

Never is the candidate

for President or Vice-President supposed to openly defy or
publicly repudiate the specific content of the platform.
This policy represents a consensus of delegate opinion on
issues of significant national importance, and hence, to
reject the platform is to reject the unified concerns of
Democrats, nationally.

Practically, however, a national

convention is one means of stroking and rewarding faithful precinct and state-level political workers--often a
high time, where the spirit of the movement can sometimes
obscure the sense of a mission.
Theodore H. White, writing in his The Making of the
President, 1960, drew a picture of the general character
of conventions when he said:
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Every convention is a universe in itself,
with its own strange centers of gravity,
its own fresh heroes and fools, its own
resolution of pressures and forces, its

own irrecapturable mood of stage and
place • • • • A convention is usually
made up of older, if not wiser, men than
the common voters who send them there.
In most states, delegates are chosen by
party leadership to honor long-time
trusted servants of the party; or from
men of eminence in culture, diplomacy
or the professions, who can give the
luster of their achievement and their
names to the delegation; or, particularly
in the organization-controlled states,
very heavily from those who contribute
the big money to campaign chests and now
crave the honorable symbol of a delegate
4
badge and the sense of high participation.
The Convention of 1960
The 1960 Democratic National Convention met in Los
Angeles, and unlike most conventions that huddle delegates
together in closely-clustered hotels, the 1960 delegates
were scattered across the breadth of Los Angeles.

They

were also divided on the relationship of white to black,
Protestant to Catholic, and on the issue of trust.
What manner of man should be selected to
lead the country? What kind of personality
might best straddle the past and turn to
face the future?S
By the time the delegates reached the floor of the Convention, the two primary combatants stood ready, their army
of strategists having organized, caucused, projected and
cajoled.

The Kennedy forces verses the Stevenson forces--

the young minds in contest against the political machine.

45
In the end, the final tally was Senator John Kennedy 806;
Senator Lyndon Johnson, 409; Stuart Symington, 86; and
Adlai Stevenson

79~.

Kennedy had controlled the big-city

bosses, and it was these who secured for him the nomination
after a last-ditch, Stevenson surge.

It was Mayor's Daley

(Chicago) , Wagner (New York) , Green (Philadelphia) and
McCormack (Boston), as well as Governor's Harriman (New
York), DiSalle (Ohio), and Williams (Michigan) that held
the Kennedy delegate strength together and secured for him
the Democratic nomination.

Stevenson had sought an "open"

convention, where the Kennedy delegates could abstain
during the first ballot and then "vote their conscience"
thereafter. 6
The packing of the galleries by the
Stevensonians was the result of sharp,
well-planned organization. They had
been allotted, prior to the Convention,
only thirty-five tickets • • • (however),
first they solicited all members of the
750 Club (a Democratic money-raising
device which promised two tickets to each
contributor of $1,000) for their unwanted
tickets and thus collected 1,000 free
tickets; next, they pressed their friends
on the host conunittee of the California
Democratic Party • • • finally, learning
that the Kennedy organizers expected to
draw 2,500 tickets • • • they lined their
own people up at the special distribution
lines for these tickets, pinned on them
large KENNEDY buttons, and claimed from
the ear-marked Kennedy supply an estimated
1,500 tickets as their own. The Stevenson
people thus, on the night of the Convention's
nomination, were in possession of almost
4,000 tickets to pack the galleries, which
they did with lusty delight.7
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Thus, as Eugene McCarthy pleaded for Stevenson's
nomination by crying:

"Do not reject this man; do not re-

ject this man who has made us all proud to be Democrats.
Do not leave this prophet without honor in his own party, 118
the spectators spilled out of the galleries chanting WE
WANT STEVENSON.

Gold balloons fell from the ceiling, and

banners and standards waved from the floor.

Still, the

party bosses held their delegates in check, and when the
balloting began, Kennedy won on the first roll-call.
The Convention of 1964
The political realities of 1964 were entirely different from those of 1960.

While Kennedy and Stevenson

had to contend with an incumbent Republican President,
Lyndon Baines Johnson pulled all the political strings
at Atlantic City in 1964.

The question was not, Who

would be the Democratic Presidential candidate, but rather,
Who would be the Vice-Presidential candidate.

This is

where the drama unfolded, especially in light of the two
premiere political personalities of the time; namely,
Lyndon Johnson and Robert Kennedy.
Robert Kennedy had suffered a great personal loss
with the assassination of President John Kennedy in Dallas.
Robert Kennedy, who loved his brother
more than he loved himself, saw John
F. Kennedy, even while alive, as more
than a person--as the flag of a cause.
His brother was for him not only the
occasion of brotherly love, but a new

47
departure in American purpose. Unspoken
in any conversation with Robert Kennedy
was the feeling that the old order had
passed • • • impatient, strong-willed,
he even more sharply than his brother
expressed the single-minded clarity
with which young people see things .
• For him, Lyndon Johnson was all
the yesterdays; for him, Lyndon Johnson
was his father's generation. And when
Lyndon Johnson becamse President, all
the yesterdays were restored.9
There seemingly were other aggravations between the
two personalities--Johnson's desire to accompany the casket of John F. Kennedy from the plane which carried the
slain president from Dallas to Washington rankled the
Kennedy's; Robert Kennedy confronted the new President on
this issue, insisting this was a moment of personal grief
and not political purpose; Kennedy traveled to Southeast
Asia on a fact-finding tour for Johnson, but on his return
was required to brief a clutch of Congressmen in the
President's presence; Kennedy's "Long Ranger" activities
as Attorney General, when he ignored Johnson and failed
to seek his advice or political savvy, embittered Johnson. 10
From a political perspective, a Presidential candidate has several considerations when choosing a runningmate:

regional balance; religious balance; appeal to

particular groups (i.e., labor, Blacks, etc.); and, executive ability.

Because of the impossibility of uniting

the Kennedy and Johnson personae, the President sought
someone to balance the ticket, in light of the Goldwater
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Republican nomination, and Black riots in numerous cities.
President Johnson was an avid follower of polls--so much
so that he commissioned Oliver Quayle and Company to conduct nationwide surveys.

The more he read, the more con-

f ident he became--no matter whom he chose as a Vice-

Presidential running-mate, the polls fluctuated less than
two percent. 11
But most of all Lyndon Johnson learned
from the polls, which became his favorite
reading material by June, that he was completely free to choose as Vice-President
any running mate he fancied • • • • Theoretically free, as any President always
is, to impose his own man as Vice-President,
he was politically free, too.12
For almost thirty days prior to that late August day in
Atlantic City, however, Johnson had almost settled his
mind on the matter - he left himself only the smallest
room for reconsideration, should the political tides recede.

They did not, however, and Johnson chose Hubert

H. Humphrey of Minnesota to join the ticket.
The Convention of 1968
'Extremism in the defense of liberty is
no.vice; moderation in the pursuit of
justice is no virtue'--a theme first
advanced by Barry Goldwater at the
Republican convention of 1964 and
adopted as their own, at the Democratic
Convention of 1968, by the rioters and
the police who responded to them. Chicago
of 1968 will pass into history as far more
than the site of the Democratic Convention
• • • it became the title of an episode,
like Waterloo, or Versailles, or Munich.
At Chicago, for the first time, the most
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delicate process of American politics was
ruptured by violence, the selection of
Presidents stained with blood. 1968,
throughout, was a year in which the
ghosts of America's past returned to

haunt the present: but at Chicago the

goblins of America's future first appeared to haunt tomorrow.13

It had been Lyndon Johnson's decision to make, and
it was he who opted to honor Chicago, and Mayor Richard
Daley, by staging the 1968 convention in the "Second
City".
The death of Robert F. Kennedy had
propelled McCarthy to center stage
as the only real alternative to
Hubert Humphrey for the Democratic
candidacy. Politically a new crest
of popularity had carried McCarthy
forward since June. A massive shift
of loyalties had swept toward him,
by every polling index • • • • He
had scored astoundingly well in the
New York Democratic primaries two
weeks after Kennedy's death • • •
yet the candidate seemed uncomfortable
in his growing prominence--and as the
convention approached, his b~havior
grew more and more erratic.l
So much so that, only two weeks prior to the convention,
Senator George McGovern of South Dakota announced his
candidacy for the nomination.

Thus he joined both Hubert

Humphrey and Eugene McCarthy, as the delegates began to
gather in the wake of the assassination of Robert Kennedy,
to joust for the title of Candidate.

Vietnam, the issue

of Civil Rights, and Law and Order, provided the backdrop.
Major Daley and his crew of 11,900 Chicago police, backed
by 300 Cook County riot-squad members, backed by 7,500
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men of the Illinois National Guard, provided the security.
The media, however, provided the mood.
Their mood, their spirit was to color al-

most all that America, including the arriving
delegates, would see of the grand gathering.
And the mood of the television men was bitter
to begin with--for they were artists, in an
art as esoteric as that of a conunander-at-hisbridge of an aircraft carrier • • • and they
were not permitted to practice it.15
The sophisticated electronics which enabled them to communicate the anticipated convention happenings had been
crippled because of striking telephone workers.

Therefore,

old-fashioned cameras using cumbersome video-tape was to
be used, but this required transport to the networks downtown affiliates, and the police were ordered to arrest
speeding couriers; cameramen were forbidden to occupy
sidewalks; the networks toyed with the idea of flying film
by

over traffic to the transmission point, but
this, too, was forbidden. 16
hel~copter

President Johnson had, as early as March, withdrawn
himself from consideration as a candidate.

Hubert Horatio

Humphrey, as Vice-President, stepped forward to carry the
standard, inspite of having fallen from grace in the eyes
of Northern liberals because of his association with the
Johnson Administration.

It was rumored that Johnson might

indeed step before the Convention and seek the nomination
for himself, however, because by late-July he doubted
Humphrey's presidential caliber, and because he believed

51

he could beat Richard M. Nixon in the Fall.

Just prior to

the convention, rumors were started by some McCarthy
staffers that Humphrey was running 20 points behind Nixon
in the polls. 17

However, when Johnson learned that the

latest Harris poll had the President, Humphrey, and Mcearthy all trailing Richard Nixon by six points, any hope
he had for a draft was dashed.

In a phone conversation

with the President, Mr. Harris personally shared the results of this latest poll and,
at the other end of the phone came an expression of disappointment approaching
shock. Harris was asked what would be
the reaction to a personal Presidential
visit to the convention to attend the
sixtieth birthday party which Dick Daley
was planning for Johnson; Harris replied
that he felt the President might be booed;
and the conversation ended with an expression of the President's total incredulity.18
That same Monday evening, Yippies rioted in north
Chicago, while black city bus drivers went on strike.

The

New York and California delegations, relegated to two
back corners of the Convention hall by Mayor Daley's
design, clamored for a draft-Kennedy movement (Edward.
Moore "Ted" Kennedy, that is).

On Tuesday, a television

reporter named Dan Rather was physically beaten to the
floor by a security agent; "The television networks will
avenge him by spending their wrath on every security agent,
every policeman, from now until the end of the convention."19

Rioting spread to the central city, and dele-
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gates inside the Convention hall kept challenging the
credentials of other delegates, especially from the South,
which resulted in a brawl among several Georgia delegates.
Leaders of the Southern delegations began to collect their
power and realign themselves behind Hubert Humphrey, in an
"Anybody-but-Kennedy" move.

On Wednesday, the Vietnam

peace plank was defeated, while the California and New
York delegates stood on their chairs to sing "We shall
overcome

. . ." .

Finally, the rioting began on Michigan

Avenue - with bottles bursting, tear gas cannisters exploding, trash containers thrown into the streets, and
barricades being used by police as battering rams.

The

crowd had included Yippies (members of the Youth International Party) as well as peace-demonstrators, McCarthy
supporters, and hangers-on, though they were controlled
by the National Mobilization Committee To End The War, and
its director, David Dellinger.

The police had moved on

them, along with the Illinois National Guard, under orders
of the Mayor to protect the campaign headquarters of the
candidates.

From his hotel suite, Humphrey watched as

his name was placed in nomination and seconded, and then
as video-tape replays recaptured the bloodshed in the
streets.

Humphrey was congratulated by phone, first by

President Johnson, and then by Richard Nixon, after he
was nominated on the first ballot.
retrospect:

But he said, in

"I was a victim of that convention ••
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Chicago was a catastrophe.

My wife and I went home broken-

hearted, battered and beaten. 1120

The bloody skirmishes

left behind a bitter legacy, and the 12 states which Hubert
Humphrey carried in the November general elections were
far from enough to secure for him the off ice he so dearly
sought.
The Convention of 1972
Miami was home to the 1972 Democratic National Convention, as Republican President Richard Nixon sat in
power at the White House.

This was to be the Convention

of Reform - and Watergate.

Still, in order to avoid the

rigged appearance of another Chicago, reform was felt to
be the only remedy for the Democrats.

Chicago Sun-Times

columnist Mike Royko wrote an open letter to reform leader
Alderman William Singer:
I just don't see where your delegation
is representative of Chicago's Democrats.
And that is what this thing is really all
about • • • • About half of your delegates
are women. About a third of your delegates
are black. Many of them are young people.
You even have a few Latin Americans. But
as I looked over the names of your delegates, I saw something peculiar • • •
there's only one Italian there • • • and
only three of your 59 have Polish names
• • • your reforms have disenfranchised
Chicago's white ethnic Democrats, which
is a strange reform • • • • Anybody who
would reform Chicago's Democratic Party
by dropping the white ethnic would probably begin a diet by shooting himself
in the stomach.21
The typical delegate was no longer a white, Anglo-
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Saxon Protestant, of middle-age (or above) who had been
hand-picked by party officials.
blacks and youth prevailed.

For in 1972, women,

For instance, in 1968 there

were only 2.6 per cent of the delegates under the age of
30, 5.5 per cent black, and 13 per cent women.

In 1972,

there were 23 per cent of the delegates under the age of
30, 15 per cent black, and 39 per cent women. 22 These
were the delegates who were to choose a candidate from
amongst the likes of:

George McGovern of South Dakota;

Ted Kennedy; Hubert Humphrey; Edmund Muskie of Maine;
Shirley Chisholm; and Senator Henry Jackson of Washington.
But 1972 was the Convention of Reforms and rules, and
George McGovern pulled the strings, and manipulated the
rules, so that by the time the balloting began, Kennedy,
Muskie and Humphrey had already withdrawn their names from
.
23
consi'd eration.

However, unlike Kennedy and Johnson, who

used their staffs and exploited all of their talents, Frank
Mankiewiez, Rick Stearns and Gary Hart controlled the
McGovern operation.

It was they who decided to abandon

the women's cause on the South Carolina floor fight, inspite of direct assurances by McGovern that he would support the Women's Political Caucus.

And it was a consensus

opinion that chose Senator Thomas Eagleton of Missouri as
the Vice-Presidential running mate.

And it was a con-

sensus opinion that ushered Lawrence O'Brien out as
National Chairman and set the stage for a delegate re-
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jection of Pierre Salinger as Vice-Chairman, in favor of
two political unknowns.

Thus, George McGovern purged the

Democratic Party and established a new order, but in doing
so isolated himself from the old, established order, as
well as voters who conceived of the Democratic Party as
the party of the common man.

Historically, McGovern

carried only two states in the general elections and received only 17 electoral votes, to 521 for Richard Nixon.
Revelations of Watergate, as unnecessary an escapade as
that may have been, would come later.
All these illustrations have been provided to enhance
historical awareness.

The Conventions of 1924, 1960, 1964,

1968, and 1972 lend insight into the character and innerworkings of previous conventions.
From the first U.S. political convention
held by the Anti-Masons in 1831, through
the 1950's, these gaudy, often raucous
gatherings served to unify various factors
within the parties. Differences in political philosophy were ironed out through
debate and compromise, often on the convention floor, sometimes in the proverbial
smoke-filled rooms • • • • In 1912, the
Democrats slugged it out through 46 ballots
before finally nominating Woodrow Wilson •
• • • The nomination by political primaries
is a new development. As recently as 1952,
the Democratic Convention rejected Senator
Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, even though
the coonskin-cap campaigner had won the most
primaries and came to the convention with
strong popular support. Not convinced that
Kefauver was the party's best choice, delegates turned instead to a man who had
entered no primaries--former Illinois Governor Adlai Stevenson.24
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Hence, the concept of an "open-convention" was the
political norm until most recent times.

The proliferation

of state primaries has allowed candidates the opportunity
to arrive at the convention site with the nomination
virtually guaranteed.

As a result, the primary loyalty

of most delegates today is not to a party, or its political
philosophy, but to a particular presidential aspirant.
After the bitterly contested nomination
of Hubert Humphrey in 1968, the Democratic
Party instituted a series of reforms that
encouraged states to rely increasingly on
primaries and caucuses. The goal was to
have the voters themselves determine the
nominee • • • "25
Nearly 30 states now have laws, or party rules, that require these delegates to remain faithful to their candidates; however, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that such
statutes are not binding on delegates to a national convention. 26

Therefore, in 1978, after the 1976 election

of Jimmy Carter, the Democratic National Committee passed
Rule 11 (H} , requiring any delegate pledged to a candidate
to vote for that candidate on the first ballot or be replaced by one who would.

In 1980, that rule was recast

as Proposed Rule F(3} (C}, and presented to the delegates
for their acceptance or rejection.
The 1980 Presidential Campaign
Having looked at some of the Democratic National
Conventions of the past, we have hopefully glimpsed some
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of its uniqueness, passion, and penchant for power-politics.
With that background established, we shall now survey the
1980 Presidential Campaign itself, primarily from the Democratic perspective.
As with most national campaigns for the past ten
years, the top domestic issue for 1980 was the Economy,
singularly captured by the term, Inflation.

It was this

issue that prompted Senator Edward "Ted" Kennedy of Massachusetts and Governor Edmund G. "Jerry" Brown, Jr., of
California to contest for the Democratic presidential
candidacy against President James Earl "Jimmy" Carter.

As

a past Governor of the State of Georgia, Jimmy Carter had
overwhelmed the post-Watergate delegates at the 1976 Convention in New York, easily capturing the nomination.
Governor Carter succeeded inspite of his lack of foreignpolicy experience, because these post-Watergate delegates
wanted more than anything else to be able to trust their
leader, and they perceived Carter as trustworthy.

Despite

this lack of foreign-policy experience, Jimmy Carter will
best be remembered for two issues related directly to
foreign-policy:

first, he was the architect of the Camp

David Accord, the first significant peace agreement between Israel and Egypt since biblical times; and secondly,
because of the seizure of 52 American hostages in Iran
who's leader, the Ayatollah Khomeini, defiantly rejected
all diplomatic efforts to secure their release.
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While it was the issue of inflation which brought
the two challengers into the political arena to do battle
with an incumbent President, it was the issue of the hostages which led to the "Rose Garden" policy.

By asserting

that his presence was required in Washington to formulate
an on-going response to the Iranian leaders, Jimmy Carter
remained at the White House; the Rose Garden became the
site of numerous, almost daily, press conferences.

Thus,

without going "on the stump", President Carter was able to
keep his name before the nation, and have it portrayed in
the light which best measures the Off ice of the President-as a leader.

This was to prove to be Ted Kennedy's greatest

frustration, for try as he would to draw Jinuny Carter out
of the White House and into public debate, he would fail
at every challenge.
In 1956, the main issue in the Eisenhower/Stevenson
campaign was the fear of war; in 1960, the issue before
Kennedy/Nixon was international relations; in 1964, the
issue before Johnson/Goldwater was still international
relations; by 1968, the issue between Nixon/Humphrey was
Vietnam; by 1972, however, the issue between Nixon/McGovern was Vietnam and inflation; and by 1976, the issue
before Carter/Ford was primarily inflation. 27 Obviously,
no political campaign is run on one issue alone, but the
above synthesis is meant to highlight the most conspicuous
issue before the candidates, as it reflects national con-
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cern.
The presidential campaign of 1980 was more difficult
to assess than most, owing to the plethora of presidential
hopefuls.

The Republican's started it all - Philip Crane

announced his candidacy on August 2, 1978, more than two
years before the actual elections.

He was joined by six

others, in due time - John Connally of Texas (who raised
$11 million on his own, and turned-down Federal matching
funds, while winning only one delegate in the primaries),
Robert Dole of Kansas, Howard Baker of Tennessee, George
Bush, John B. Anderson of Illinois (who, inspite of his
poor showing in Republican primaries, mounted his own
independent candidacy for the presidency) , and Ronald
Reagan, former governor of California.
The Republican's early primary battles were just
that - battles, for position and power, as well as votes.
However, by the conclusion of the primaries in June, five
of the Republican hopefuls had joined ranks behind Ronald
Reagan.

Surprisingly, and uncharacteristically, the Re-

publicans displayed a great deal of unity behind their
candidate, with John Anderson being the only holdout.
This made it possible for Reagan strategists to plan their
Fall agenda:

Connally would work for Reagan in Texas

(which Carter had won in the 1976 election), and with his
intimates in business and financial circles; Bush, a former
Texas congressman who beat Reagan in Massachusetts, Con-
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necticut and Pennsylvania and had a strong showing in Maine,
would work for Reagan in the Northeast; Howard Baker would
work in the cities of the Border states, where he was
particularly popular among blacks; Robert Dole would work
for Reagan among the farmers of the Mid-west and Plains
states; and Crane, a Congressman from the Chicago-area,
would work for Reagan among the industrial cities of the
Mid-west. 28

This was the battle-plan, and it was to work

as planned, because, unlike the Democrats, the Republicans
were able to maintain that element of unity.
Political polls have emerged as the divining-rod of
political health, measuring the strength of any candidate
at any given moment.

Lyndon Johnson virtually inhaled

them, and Jimmy Carter, as the newly-elected President in
1976, used them to his advantage in convincing a reluctant
Congress to accept his proposals, based upon his strong
showing in the polls.

By late 1979, however, President

Carter's popularity had begun to sag.
the challenger.

Pause.

Enter Ted Kennedy,

The Iranians attack the U.S.

Embassy in Teheran, seizing 52 American hostages.

Sud-

denly President Carter's position in the polls is
strengthened markedly.

Re-evaluate.

No longer threatened

by political erosion in the polls, the President, under
advice, decided not to campaign in the primaries, but to
remain at the White House "in the national interest",
placing himself and his office above mere politics.

Thus,
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the course of the primary campaign was altered immeasurably.
Eventually, with the continued belligerence of the Ayatollah
Khomeini, and the unsuccessful rescue attempt in the Iranian desert, Jinuny Carter's position in the polls began to
slide dramatically.

Unable to attack the President on the

sensitive issue of the hostage negotiations, Ted Kennedy,
in frustration, took to calling the President a clone of
Ronald Reagan, referring to his fiscal policies.
Kennedy declared that 'the first real
test' of the primary season would come
in January's Iowa caucuses. But
Kennedy's organization was no match for
Carter's, and he lost by a 2-to-l margin
• • • • The New Hampshire primary, the
nations first, was next, and though it
was in his own backyard, he lost. And
he continued to lose steadily--dropping
seventeen of the first nineteen contests
• • • • Kennedy's dismal streak culminated in a humiliating 2-to-l shellacking in the Illinois primary in March. 29
However, it was at this point that the Iranian situation
began to deteriorate and this, coupled with soaring inflation and increasing unemployment, brought about a
dramatic shift.

In the final ten weeks of the primary

ordeal, Kennedy beat the President nine times, including
four major races--New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and
California.
Governor Jerry Brown had also entered the primary
contests early, but had attracted only a small following
of support.

After a poor showing in the Wisconsin primary,

in which he had hoped to score highly, Brown withdrew his
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candidacy.

His presence was not to be felt during the

final ten weeks, when Carter's popularity diminished.
What had been, for all practical purposes, a two-man race
was now officially to be that way.
"'Not a victory for a candidate, but for a cause',
Kennedy scribbled in his notes the night he won the Penn"30
. primary.
.
sy 1 vania

Disenchantment with President

Carter's domestic and foreign policies caused a backlash
in the last weeks of the primaries, and as a result, many
Democrats chose to vote for Kennedy as a means of registering their discontent.

As will be seen later, these

were not so-much votes for Kennedy, as they were votes
against Carter.
Tuesday, June 3rd, 1980 was unofficially dubbed
"Super Tuesday"--the final eight primaries of the season
were held, and Kennedy won five of the contests, including
New Jersey, California, Rhode Island, New Mexico and South
Dakota, while Carter captured Ohio, West Virginia and
Montana.

Statistically the race was over at this point,

for the Ohio victory gave Jimmy Carter more than the
1,666 delegates needed for the nomination, but Kennedy
refused to accept the inevitable.

One reason for his

optimism was the fact that campaign monies continued to
arrive, even after Super Tuesday.

Kennedy, therefore,

vowed to "close the gap." 31
Technically, closing the gap meant dispatching two
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dozen delegate hunters, to contact unconunitted delegates.
Senator Kennedy also plans to spend long
hours on the telephone talking to Carter
delegates and unconunitted delegates • •
• 'We have to convince them that they're
not going to New York just to ratify an
earlier decision but to set an agenda
for the next four years and to pick someone who can carry it out.•32
They pursued this impossible dream because the party charter
prohibits it from requiring any delegate to vote against the
dictates of his or her own conscience.

They were, in ef-

feet, living out the principles of the Open Convention
Movement, but we shall discuss this in greater detail in
Chapter Three.
THE OPEN CONVENTION MOVEMENT
Having already briefly surveyed the Open Convention
Movement in Chapter One, we shall briefly consider at this
point:

a.) the origin of the term "Open Convention"; b.)

the occurrence of an open convention concept at other conventions; c.) the demographics of the participants in the
movement; and d.) the rationale behind the movement.
The term Open Convention originated, according to
William Safire, with California Governor Earl Warren on
the eve of the 1948 Republican convention:

"I don't think

any one candidate has enough votes to win.

As long as that

prevails it's a wide-open convention. 1133

Safire defines

an Open Convention as a political convention where no
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single candidate arrives with a clear mandate.

34

"Origin

of the phrase is probably from gambling terminology:

a

'wide-open' town is one in which gambling, as well as
prostitution, is permitted."

35

The concept of an open convention has occurred at
several other national conventions.

In 1956, former Presi-

dent Harry Truman made it quite clear that he favored an
open Democratic convention, because he did not want Adlai
Stevenson to lock up the nomination before the convention
began--Truman supported the candidacy of New York Governor
Averell Harriman.

Senator Estes Kefauver actually arrived

at the convention with the largest measure of delegate
support, but the open convention eventually worked to
Stevenson's advantage and, ultimately, to his nomination.
At this point, Stevenson in turn announced that he favored an 'open
convention' in the choice of a vicepresidential nominee. The delegates,
who couldn't remember a previous opportunity to choose a vice-president
freely, almost went for Senator John
36
F. Kennedy, but finally chose Kefauver.
Again, in 1960, former President Truman called for
an open convention because he didn't feel John Kennedy, the
Senator from Massachusetts, was ready to be President.
"Kennedy told an aide:

'Mr. Truman regards an open con-

vention as one which studies all the candidates, reviews
their records and then takes his advice. 11137

As we have

already seen, despite Adlai Stevenson's strenuous efforts,
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the big-city bosses held the delegates in check and Kennedy
handily won the nomination.
We have already mentioned the 1948 Republican convention, and earlier we saw how "open" the Democratic convention of 1924 was.

Historically, most conventions prior

to 1968 were "open", to some degree.
The degree of openness is measured against another
type of convention setting, the Brokered Convention.

A

brokered convention is one,
at which many key delegates are
committed to 'favorite sons', thus
cutting down the first-ballot strength
of serious contenders for the nomination
• • • the opposite of a brokered convention
is an open convention, in which individual
delegates are free to vote their personal
choice. In a 'lock-up' or 'rigged' convention, the outcome is rarely in doubt,
as when an incumbent president is a candidate for renomination.38
Demographically, the participants in the Open Convention Movement were largely confined to the Northeastern
United States.

These participants can, for the sake of

our study, be divided into three main groups:
Democratic establishment of the East; 2.

1.

the

the post-Water-

gate generation of Democratic congressman; and 3.

that

portion of the Democratic establishment beyond the Eastern
boundaries of the United States.
When speaking of the Democratic establishment involved in the Open Convention Movement, it should be remembered that these include both supporters of President
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Carter, who nevertheless still wished to see the Convention
opened-up for the sake of party unity, as well as antagoists.

The Eastern establishment included Governor Grasso

of Connecticut, Mayor Ed Koch of New York City, and Senator
Robert Byrd of West Virginia, all Carter supporters.

Also

included in the group of Eastern Democrats were antagonists
such as:

Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts, Governor Hugh

Carey of New York, Mayor William Green of Philadelphia,
Edward Bennett Williams (financier, and chairman of The
Committee To Maintain

An

Open Convention) of Baltimore,

and Mayor Jane Byrne of Chicago.
Among the post-Watergate freshman Democratic congressmen who aligned themselves with the Open Convention
Movement were:

Representative Michel Barnes of Maryland

(one of the more visible proponents of the Open Convention
Movement); Representatives Thomas Downey and Jerome Ambro
of New York; Representative James Exxon of Nebraska; Representative Edward Markey of Massachusetts; Representative
Norman Dicks of Washington; Representative Benjamin Rosenthal of New York; and Representative Dan Glickman of Kansas.
While this list is not inclusive it is, nevertheless, representative.
Among the Democratic establishment beyond the Eastern
borders of the United States, we find such figures as:
Governor Richard Lanun of Colorado; William Lemieux, an aide
to Washington Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson (Jackson, him-
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self, supported the movement but did not actively participate); and Representative Morris Udall of Arizona, an old
Kennedy supporter and friend.
While it will be seen that the Movement had widespread geographical representation, a quick perusal will
indicate a heavy concentration of Eastern influence.
conclusions may be deduced from this observation:

Four

the

Eastern portion of the United States has historically been
more liberal politically, and more predisposed to change
and shift, politically; the Eastern population is significantly more dense than the Western, and consequently,
represents areas of heavy voter-strength and electoral
importance; the freshman Representatives were not particularly loyal to their party, nor did they feel obliged
to return any political favors, as they had incurred few
political debts; and finally, the Eastern states became
a political battleground because some of the most significant primaries (i.e., New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
and Ohio) occurred late in the campaign season.
Lastly, the rationale behind the movement can be
seen by historical precedent and the Democratic party
charter.

As has been observed earlier, starting as early

as 1948, the concept of an "open convention" has been
verbalized at numerous conventions, including 1956, 1960,
and 1976.

Even prior to the conceptualization of the

term, Democratic Conventions, such as 1924, pragmatically
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participated in the spirit of an open convention.

Indeed,

until the reforms of 1972, following the Chicago convention
of 1968, most Democratic conventions were "open conventions", to some degree.

This has changed since 1968,

through the institution of reforms and rules, and the increase in statewide-primaries.

However, the Democratic

National Conunittee approved Rule ll(H) in 1978, which said:
All delegates to the national convention
shall be bound to vote for the Presidential
candidate whom they were elected to support
for at least the first convention ballot,
unless released in writing by the Presidential
candidate. Delegates who seek to violate this
rule may be replaced with an alternate of the
same Presidential preference by the Presidential
candidate or that candidate's authorized representative at any time up to and including
the Presidential balloting at the national
convention.
The crux of the argument put forth by proponents of
Rule ll(H), which was to become Proposed Rule F(3) (C) at
the 1980 Democratic Convention, was that the role of a
delegate had changed.

It was argued that delegates were

no longer elected on their own name, or by their own merit,
but rather because they represented a particular Presidential candidate.
Advocates of the rule see it as an integral part of recent Democratic Party
reforms which, while originally intended
to guarantee fair delegate representation
for minority candidates, should not deny
the same benefit to a majority candidate. 39
However, a section of the Democratic Party Charter,
which supporters of an open convention referred to fre-

69

quently, prohibited any delegate from being required "to
cast a vote contrary to his or her expressed preference. 1140
In other words, a delegate was to be allowed to vote their
conscience, and it was this apparent conflict which recast
Rule ll(H) as Proposed Rule F(3) (C), to be brought before
the delegates at the national convention for their approval
or rejection.

It would be the delegates themselves who

would decide whether they wished to retain their absolute
freedom of choice, or as some had warned, be turned "into
robots forced to support a candidate they were chosen to
represent many months earlier, no matter how events may
have changed." 41
Having thus considered the historical background of
Democratic National Conventions, in general, as well as
surveying the 1980 Democratic Presidential campaign through
the primaries, and having considered the historical authority for an open convention, as well as the rationale
behind the movement, we move to Chapter Three, in which we
shall investigate the Open Convention Movement rhetorically
through the use of Burke's dramatistic pentad.
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CHAPTER III
THE ACT

THE OPEN CONVENTION MOVEMENT
In Chapter One, we sought to locate the beginnings
of the Open Convention Movement within the context of the
1980 Democratic Presidential primaries.
we shall:

In this chapter,

state the purpose of the movement; consider

the composition of the constituents of the movement; examine the level of Identification inherent among the
participants, in light of personal goals and ambitions;
and finally, view the actions of the participants and
the influence of the media.
THE PURPOSE

The primary purpose of this short-lived movement was
to present, through symbolic acts, opposition to Proposed
Rule F(3) (C), a 77-word resolution which, we have already
seen, would have required delegates to the Democratic
National Convention to vote, on the first ballot, for the
Presidential candidate whom they had represented in their
statewide primaries.

This opposition was philosophically

founded on the Democratic Party charter, a portion of
which prohibited any delegate from being required to cast

74

a vote against their own conscience, and substantiated by
historical precedent at earlier Democratic National conventions.

Secondarily, certain participants also sought

to "dump" President Carter, while others sought to foster
Party unity.

The primary purpose, however, was opposition

to the proposed rule.
THE MOVEMENT CONSTITUENCY
Chapter Two presented three main classes of participants in the Open Convention Movement:

the Democratic

establishment of the East; the post-Watergate freshmen
Democratic Congressmen; and the Democratic establishment
beyond the Eastern boundaries of the country.

Perhaps

even more important than the demographics of the participants is the fact that the movement was comprised of both
antagonists and supporters of President Carter; the supporters merely wishing to preserve party unity, the
antagonists seeking to dump an incumbent President who
had plummeted in the polls and whom they perceived appeared
incapable of handling domestic problems and foreign crisis.
Due to this natural dichotomy in the group, Identification
(or, unity} was necessarily required within the movement
itself.
The "members" of the Open Convention Movement, we
have said, were more participants in this loose-knit
conglomeration of political mavericks, than members in a
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structured organization.

In fact, these participants fell

into four sub-groups:
1.

Those who sought the Presidential nomination
themselves, either directly or indirectly
(whom we shall call "Candidates")

2.

Those who supported these alternate candidates
(whom we shall call "Supporters")

3.

Those who supported the renomination of
Jinnny Carter (whom we shall call "Carterites")

4.

Those who rejected all of the above, and
sought to introduce other politicians from
outside the movement, to the delegates at
the Convention as possible candidates (whom
we shall call "Mavericks")

This first group, who sought the Presidential nomination themselves, included Senator Kennedy and Governor
Hugh Carey of New York and Senator Jackson of Washington.
As early as March 20th, 1980, Senator Edward "Ted"
Kennedy had called for delegate abstentions at the Democratic National Convention, 1 and his was to be the first
of many such voices crying in the political wilderness.
While Senator Kennedy had made himself an obvious
candidate by his campaigning, Governor Carey had only
indirectly made himself available, throwing his hat more
in the direction of the ring than into the ring itself,
as it were.
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Mr. Carey denied any political intentions
of his own - 'This for me is a non-political
year', he said with a smile - but nevertheless
left his own options wide open for the coming
national political battle. He stopped short
of saying that he would definitely support
the nominee of the Democratic Party, although
he said, ' I would hope to do so•.2
Senator Jackson of Washington became one of the candidates suggested by the freshman Congressmen (or, "Mavericks"). 3

Campaigning in 1976 for the Presidential nomi-

nation, he had beaten Carter in Massachusetts and New York,
and this inspite of the fact that he was identified as a
Democratic right-winger. 4 Jackson never openly campaigned
for the Open Convention Movement, though he supported it
in principal.
Jackson has alienated liberals with his
hawkish views on defense. But he would
neutralize some of Reagan's appeal to
the foreign-policy right, and he is a
favorite of or5anized labor and of many
Jewish voters.
Jackson allowed the formation of a draft conunittee by his
old fund-raiser,

s.

Harrison (Sonny) Dogole, but he re-

portedly was also willing to accept the Vice-Presidential
spot on a party-unity ticket. 6
The second group, those who supported the alternate
candidates (and here we mean especially the candidacy of
Ted Kennedy), was a somewhat larger group.

This group

included Mayors Byrne of Chicago and Green of Philadelphia, 7 but it also included such notables as Shirley
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Chisholm of New York, Iris Mitgang of the National Women's
Political Caucus, and Albert Shanker, President of the
United Federation of Teachers. 8 This group was not united
in its goal, but rather, participants fell into two subgroups:
1.

Those who philosophically favored the freedom of choice for the delegates which Proposed Rule F(3) (C) would deny, and secondarily favored the candidacy of Senator
Kennedy (Ms. Mitgang, Mrs. Chisholm and
Mr. Shanker are representative of this
group).

2.

Those who supported the candidacy of Senator
Kennedy and, therefore, supported his efforts
to open-up the convention as a means of enhancing his political opportunities (both
Mayors Byrne and Green are representative
of this group).

The obvious problem in this second group is that the
goals, which were of primary importance to its members,
were divided.

Hence, Ms. Mitgang was delighted with the

results of "Super Tuesday's" primaries because, with Senator Kennedy doing as well as he did, women were able to
come to the Convention with a great many demands (i.e.,
the Equal Rights Amendment, the appointment of women to
policy-making positions in government, etc.). 9 Mr. Shanker,
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writing in the New York Times, said that:
The attempt to bind the delegates with eviction from the convention as
the penalty for disloyalty - represents
a startling effort by the incumbent to
overturn Democratic Party history.10
Mayor William J. Green of Philadelphia endorsed the
candidacy of Ted Kennedy on April 15th, saying the Massachusetts Senator was "the best candidate for the nation's
major cities", 11 and he made this endorsement inspite of
the fact that most of the nation's mayors, with the exception of Mrs. Jane M. Byrne, backed the renomination of
President Carter.

Mayor Green was a family friend of

the Kennedy's, so the endorsement may have been anticipated
but it was politically treacherous for the mayor of a
large city to abandon the President's campaign. 12
The third major group of participants in the Open
Convention Movement consisted of supporters of President
Jimmy Carter.

These included Senator Robert C. Byrd of

West Virginia, Governor Ella Grasso of Connecticut and
Mayor Ed Koch of New York. 13 What characterized this
particular group of participants was their request for an
open convention, as opposed to the demanding posture of
other participants.

Their rhetoric was significantly

less critical of the President and his performance, and
their rationale was consistently one of seeking party
unity.
For instance, Mayor Koch threatened to withdraw his
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less-than-enthusiast support from President Carter until
the "Billygate" affair (involving the President's brother,
Billy Carter, and his dealings with the government of
Libya) was handled satisfactorily. 14

The Mayor advocated

an open convention as a means of promoting party unity, as
the President's popularity had diminished greatly among
New York's numerous ethnic minorities. 15
The final group of participants in the Open Convention
Movement, whom we have called "Mavericks", consisted of
those who opposed both the renomination of Jinuny Carter
and the candidacy of Ted Kennedy.

Most, though not all, of

the freshman Democratic Congressmen who came forth on July
25th to herald the Committee To Maintain An Open Convention
16
fell into this group.
Representative Toby Moffett of
Connecticut is one notable exception; a Kennedy supporter,
he went to the National Convention in New York as a committed Kennedy delegate. 17 His commitment, however, was
more the exception than the rule, when one considers this
group.

Most were disappointed by the Carter performance,

fearful of his presence on the November ballot, and convinced that the Chappaquiddick incident would stymie the
e 1 ection campaign o f Kenne d y. 18
I

I

"What we're looking for is an alternative to both"
said Representative Jerome Ambro of Long Island (New
19
York) •
Ambro was joined by Representatives Thomas
Downey (Long Island), Don Edwards and Fortney Start (Cali-
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fornia}, Timothy Wirth (Colorado} and Michael Barnes (Maryland), as they issued a statement saying,
There are an awful lot of people in-

terested in this.

If we could get 50

unconunitted members of Congress to
join us, we believe you'd get another
30 to 40 members presently Pro-Carter
or Pro-Kennedy.20
However, the Conunittee To Maintain An Open Convention
officially came into being only three weeks prior to the
vote on the Convention floor. 21 There were approximately
40 Democratic Congressmen involved, but two were already
Carter supporters and 10 were Kennedy supporters.

"Some

people felt we might look like dupes of a Kennedy ploy, and
we didn't want to do it that way", 22 Mr. Ambro said. The
majority of unconunitted participants drafted a letter to
both Carter and Kennedy, urging both "to release your delegates at the Democratic National Convention so that the
convention may consider all alternatives for the nomination
of our party. 1123 Their life-expectancy was extremely short,
and while most were theoretically uncommitted, they nevertheless had developed a list of favored alternatives.
These included Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, Vice-President Walter Mondale, Senator Henry Jackson (Washington) and
Representative Morris Udall (Arizona). 24 This sense of
urgency, created by a shortage of time, left little opportunity for in-depth planning, or subtlety in rhetoric.
Therefore, out of this sense of crisis, Representative
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James Blanchard (Michigan), a supporter of President Carter,
said, "The President's relations up here (with Congress)
are terrible.

There's no wellspring of warmth for him.

These guys are free agents. 1125

When President Carter met

with the dissidents in late-July, he told them he would
not campaign in their districts if he would hurt them by
doing so. 26 Though he acknowledged his weaknesses, Represenative Dan Glickman (Kansas) said:
If there had been strong ties between
the White House and Congress, this
couldn't have happened. It's part of
a breakdown of leadership up here •
• • • Some of it is a failure of Carter,
and some of it is institutional - the
decentralization of the House and the
political parties in America. The end
result is that we just don't need the
President as much anymore.27
Thus, what developed in 1980 was not a unified movement but rather four distinct and diverse sub-groups, all
functioning philosophically to the same end (defeat of Proposed Rule F (3)(C)) but each having group goals and individual ambitions separate from one another.
GOALS AND MOTIVATIONS
Obviously, the goals and ambitions of the first two
groups were similar - both sought the candidacy of Kennedy
(primarily).

Both groups used speeches, press interviews,

and television appearances to publicly promote their candidate, challenge the President and advocate an open con-
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vention policy.

However, the priorities and goals differed

somewhat among participants - Senator Kennedy himself, as
well as Mayors Byrne and Green seeking first the candidacy
of Kennedy and, secondly, an open-convention as a means to
that end.

Mr. Shanker and Mrs. Chisholm sought an open

convention, on philosophical grounds, as their primary
objective.

This did not so much detract from Identification

as it determined the level of strident attack mounted by
group participants.
The third group, or "Carterites," was not so much
philosophically motivated as they were politically astute.
They supported the renomination of Jinuny Carter but, recognizing that by late-July his approval rating among
voters polled was only 22% 28 they argued that opening the
convention was the only way to unify the party.

Their

level of Identification was high, and their rhetoric was
more supportive and less strident.
The final group, or "Mavericks", was the most combative in their rhetoric, and their motivation was political survival.

While they demonstrated a moderate

level of Identification.among themselves, they demonstrated
a low level as they related to other participants in the
movement.

Over-all, it must be deduced that the level of

Identification evidenced among participants in the movement was low-to-moderate, though cohesion was nevertheless
maintained because of the broader goal of opposition to
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the proposed rule.
IDENTIFICATION WITHIN THE MOVEMENT
Identification must be considered on two levels first, there is the level of Identification inherent in
the movement itself, and secondly, there is the level of
Identification which the movement sought to develop among
the delegates (discussed more fully under the sub-title
Scene).

We have discussed the general low-level of Identi-

fication inherent in the movement as it evolved, and this
is due to three causes.
First, the rhetorical strategies employed by spokespersons of the Open Convention Movement were directed to
29
The Strategies were designed to
external audiences.
directly influence the delegates to the Convention, or to
influence public opinion so as to bring pressure on the
delegates.

There was apparently no internally-directed

rhetoric, which might reconcile the different factions
and enhance Identification.

Neither of the four sub-groups

made any effort along these lines, at least in published
rhetoric, nor did the two most prolific spokespersons,
Kennedy and Carey.
Secondly, the four sub-groups had different goals.
True, the ultimate objective of each was defeat of Proposed Rule F(3) (C), but there were still prominent group
goals and individual ambitions which, by their obvious
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presence, precluded Identification.

Senator Kennedy and

Governor Carey had personal designs on the candidacy.

The

supporters of Kennedy sought to promote his candidacy while
disenfranchising the Carterites.

The supporters of Carter

sought to promote party unity without alienating the Kennedy forces.

The freshman Congressmen sought to dump Carter

(because they felt he couldn't win) and Kennedy {because of
the character issue surrounding Chappaquiddick) in favor of
the candidacy of a third nominee.
Thirdly, the four sub-groups had different allegiances.

Kennedy, as an Eastern liberal, had typical allegi-

ances with the liberal Establishment Democrats, union
leaders such as Douglas Frasier and Albert Shanker, as
well as the Black and Jewish conununities.

His followers,

particularly the two mayors, had alliances with business
and union representatives, on the one hand, and heavy
burdens to provide necessary Federal funding and support
for their municipalities, on the other.

The Carter sup-

porters were allied with the Administration and, as such,
supported Carter policies to varying degrees. 30 Some, such
as Governor Grasso, supported Administration policies more
than did Mayor Koch, for example (Koch's support dropped
markedly after the April U.S.-backed United Nations resolution condemning Israel's expansion on the West Bank). 31
Lastly, the freshmen Democrats were non-aligned with the
Party hierarchy, and felt politically independent of Party
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politics.32

They were, for the most part, uncommitted to

any one candidate but proposed the candidacy of a conservative Democrat (Jackson), a moderate Democrat identified
with the Carter Administration (Mondale), or one of two
liberal Democrats (Muskie and Udall).

In all, the allegi-

ances, or non-allegiances, of the four groups is as diverse
as their personal goals and individual ambition.

As such,

this diversity presented an enormous obstacle to Identification, and without a concerted effort it is easy to
understand why the level of unity among the participants
in the movement never reached that high level so necessary
for an Identification-effective rhetoric.
Considering the diversity of goals and allegiances,
and the emphasis of the rhetorical strategies, it is to
the spokespersons credit that Identification was as high
as it was.

While a low-to-moderate level of Identification

is certainly not the ideal operating position, it still
allowed the spokespersons to propagate their rhetorical
strategies without appearing disorganized or chaotic.

The

most factious element, Representatives Ambro and Barnes,
officially became involved only three weeks prior to the
Convention vote, and this was another factor in establishing an over-all moderate level of Identification among
the spokespersons.

Actually, only Senator Kennedy and

Governor Carey, as major spokespersons, were directly involved in the movement for three-months or longer. 33 What-
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ever their personal goals and ambitions, each of the
participants shared a common opposition to Proposed Rule
F(3) (C), and this opposition was strong enough to offset
the natural divisions among them, and this, coupled with
the late entry of the "Mavericks", contributed to the
moderate level of Identification.
THE ACTIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS AND
THE INFLUENCE OF THE MEDIA UPON THE MOVEMENT
The Open Convention Movement was first given impetus
by Senator Edward "Ted" Kennedy as early as March, 1980.
By virtue of his campaigning, Senator Kennedy was an obvious
contender for the Democratic nomination for President,
having entered all the available primaries and challenging
President Carter to debate. 34 By the conclusion of the
primaries, President Carter held nearly a 2-to-l delegate
35
edge,
but Senator Kennedy was apparently convinced that,
because of the President's drastically declining support,
the Democratic Party would have to find a winnable alternative. 36

As heir-apparent to the Kennedy-family claim

on the White Whouse, he saw himself as the most viable
alternative.

As his strategy developed concerning the

binding-rule, an aide stated that, "The pressure for a
rules fight would have to come from the Carter delegates
themselves.

We can't stage it ourselves.

We'd lose. 1137

Governor Carey began his crusade for an open con-
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vention with his May 5th press conference in Albany.

His

most impressive message, however, came on May 21st, with the
publication of "An Open Convention", an impassioned cry
against "an empty ritual perversely called a convention 11 ,

38

which established Carey as the unofficial herald of this
new position (continuing to claim no interest in the candidacy himself, he still managed to react angrily when called
39
a "political ditherer").
The Governor traveled to Washington in late-July for
a joint news conference with Representatives Ambro and
Barnes, as well as five other spokespersons, at which time
the name of Senator Jackson arose as an alternative to both
Carter and Kennedy (at the same news conference, Governor
Carey's name was also mentioned as a possible dark horse
candidate). 40
Governor Carey, on the eve of the convention, continued to plead the cause of an open convention, first to
the New York delegation and then to the delegates from
Texas.

"The Governor continued his effort to allow dele-

gates a free choice.

He predicted victory on the issue •

• • 'I've never lost a fight', he said. 1141

The announce-

ments by Senator Byrd and Governor Grasso, both Carter
supporters, lent credibility to the prospect of a convention where the delegates would be free to choose.

Added

impetus was provided by a Gallup Poll in Newsweek magazine
{August 11, 1980), where more than 1,000 voters "returned a
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55-38 majority in favor of throwing the convention open.

1142

At his first press conference after becoming Chairman
of the movement, Edward Bennett Williams argued that "the

rule binding delegates would undo 148 years of Democratic
history, and reduce them to 'nothing more than robots or
automatons. 1143 He insisted that "this is not a dump-Carter
movement 11 , 44 but that an open convention would strengthen
Carter's political position, should he win the nomination.
"The committee asked only, he said, that they be permitted
to vote their will - that they not be 'led like lemmings
to the sea•. 1145 This daily production of rhetoric had an
effect; in early July, 11 percent of the Carter delegates
46
opposed the rule and another 5 percent were undecided.
By late-July, 16 percent opposed the rule and 7 percent
were undecided. 47 However, not everyone accepted this
free-flowing rhetoric unquestioningly - when Newsweek
magazine covered the Williams' press conference, they
captioned their story: "The Drive To Dump Carter 48
11

•

As mayor of New York City, Ed Koch took advantage of
the extensive media at his disposal to broadcast his
political inclinations, much as Governor Carey did.

Un-

like the Governor, Major Koch was ostensibly a Carter
supporter.

However, as the Carter Administration con-

tinued to bounce from one political embarrassment to
another, Koch's support grew cooler, and his calls for an
.
open convention
more f requen t • 49
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As President of the United Federation of Teachers,
Albert Shanker's endorsement of the open-convention concept
provided union strength to the movement, and his articulate
presentation in the New York Times provided a philosophical
foundation which rendered significant impetus to the movement. so

The article traced the history of Proposed Rule

F(3) (C), quoted the rule in its entirety, provided illustrations of delegates going against their "bound" commitments at earlier conventions, supported a philosophical
premise for an open convention by drawing on the example
of Edmund Burke, and finally closed by urging the delegates
not to gag themselves.
Both Senator Byrd and Governor Grasso were selfproclaimed Carter supporters who nevertheless advocated
an open convention.SI

As the two made their statements

only four days apart from one another (Governor Grasso on
July 29th, and Senator Byrd on August 2nd), they were accorded conspicuous attention by the media.

Both felt

compelled to press for party unity, which they believed
was being sacrified by binding the delegates, and both
seemed confident that Carter's delegate strength would
hold even without the binding rule.s 2
The media gave "favorite-child" status to Representatives Jerome Ambro (New York) and Michael Barnes (Maryland) , though they were only two of a much larger group
3 Many
of Congressional rebels.s
of the printed statements
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of the Committee To Maintain An Open Convention were made
by Representative Ambro, while Representative Barnes was
a frequent television guest, as well as appearing on televised newscasts.

For approximately three weeks these two

political personalities became the most-oft heard voices
of that group of participants in the movement who rejected
both Carter and Kennedy.

What they accomplished at their

first news conference was to set the mood for their rhetorical participation for the next three weeks. 54
As a last consideration, the effect of the media on
the movement needs to be considered.

By media we mean both

television and radio, as well as the printed medium of newspapers and news magazines.

All these avenues were employed

by participants in the movement, in an effort to popularize
their cause.
The name of Senator Kennedy, we have said, became a
daily headline in nationwide newspapers by late-May.

He

also granted numerous interviews to magazines such as Time,
Newsweek, and U.S. News and World Report. 55 Towards the
last weeks of the primaries he was frequently seen on
television news broadcasts, and as mentioned earlier, he
appeared several times on such television programs as Meet
The Press and Issues and Answers.
The Kennedy staffers carried out their delegatehunting by phone contact and personal encounters with both
Carter-and-uncommitted delegates.

Meanwhile, Mr. Kennedy
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kept his long-shot challenge prominently in public view
through a series of speeches, Congessional hearings and
appearances before the committee formulating the party

platform to be adopted in New York.

56

So, too, other participants used the media.

Repre-

senative Michael Barnes appeared on Meet The Press on
July 27th, and once the Committee To Maintain

An

Open Con-

vention officially surfaced in late-July, few days went by
without some newspaper carrying an article about the open
convention.

Governor Carey held weekly press conferences

to espouse an open convention, as well as appearing at
numerous cocktail parties, fund-raisers and banquets.
In fact, it might be said that the Open Convention
Movement was a media event.

The movement operated rheto-

rically through the medium of the media, which served as
an avenue of dissemination for the numerous calls for an
open convention.

Had the media not been available as a

rhetorical medium, little could have been done to propagate the rhetorical message which sought to achieve
identification.

Had the media not been so persuasive

the delegates would not have been aware of growing national
discontent with Jimmy Carter's performance, or the polling
strength of the various proposed alternate candidates. 57
Had the media not been so readily available, the time constraints on the movement would have made it impossible to
mete out the volume of rhetorical information which the
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participants needed to broadcast.
While it may be said that the movement required an
avenue for its rhetoric, some of these medium proved to be
more than just avenues.

For instance, Newsweek magazine

ran articles entitled:

"The Drive To Dump Carter"; "The

Row Over A Rule"; "Fighting After The Final Bell"; "Kennedy's Delegate Hunt"; "Not Very Happy Warrior"; and,
"The Mutinous Democrats".
titled:

Time magazine ran articles en-

"Vowing Defiance To The End"; "Madison Square

Garden of Briars"; and "That Which We Are, We Are",
eulogizing the campaign of Senator Kennedy.
York Times ran articles entitled:

Even the New

"Congress Rebels Held

Reflection of Carter Lapse"; "Binding Rule Divides Delegates In New York Area"; "Gauging The Delegate Count";
"Amid Others' Doubts, Governor Grasso joins Move For Open
Convention"; "Strauss Says President's Delegates Must
Support Carter On First Ballot"; and, "Most Democratic
Senators Termed Uneasy Over Carter Renomination".

Hence,

the headlines themselves served to create a rhetoric of
their own, quite apart from the content of the articles.
The accessibility of the media to the Open Convention Movement not only offered a rhetorical medium to the movement,
but also served to enhance credibility, serving to stimulate a more favorable response from the delegates.
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IN SUMMARY
In this chapter, the primary purpose of the Open Convention Movement was presented as its opposition to Proposed Rule F{3) {C).
The membership of the movement was divided into four
groups:

those whom we called "candidates" themselves;

those whom we called "supporters" of these alternate candidates; those whom we called "Carterites"; and finally,
those whom we called "mavericks", because of their rejection
of both Carter and Kennedy.
The goals and motivations of these four groups were
as diverse as their make-up.

This, combined with rhetorical

strategies directed at the delegates, and differing allegiances, contributed to a low level of Identification among
the participants of the movement.

Still, because they

agreed on the broader goal of opposition to the proposed
rule, the participants were able to maintain cohesion.
The activities of the participants were traced, and
the intense influence of the media upon the movement was
surveyed.

Indeed, without the media, the movement would

have been hampered beyond salvation, though it is also
true that the media created its own rhetoric by the way
in which it presented the rhetoric of the spokespersons
of the movement.
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CHAPTER IV
THE SCENE
THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
In our consideration of the Democratic National
Convention of 1980, we shall examine the following:

to

what "audience" the rhetorical strategies of the movement
were address; how homogeneous this group was, and the level
of Identification inherent among the delegates; the events
and circumstances of the Convention itself, and finally,
the immediate effects of the movement on the Democratic
Convention.
THE AUDIENCE
The Democratic National Convention of 1980 consisted
of two audiences, not one.

The first and largest group

consisted of the more than 3,300 delegates to the Convention, plus alternates. 1 Almost two thousand of these
delegates were pledged, prior to the Convention, to the
candidacy of President Jimmy Carter, 2 while approximately
one thousand were pledged to Senator Ted Kennedy. 3

There

was a very small group of uncommitted delegates, or delegates pledged to favorite-son candidates.
Most of the delegates to the Democratic Convention
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were either elected in state-wide primaries, or chosen in
state Party caucuses.

A small number were honorary

positions (for instance, Senator Patrick Moynihan of New
York was selected by state Democratic Party officials to be
a delegate to the National Convention, and he went to
Madison Square Garden uncommitted to either Carter or
Kennedy).
In 1980, there were 37 state primaries - twice as
many as in 1968 4 - stretched out over a five-month period,
prompting some political analysts to suggest reforming the
selection process by instituting a national primary, or
.
1 primaries.
.
.
5
regiona

With the conclusion of the primaries

and caucuses, the make-up of the delegate-body had been
largely determined.
The second group consisted of the two major candidates and their campaign staffs.

For Jimmy Carter, this

group included Robert Strauss, Jody Powell, Hamilton
Jordan, Vice President Walter Mondale, Stuart Eizenstat
and Zbigniew Brezinski, along with Tom Donilon.

For Ted

Kennedy, this group included Richard Stearns, Phillip
Bakes, Paul Kirk, Peter Edelman, Carl Wagner, Paul Tully,
and Susan Estrich.
HOMOGENEITY AND INDENTIFICATION AMONG DELEGATES
Obviously, even within these two groups, there were
divisions and dichotomies.

Split philosophically into
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two antithetical camps - the Carterites and the Kennedy
forces, the Senator's managers, sporting buttons which
read "FREE THE CARTER 2,000", pushed for a resolution that
would allow delegates to vote for any candidate. 6

They

argued that delegates at past Democratic Conventions had
been free - in theory, at least - to vote for whomever they
wanted, even on the first ballot. 7 Joseph Raub, a longtime
liberal activist, declared that the loyalty rule would
prohibit any action at the convention and "turn the Democratic Party from a deliberative body to a group of robots .118
On the Carter-side, the President's campaign chairman Robert Strauss said:
These delegates have only one responsibility - to express the will
of the people who elected them on
the first ballot of the Presidential
roll-call. On any other issue before
the convention, they are free to do what
they want. We have no intention of trying
to enforce the rule except on the rollcall. 9
The dogmatism of the Carter staff was not universally
believed or accepted by all the Carter delegates, and this
is the atmosphere which lessened the level of Identif ication.
Privately, a number of Carter delegates
have expressed fear and irritation that
they might be purged from the Convention
if they opposed the White House on the
rules issue. 'The rule stinks', said one
Carter delegation leader. 'It was a tactical
mistake, but we're stuck with it•.10
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Virtually all the delegates to the National Convention
opposed the presidential aspirations of Republican Ronald
Reagan, yet this was the only goal which they universally
shared.

Many of the Carter delegates hoped for a Kennedy-

Carter reconciliation, wishing to enhance party unity for
the fall campaign.

11

Others in the Carter camp, dogmati-

cally refusing to yield on either the rule fight or their
allegiance to Carter, simply pushed on.

12

By early August, a reported 16 percent of the Carter
delegates opposed Proposed Rule F(3) (C) ,

13

all the Kennedy delegates also opposed it.

while virtually
Thus, approxi-

mately 320 Carter delegates and 1,000 Kennedy delegates
stood ready to vote against the rule, but simple mathematics displays that more than 1700 delegates either
favored the rule, or were uncommitted.

One out of almost

every six Carter delegates was opposed to the rule, and
another 7 percent were undecided. 14

However, much of this

opposition was not a pro-Kennedy shift, but a move for
party unity much as Senator Byrd and Governor Grasso
advocated.
Within the body of delegates who constituted the
Scene, there were arguments which

tended to go like this:

Ed Campbell (Carter delegate and Iowa State Party Chief,
opposing the rule), "I don't like to change the rules in
the middle of the game

(but) it's worth the risk.

feel the party would be better served if they had an open

I
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convention 11 ; 15 Louise Beaudreau (Carter delegate from
Oregon who was uncommitted about the rule}, "I don't want
to alienate the Kennedy forces • • • I'm going to wait til

I get there to make up my mind 11 ; 16 Judith Henning, an uncommitted delegate from Colorado, "I'm getting beat up on
by some other delegates when we get together at meetings,
especially the Kennedy delegates 11 • 17 This was in contrast
to Barbara Holmes, a Carter delegate and state senator from
Colorado, who said, "Kennedy has already lost in the Democratic primaries, and if he can't win the primaries, I don't
think he can win the general election. 1118
There was a high level of Identification among the
under-dog Kennedy delegates, but as indicated above, the
level of Identification among Carter delegates was only
moderate.

This divisiveness was not politically motivated

but, rather than disavowing their allegiance to Carter,
these presidential supporters who opposed the rule were
seeking to pacify the considerable Kennedy loyalists and,
therefore, enhance Democratic Party unity. 19 The over-all
level of Identification between the two groups was low;
generally, they approached the National Convention with an
adversarial attitude toward each other.
THE EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CONVENTION
The Convention rules committee met in Washington,
D.C., in mid-July to finalize the agenda it would set
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before the delegates in New York in August. 20

The rules

committee was comprised of Democratic Party officials from
around the country, and like the delegate make-up, represented a 2-to-l split between Carter and Kennedy supporters.
Kennedy strategists worked to persuade committee members
not to approve the measure which would bind delegates on
the first ballot.

After two and one-half hours of debate,

the Carter forces won, 87 to 66, and the rule was recommended for adoption by the delegates. 21 And so the scene
was set for the final decision, and the last battle would
be fought in Madison Square Garden by the delegates themselves.
The Kennedy forces fought to have the vote on the
rule moved to Tuesday evening, the second night of the
convention - allowing them time to secure additional defections among the Carter and uncommitted delegates while the Carter staff argued for a Monday vote. 22 To
present their respective arguments on the Floor, Senator
George McGovern would represent the Kennedy opinion, and
Senator Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut the Carter
opinion (Edward Bennett Williams would be the second
speaker in opposition to the rule, and his oration would
draw the most notice). 23
Still confident that he would win the rules vote,
Mr. Carter's most urgent concern was Kennedy's anticipated
reaction to the vote, for members of the Senator's family
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had urged him to walk out should he lose.

24

In light of

this concern,
The Carter side made most of the con-

cessions, scheduling.the rules and
platform debates for evening hours
at Kennedy's request, giving ground
on four of eighteen disputed platform planks - Teddy dropped one in
return - and increasing his ration
of Convention floor passes.25
Two issues were not negotiable by Carter; the roll-call on
the rules issue itself, and the date of the vote. 26
The Carter forces assembled 128 floor "whips", clad
in green and white vests, who patrolled the Convention
floor watching for delegates who appeared to waiver. 27
"They had memorized the quickest routes through the nearly
always clogged aisles", and could reach every Carter dele28
gate on the floor in seven minutes.
The night the Convention opened, and the delegates met to decide the fate
of F(3) (C), Carter's whips went from brush-fire to brushfire.
The final vote was 1936.4 to 1390.6 29 in favor of the
Carter position on the rule, but the voting was actually
over after the Pennsylvania delegation gave Jimmy Carter
the votes he needed to go "over the top". 30
Senator Kennedy phoned Camp David and congratulated
the President, after which he went back to work on his
concession speech (actually entitled the Speech on Economic
Issues), to be delivered Tuesday. 31
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Kennedy had included a paragraph of
praise for Carter. But then he picked
up a newspaper and read a conunent by
Hamilton Jordan . • • 'We could do it
without him • • • '. With that, Kennedy
toned down his speech to only one mention
of Carter.32
The Senator's speech on Tuesday evening was a significant oratorical success, so much so that there were major
defections among Carter supporters from the industrial
states on votes on the platform issues.

In a meeting on

the podium between Speaker Thomas "Tip" O'Neill and Carter
and Kennedy staffers, it was decided a roll call vote would
embarrass the President.

Therefore, O'Neill would call for
a voice vote and would divine the ayes and nays as agreed. 33
The result was a victory for Kennedy on the voting for a

$12 billion jobs program, while the Senator's wage and
price controls plank was abandoned. 34
On Wednesday evening, James Earl Carter was renominated as the Democratic candidate for President of the
United States.

The Open Convention Movement had come to

an end Monday night, and had been celebrated and laid to
rest Tuesday by the Kennedy oration. However, Wednesday
found the same problem of disunity. 35 Vice-President
Walter Mondale had followed Kennedy's example, and in his
speech relentlessly quoted old Reaganisms (i.e., calling
the weak and disadvantaged "a faceless mass waiting for a
handout"; and declaring that "the minimum wage has caused
more misery and unemployment than anything since the Great
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Depression."). 36
When Jimmy Carter rose to accept the 38th nomination
at the Democratic Convention, he urged Kennedy to support
the Party and his candidacy. 37 When Kennedy finally appeared on the podium for the traditional show of unity,
he walked stiffly onto the crowded
stage and tentatively shook the hand
of the President, who patted his back.
For a moment, Kennedy was hugged by
O'Neill, while Carter shot him quick,
anxious glances.38
One more handshake and Kennedy moved offstage.

Called back

for pictures with the President, he was gone inrrnediately
afterwards.

"There was no warmth, no clasped hands held

. h . .. 39
h 1g

Jimmy Carter had hoped his four days in New York
would help him to catch Ronald Reagan (whom he trailed in
the polls by 18 percentage points) , but the contentions
and disunity did nothing to alleviate his political
.
40
h an d 1cap.
IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF THE MOVEMENT ON THE CONVENTION
Just as Pericles' addressed his Funeral Oration to
the gathered throngs of Athenians, and Sir Winston Churchill
addressed his war-time speeches to the beleaguered citizens
of England, so too, the spokespersons of the Open Convention
Movement addressed themselves over a period of approximately
five months, to the delegates to the Democratic National
Convention primarily, and secondarily to the public at large.
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The seven rhetorical strategies (which will be examined in Chapter Six) used by participants in the Open
Convention Movement proved to be only somewhat successful.
Obviously, the goal of the movement was to defeat Proposed
Rule F{3) {C), and this did not happen.

What did happen was

that an increasing portion of Carter delegates were swayed,
but at the same time the chasm between the two camps was
deepened. 41
The Kennedy supporters were crystalized by the beginning of the Convention, somewhat as a result of the
rhetorical strategies of the spokespersons of the movement.
However, while approximately one-of-five Carter delegates
pulled back their support of the rule {16 percent actually
opposed, and 7 percent uncommitted) , 42 the balance of the
Carter delegates and the entire staff united in support of
the rule, deepening the existing chasm.

Therefore, there

was never more than a moderate level of Identification
achieved.

By their acceptance of Rule F(3) {C), the dele-

gates initiated a new political pattern upon the Democratic
Party, and its National Conventions.

And the spokespersons

of the movement must accept some of the responsibility for
the establishment of this new pattern (the political power
of an incumbent President cannot be overlooked here).
SUMMARY

The audience at the Democratic Convention in New York
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was composed of two groups; the delegates themselves (who
split into two major groups - Carterites and Kennedyites)
and the two major candidates for the nomination as well as
their staffs.
These two groups tended to have an adversarial attitude towards one another, thus the level of Identification
between them was low.

Internally, the level of Identifi-

cation among the Kennedy supporters was high, while the
level among the Carter supporters was only moderate.
Though the rhetorical strategies of the movement had
some success in drawing away a portion of the Carter supporters in opposition to the proposed rule, over-all the
primary goal of the movement was not achieved, nor was
the level of Identification among the delegates signif icantly altered by the conclusion of the Convention.
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CHAPTER V
THE AGENTS
THE SPOKESPERSONS OF THE OPEN CONVENTION MOVEMENT
Inasmuch as we have already examined the Open Convention Movement, as an entity, and the Democratic National
Convention, we now turn our attention to the various
spokespersons of the movement.
examine:

In this chapter we shall

who the major spokespersons were; how the spokes-

persons viewed their roles; whether any significant rhetors
arose within the movement, and what influence they exerted;
and finally, what alliances, if any, the spokespersons
formed.
THE MAJOR SPOKESPERSONS
In Chapter Three, we discovered four very distinct
sub-groups which, when combined, represented the participants in the Open Convention Movement.
1.

These were:

Those who sought the Presidential nomination
themselves (named, "Candidates")

2.

Those who supported these alternate candidates
(named, "Supporters")

3.

Those who supported the renomination of Jinnny
Carter (named, "Carterites")
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4.

Those who rejected all of the above, in favor
of still other possible candidates (named,
"Mavericks")

By our definition, these were participants in the
movement, and virtually all made public pronouncements at
one time or another.

Therefore, it would technically be

possible to speak of all these participants as spokespersons, but our quest is to discover the major spokespersons.

Hence, Senator Jackson, Mayors Byrne and Green,

Ms. Mitgang and Mrs. Chisholm, Governor Lamm and others
will not be considered here.

Our major spokespersons must

possess at least one of the following credentials:
1.

They produced a large quantity of rhetoric
as a spokesperson of the movement

2.

They produced a significant rhetorical product, by which they were identified with the
movement, or which gave impetus to the movement

3.

The media identified a spokesperson

as being

a part of the movement
Some spokespersons meet more than one of these
criteria, but all those classified as major spokespersons
must meet at least one.

Under category One, Senator

Kennedy and Governor Carey are spokespersons who produced
a large volume of rhetoric on behalf of the movement.
Under category Two, Mr. Albert Shanker is representative
of a speaker who produced a significant rhetorical product

115
TABLE I

The following chart represents a chronological
development of the Open Convention Movement, and the
contributions of the agents therein.
. .rch 10th
. .rch 20th
. .y

5th

. .y 6th

llay 9th
. .y 12th
. . y 21st

. .y 26th
.Tune 2nd
.Tune

5th

June 11th

June 15th
July llth

Sen. Kennedy delivers a apeech opposin9 Pres .
carter
Sen. Kennedy i••ues hi• fir•t call for
delegate abstentiona"On first
ballot
Gov. C&rey call• for an 'open convention'
during pre•• conference
Paul Kirk, Kennedy aide, deaands the
re•i9nation of John c. White,
Democratic National Chairman
Gov. Carey again calla for open convention
at press conference
Sen. Kennedy call• for open convention
during a press conference
Gov. C&rey'• article •An Open convention•
i• released
len. Kennedy attacks leadership of Pres .
Carter during apeech at Rutgers
University
Sen. Kennedy holds pre•• conference after
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conference
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to Meure an open convention
Uward ..nnett Willi... 1a ....d Chai nun of
fte c::-ittee to . .intain an Open
eoa..ndon
len. lyrd aaaounce1 bi• npport of an open

Aupat Uh

..ror Soc:b IM>14• pre•• OOftfennce after calling

Aup8t Ith

-.preeeataU.,.• llllbro Ud . .me• Mld a pnaa
eoatereaoe at.reaaiaf t.t.ir effort•
for ............u .......at
al......te . . .Mate•
1en . . . . . . ., i•ne• a et.at.-tat tdt.Wrwint
~· crutidaey after tM floor

July 26th
July 27th
July 29th
July JOth
July ll•t

Au9u1t lat

Aup8t 12'-h
Aupat Uth

new•

eoftfffttion

for an .,_ . -. .tion hriat a
te1Hiaion iateniev

wte on r ()) (C)

au . .......,. ..u.,.ra

~·

......, •

.,..ch

llefon t.M ..1. .ate8, eueaaint
---.iC Uhel

116
(Governor Carey might also be included here).

Senator Byrd,

Governor Grasso, Mayor Koch, and Representatives Arnbro and
Barnes are representative of category Three (in which might
also be included Senator Kennedy and Governor Carey}.
Beginning with his March 20th call for delegate
abstentions, Senator Kennedy was the most prolific spokesperson for an open convention.

His was the first, and most

often heard, voice for this challenging position.

By

May 5th, Governor Carey took up the call for an open convention, and his May 21st article in the· New York Times,
"An Open Convention", was a significant rhetorical product.

So too, was Albert Shanker's "Where We Stand", appearing
in the New York Times on July 27th.

Because of their

prominence in political circles, as well as their publicized support for President Carter, Mayor Koch, Senator
Byrd, and Governor Grasso were given front-page attention
by the news media when they stepped forward to endorse an
1 Representatives
.
.
Arnb ro an d Barnes were
open convention.
accorded prominence by the media as "leaders" of the Congressional rebellion against Carter and the binding rule. 2
These eight, then, constitute the major spokespersons of
the Open Convention Movement.
THE ROLE OF THE SPOKESPERSONS
The roles of the spokespersons can be divided into
five views, which we have labeled Pragmatic, Correcting,
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Spiritual, Unifying, and Confrontational.

First, Kennedy

and Governor Carey accepted a very pragmatic role as
spokespersons.

Their primary

~ntention

was to open-up the

convention, so that either might step into the gap should
the delegates fail to renominate Jimmy Carter on the first
ballot.

Their arguments were founded on historical pre-

cedent, as well as the philosophical premise of freedom of
choice, but an open convention was a means to an end, not
an end in itself.
Senator Kennedy became the single most prolific
spokesperson of the Open Convention Movement, and he
utilized a variety of rhetorical media to do this.

From

late spring onward, he appeared frequently on such syndicated television programs as NBC's Meet The Press and
ABC's Issues And Answers. 3

He was a frequent speaker at

such meetings as the Los Angeles Press Club, the U.S.
Conference of Mayors, and the Association of Federal, State
and Municipal Employees. 4 By late-May he was giving daily
news interviews, where he challenged Carter Administration
policy and advocated an open convention.

He was a

national leader, head of the liberal wing of the party,
and heir-apparent of the Kennedy claim to the Presidency.
Governor Carey became the unofficial spokesman of
the Open Convention Movement by early May, 1980.

His

aspirations for the nomination were less obvious than
Senator Kennedy's, and hence he spoke more as a man with
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a virtuous cause and less as an aspiring candidate.

He used

his considerable influence as governor of New York to keep
the issue of an open convention frequently on the pages of
newspapers nationwide.

Beginning with his May 5th press

conference in Albany, he reached full stride on May 21st
with his New York Times article, "An Open Convention".
Here he said:
Silence is the politicans pet chameleon
and can be made to blend into any background. Discretion may dictate caution
at this moment but there are times when
a cause is better served with plain talk
- whatever the risks. This year, a
managed convention, merely anointing a
prearranged winner, may adequately express the Republican Party's vision of
America, but the main event for Democrats at Madison Square Garden in August
must not be a simple coronation.5
Secondly, Mayor Koch's role may be viewed as a correcting influence.

As a Carter supporter and mayor of the

nation's most populous city, Koch bore a heavy political
burden.

New York was composed of numerous Ethnic minorities,

many of which faced their own unique problems.

Blacks and

Puerto Ricans both faced unemployment that exceeded twice
the city's average, while the Jewish conununity was furious
over the Carter Administration's anti-Israel stance on a
United Nations vote concerning West Bank settlements. 6
Additionally, the Billy Carter affair with Libya had
angered the Jewish community still further, confirming in
Koch's mind the inepititude of the Administration for
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handling foreign policy crises. 7

Balanced against these

considerations were the more typical responsibilities of
an urban mayor, not the least of which was to curry favor
from the Federal government.

Hence, Koch's dilemma bred

his position - he would gently, sometimes grudgingly,
support the Carter candidacy while recognizing that if
Carter received the Party nomination at an open convention,
his opportunities for recapturing New York's Black, Hispanic and Jewish votes, which Carter lost to Kennedy during
the State's primary, would be markedly improved.

Koch was

too prudent a politican to oppose an incumbent President,
but too outspoken to let certain Administration blunders
go unnoticed or unchallenged.
Thirdly, Mr. Shanker assumed virtually a spiritual
role.

He was a non-political figure standing on "holy

ground", as he epitomized our ideal rhetorician by appealing to the highest nature of the delegates.

His argu-

ment for an open convention was based on a universal
principle - the historical and philosophical right of
each delegate to vote his or her own conscience - wholly
apart from the pragmatics of politics.
Fourthly, the roles of Byrd and Grasso may be viewed
as a unifying influence.

The difference between these two

spokespersons, and the role of Mayor Koch, is one of emphasis.

Neither Byrd nor Grasso emphasized criticism of

Carter, while Koch, on the other hand, pulled no punches. 8
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The Senator and the Governor both emphasized the political
wisdom of uniting the party behind its Presidential nominee,
saying "The President would have a stronger mandate, a
deeper vote of confidence • • • " 9 if the convention were
opened.

Both believed that even an open convention would

renominate Carter, but that party unity would be enhanced
by freeing the delegates. 10 The White House tended to have
a more subdued reaction to this group.

Jody Powell, re-

sponding to Senator Byrd, said that,
Inasmuch as both the President and the
majority leader of the Senate • • •
must work together on matters of some
import to the nation, the White House
is going to decli~e comment on his
statement today.
The Carter camp had a similar response to Governor Grasso's
comments.
Finally, both Representatives Ambro and Barnes assumed a confrontational role.

The Open Convention Move-

ment, as it was personified by Ambro and Barnes and the
other freshmen Congressmen who chose to call themselves
the Committee To Maintain An Open Convention, was the most
strident element in the 1980 Democratic campaign. Their
12
motivation was pure political survival,
and their attacks on both Carter and Kennedy were unbridled and unrelenting.

Appearing on Meet The Press, Congressman Barnes

said that "it would be extraordinarily unlikely" that an
open convention would turn to Senator Kennedy, 13 while
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continued revelations of Billy Carter's ties to Libya had
become "a Chinese water torture." 14 Neither correction nor
unity were the goal here, but these two spokespersons
clearly sought to rid the Democratic Party of both "albatrosses", Carter and Kennedy, in favor of a candidate
whom they perceived as electable. 15
When they finally persuaded Senator Kennedy to sign
a release agreement, 16 whereby his delegates would be free
to abstain on the first ballot, the additional pressure
on the Carter camp for similar concessions brought only
an angry response from Robert Strauss, Carter's campaign
manager. 17 Inspite of the Kennedy camp's release of their
Convention delegates, President Carter never agreed to the
same release, and thus the battle for an open convention
was taken all the way to the floor of Madison Square Garden.
However, while they expressed their role as being peacemakers within the party, their confrontational approach
served only to alienate both Carter and Kennedy supporters.
Interestingly, though the sharpest attacks were issued by
the freshmen Democrats, the Carter camp reacted against
the Kennedy forces.

Mr. Strauss declared,

If we were to free each delegate,
you'd bring total disarray on that
convention floor • • • • To compromise and yield to Kennedy's
demands would just create more
conflicts and the networks would
magnify it.18
Inspite of these demands originating from the freshmen
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Congressmen, they were perceived by the Carter forces as
"Kennedy demands".

SIGNIFICANT RHETORS AND THEIR INFLUENCE
The determination as to whether or not any significant
rhetors arose within the movement is a subjective judgment.
The sheer volume of rhetoric produced by Senator Kennedy
would qualify him for consideration as a significant rhetor.
Then, for his stirring call-to-arms address, "An Open Convention", Governor Carey must be considered a significant
rhetor.

Finally, Albert Shanker's articulate statement in

support of an open-convention must elevate him to the
status of a significant rhetor.
Senator Kennedy's campaign for the Democratic nomination had gotten off to a very slow start, which proved
frustrating to the Senator. 19
Almost as soon as it became clear that
Kennedy didn't stand much chance of
wrestling the nomination from Carter,
he began to win . • • Kennedy wasted
no time in capitalizing on the shifting
mood. He was finally finding his
stride as a campaigner • • • . 20
Campaign aide Paul Kirk called it "a campaign of the
21
heart".
Yet privately, there was anger and bitterness
brewing inside the Kennedy staff.

Stephen Smith, Kennedy's

brother-in-law and campaign director, complained that "nobody stood up for him (Kennedy), not even his old
22
friends."
Kennedy saw himself as a crusader for a cause,
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and this crusade-idea kept him fighting, even after the
23
primaries were over.
By early June, the name of Ted
Kennedy, and his efforts to

br~ng

about an open convention,

were appearing daily in newspapers nationwide.

Yet the

speech for which his 1980 campaign shall be remembered was
his concession speech, on the floor of the Convention, after
the acceptance of the proposed rule one day earlier.
"For all these whose cares have been our concern, the work
goes on, the cause endures, the hope still lives, and the
dream shall never die, 1124 Kennedy implored, and the delegates responded with cheers, tears and chants for 39 un25
. t errup t e d minutes.
.
in

The barn-burner of a speech was Kennedy's
best. He restated the Democratic Party's
concern for the little man and attacked
Reagan with glee. The tone was passionate and eloquent, the substance oldfashioned liberal, evoking the heritage
of the New Deal and the mystique of the
Kennedy's.26
Capsulizing Kennedy's campaign efforts from the early
primaries to the Convention speech, Allan Mayer wrote,
In one night, with one superb speech
that was by turns graceful, rousing,
poetic and defiant, Kennedy transformed what was supposed to have been
a tearful last hurrah into a triumphant
call to arms.27
If Senator Kennedy will be remembered for his concession speech, Governor Carey will be remembered for his
impassioned plea for "An Open Convention."

Where Kennedy

closed the Open Convention Movement with his concession
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speech, Carey first articulated the position on May 21th,
28
1980.
What I propose is, in fact, neither
unfair nor apt to lead to ruinous
division • . • • It recognizes
that the velocity of events requires that we devise a system
for selecting candidates that
offers a choce based on the maxi- 29
mum amount of information possible.
Governor Carey continued to attract attention from the
media, and he often expounded the concept of an open convention, but his May 20th proclamation became a political
shot-heard-round-the-country.
Albert Shanker is a unique character within the
parameters of the Open Convention Movement.

As President

of the United Federation of Teachers, he was a non-political
personality in a highly-political movement.

His appearance

on the scene was also peculiar; arriving virtually out of
no-where, his message struck with megaton-force, only to
find him disappearing into a funnel-cloud of obscurity.
Still, the message rang out a clarion call, addressing
public concerns in the political arena.
If these three represent the most significant rhetors
in the movement, it is more difficult to measure the extent
of influence they exerted.

The Open Convention Movement,

inspite of its strenuous rhetorical efforts to influence
the delegates, also generated a large groundswell of public
support, due to its extensive media exposure.

What
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eventually developed was a public support for the movement
(55 to 38 percent) 30 far exceeding the success achieved
among the delegates.

It is likely that Mr. Shanker's

article was contributory to this public sentiment.

Part

of the psychology of the movement was to use public opinion
to sway the delegates; therefore, if Mr. Shanker's exhortation was a vital influence, he must be considered a
significant rhetor inspite of his lack of producing any
further rhetorical efforts.
After his article, "An Open Convention", Governor
Carey was adopted by the media as the unofficial spokespersons for an open convention policy.

While it was at

times intimated that the Governor had ambitions beyond
his Albany office, as an unofficial candidate his rhetoric
was less suspect than that of Senator Kennedy.

As his

most significant proclamation was trumpeted on May 21st,
there was enough lead time for it to influence both delegates and the general public.

Inspite of the fact that

no statistical evidence is available to support or deny
these contentions, it does appear that Carey gained
considerable stature among the delegates.

For instance,

even the heavily Pro-Carter delegation from Texas allowed
him access, just prior to the convention, for one last
pitch for an open convention (his reaction was mixed,
with some delegates

chanti~g

others chanted "Open It Up").

"We Want Carter", while still
31
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Senator Kennedy was the most often-heard advocate of
an open convention, yet because of his Quixote-esque quest
for the nomination he was also the most contested.

While

President Carter avoided criticism, Robert Strauss, Tom
Donilon and a host of other Carter staffers often criticized
the movement as a Kennedy attempt to rest the nomination
away from Jimmy Carter. 32 Inside the movement, the freshmen Democratic Congressmen continued to repudiate Kennedy
with almost as much vigor as they accorded Carter. 33 Still,
with all the media attention he was accorded, and all the
criticism he attracted, his Concession speech before the
Convention was probably the most memborable oration of the
Democratic campaign of 198o. 34
ALLIANCES OF THE SPOKESPERSONS
Only three spokespersons, Senator Kennedy and Representatives Ambro and Barnes, made attempts at establishing significant alliances.

Senator Kennedy's efforts

were by far the most extensive, but these were aimed at
strengthening his political opportunities for the Presidential nomination.
endorsements, from:

Thus he sought, and received, union
The United Federation of Teachers,

The Sheet Metal Workers International Association, The
Pennsylvania Labor Federation, The United Automobile
Workers Union, as well as 35 member-unions of the AFLCio. 35

He also won the endorsement of Americans for Demo-
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.
.
cratic
Action,
a

t

.
11 y l'b
. t 'ion. 36
ra d'itiona
i era 1 organiza

Representatives Ambro and Barnes sought to attract
approximately 30 to 40 Senators to their cause, believing
that this alliance would erupt into an irreversible flow
to free all the delegates. 37 This alliance never materialized, but one that did draw Edward Bennett Williams and
Arnold Picker to the Committee To Maintain An Open Convention. 38

Williams, a Washington lawyer, financier, and

owner of the Baltimore Orioles baseball franchise, was
named Chairman of the Committee, and fund-raiser Picker
immediately supplied $200,000, having collected pledges on
.
39
h is own.

Thus, the Committee To Maintain An Open Convention
secured for itself a gifted orator and a successful fundraiser, but this was the extent of their alliances.

Ef-

forts to attract Muskie, Mondale, Udall, or Jackson, as
alternates to Carter and Kennedy, would prove unsuccessful
for a variety of political reasons.

Both Muskie and Mon-

dale, in public demonstrations of support for Carter,
squashed draft-movements on their behalf, Mondale saying,
"I am not a candidate • • • and I have no intention of
40
becoming one."
Jackson allowed a draft committee to be
formed, but he refused to actively participate in a dumpCarter effort.

Morris Udall categorically stepped aside

by saying, "If nominated I would run - for the Mexican
border. If elected, I would fight extradition,." 41 and he
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accepted the role as keynote speaker for the National Convention.

These four took their roles from their own

political perceptions, and the rhetorical strategies of the
Open Convention Movement would not sway them.
SUMMARY
In order to define "major spokespersons", three
criteria were established:
1.

They produced a large volume of rhetoric

2.

They produced a significant rhetorical product

3.

The media identified them as spokespersons

Using this criteria, eight spokespersons were identified, including Senator Kennedy, Governor Carey, Mayor Koch,
Mr. Shanker, Governor Grasso, Senator Byrd, and Representatives Ambro and Barnes.
These eight spokespersons demonstrated five distinct
roles, with Kennedy and Carey accepting a pragmatic role,
Koch a correcting role, Shanker a spiritual role, Byrd and
Grasso a unifying role, and Ambro and Barnes a confrontational role.
The movement produced three significant rhetors, in
Senator Kennedy, Governor Carey, and Mr. Shanker, who's
rhetorical products gave impetus to the movement and provided apparent popular support.
Only Senator Kennedy and Representatives Ambro and
Barnes produced any significant alliances during the
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course of the movement, with the Senator being the most
notable achiever.
Having thus considered

t~e

Agents of the Open Conven-

tion Movement, we next turn our attention to their speeches,
interviews, and articles in Chapter Six.
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CHAPTER VI

THE AGENCIES
THE SPEECHES, INTERVIEWS, AND ARTICLES OF
SPOKESPERSONS FOR THE OPEN CONVENTION MOVEMENT
Having already considered the Act, Scene, and Agents
associated with a rhetorical analysis of the Open Convention Movement, we now turn our attention to the Agencies.
Here we shall examine the speeches, interviews, articles,
and other rhetorical devices of spokespersons for the movement, seeking to understand: what rhetorical acts were performed; what strategies were employed, and who employed
them; what rhetorical patterns, if any, repeat themselves;
and finally, as repositories of data, what information and
details were divergent and unique.
THE RHETORICAL ACTS
Political campaigns are typically characterized by
the "stump speech", a basic speech which a candidate presents to many audiences, with only little variation,
through which he delivers the heart of his message.

As

mentioned earlier, however, only Senator Kennedy and Governor Carey were involved in the Open Convention Movement
for three months or longer.

Therefore, because of this
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crisis of time, the movement was not typical of political
situations.

Logic dictated that maximum saturation was re-

quired to effect the attitude change among the delegates,
and spokespersons quickly utilized the readily available
mass media as a medium.

We have chosen two speeches, nine

interviews, two articles, and one statement, as typifying
the rhetoric of the Open Convention Movement.

These in-

clude:
1.

Senator Ted Kennedy's "Basic Speech", (New York
Times, March 10, 1980).

2.

New York Times Interview with Senator Kennedy,
(April 11, 1980).

3.

New York Times Interview with Governor Carey (May
6, 1980).

4.

Governor Carey's Article entitled "An Open Convention", (New York Times, May 21, 1980).

5.

New York Times Interview with the National Organization of Women (June 5, 1980).

6.

New York Times Interview with Senator Kennedy,
(June 11, 1980).

7.

New York Times Interview with members of The Committee To Maintain An Open Convention, (July 25,
1980).

8.

Mr. Shanker's Article entitled "Where We Stand",
(New York ·Times, July 2 7, 19 80) •

9•

New Yor·k ·Times Interview with Governor Carey and
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Mayor Koch, (July 28, 1980).
10.

New York :rrime·s· Interview with Governor Grasso,

11.

(July 30, 1980).
New York Tim:es Interview with Representative
Ambro, (July 31, 1980).

12.

New York Times Interview with Senator Byrd,
(August 3, 1980).

13.

Senator Kennedy's Withdrawal Statement, (New
York Times, August 12, 1980).

14.

Senator Kennedy's Concession Speech (New York
Times, August 13, 1980).

Also indicative of the rhetorical situation which the
spokespersons found themselves in was that more than half
of our representative rhetoric occurred within three weeks
of the Convention, or less.

The above selection is intend-

ed to be representative but not inclusive, typifying the
rhetoric of the movement.

The eight spokespersons, as de-

fined in Chapter Five, are all represented in the above
list of speeches, interviews and articles, and the three
significant rhetors, as well as their important rhetorical
products, are also included.
Senator Kennedy was the only spokesperson in the
movement who consistently used speeches, as a rhetorical
form, to communicate the concept of an open convention. 1
The other sev.en spokespersons primarily used interviews,
both press and television, and articles to communicate the
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Open Convention concept.

The Senator used these forms

also, as well as phone contacts and personal contacts. 2
By early-August, Governor Carey was also using personal
3
contacts with delegates to promote an open convention.
The following charts are provided to assist the reader in his or her understanding of the rhetoric of the Open
Convention Movement.

The charts are designed to give an

over-all grasp of the construction and emphasis of each
rhetorical product, thus supplying a "wholeness" to the
rhetoric.

It should be borne in mind that a Burkean in-

vestigation is primarily concerned with the Strategies
used to achieve Identification. 4 Therefore, what will not
be identified are items such as the degree of ethos,
pathos, and logos presented by each spokespersons, or the
stylistic content (such as metaphors, alliterations, etc.)
These items are typical of an Aristotelian approach, but
are not usually associated with a Burkean-centered investigation.

While a consideration of Invention, for instance,

is instructional in an understanding of the rhetoric of a
given speaker, the interrelatedness of areas within the
Pentad provides its own insight and appreciation for the
manner and effectiveness achieved by the various spokespersons of the movement.
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THE RHETORICAL STRATEGIES
In Chapter One, seven rhetorical strategies were
catalogues:
1.

The Strategy of Thwarting - whereby Candidate
car.ter was portrayed as beatable.

2.

The Strategy of Confrontation - whereby President
Carter was portrayed as incapable of the demands
of his off ice.

3.

The Strategy of Viability - wherein alternate
candidates were portrayed as acceptable.

4.

The Strategy of Unity - wherein Party unity was
stressed.

5.

The Strategy of Precedence - wherein historical
precedent and the current Democratic Party charter were cited in opposition to the proposed
rule.

6.

The Strategy of Principle - wherein philosophical
grounds were developed in opposition to the rule.

7.

The Strategy of Self-Esteem - wherein delegates
were asked to choose their own roles within the
Convention.

A glance at the previous charts will reveal the following; there were 45 uses of the seven rhetorical strategies by the Agents, while 22 times they presented unique
information or demands.

The number One strategy, in terms

of use, was the Strategy of Confrontation, used 11 times

140
on 8 different occasions; second was the Strategy of SelfEsteem, used 8 times on 6 different occasions; third was
the Strategy of Thwarting, used 7 times on 5 occasions,
fourth place was a tie between the Strategies of Viability
and Unity, both used 6 times on 6 different occasions; next
was the Strategy of Principle, used 4 times on 4 occasions;
and last, the Strategy of Precedence was used 3 times on 2
different occasions.
The seven rhetorical strategies did not all happen at
one time, nor were they all practiced by each of the eight
spokespersons. 5

Collectively, however, they convey the

sense of emphasis and direction which the spokespersons
developed over the course of time.

To illustrate their

usage, we shall consider each strategy individually.
The Strategy of Thwarting, we have said, portrayed
Candidate Carter as beatable.

This strategy was employed

on June 10, when with the conclusion of the primaries and
President Carter statistically having captured enough delegates to regain the nomination, Senator Kennedy pressed the
strategy
In a speech at Anaheim, California, to
the American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees, (Kennedy) noted that government officials
often faced budget deficits, and then
said: 'Somehow they always manage to
close the gap, wgich is exactly what
I intend to do',
referring to his contest with President Carter for the
nomination.
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The strategy was also illustrated by Senator Byrd
when he responded to a question about Mr. Carter's reelection prospects by saying, "it would be pretty difficult
for Mr. Carter if the election were held at this time". 7
Again, Thwarting was used by the Congressional "Mavericks" at a news conference, when Representative Barnes
expressed concern that Jinuny Carter could not beat Ronald
Reagan at that time. 8 Benjamin Rosenthal (New York), as
one of the late-July organizers of the Conunittee To Maintain

An

Open Convention, said, "We reflect the public.

And there is no support for Carter in this country.

In my

district he would run third today. 119
The Strategy of Confrontation was the most often
used strategy and was practiced by a larger group of spokespersons.

For instance, at his May 5th news conference,

Governor Carey catalogued his perceived shortcomings of
the Carter Administration by specifying "the interest
rates, the discharge of auto workers, the near collapse of
the economy on the housing side, unemployment raging upwards, (and) skyrocketing inflation ••• 1110 In his March 10
speech Senator Kennedy said,
The "disgrace of the human race" of
1976 has become an accepted part of
Administration's embrace of the status quo in 1980. Yet Federal spending through the tax laws has nearly
doubled during the past three years
• • • nor will it work to excuse inflation as an inevitable result of
rising energy costs, to blame it all
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on "a worldwide problem with oil
prices". • .11
attempting to paint President Carter as an incapable President and an undesirable candidate for the 1980 nomination.
He continued this Strategy of Confrontation on April 11th,
by saying,
From both the Republican front-runner
and a Democratic incumbent, now striving to become a pale carbon copy, we
are hearing the incantations of an
economic politics that is outworn,
irrelevant and, in the end, dangerous
to the social fabric of the nation. • •
at stake is not merely the continuity
of a party but the integrity of the
nation. We must not enter a new decade with a consensus against the past
but no consensus about the future. I
am not appealing in this campaign
solely for a candidacy, or even for a
program, but for a new social bond
that can temper the rancors and rivalries among us • • • 12
Mayor Koch participated in the Strategy of Confrontation, but never conunitted himself to the Strategy of
Thwarting.

In other words, he openly criticized what he

perceived to be weaknesses in the Carter Administration,
but he never advocated the rejection of Carter.

For in-

stance, Koch threatened to withdraw his support of Carter
(though he never actually did so) during a City Hall news
conference July 27th, in which he repeatedly referred to
"Billygate." 13 Described by the press as a "measured retreat from his once vociferous support of Mr. Carter", 14
Koch affirmed his continued support of the President, but
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added this warning: "I don't want to rule out the possibility that under certain circumstances I might not. 1115
Senator Byrd was critical of the President's handling
of Billy Carter's dealings with Libya, "stating that the
affair had shown 'bad judgment and rather amateurish' conduct of foreign policy 16 In the Senator's opinion, White
11

•

House handling of the Billy Carter case was "politically
damaging to the President but • • • (it) need not be considered permanent or fatal 17 illustrating Confrontation.
11

,

The Senator continued to press his case when he said,
I don't believe in family diplomacy
to start with. I think it was an act
of rather poor judgment to even think
of sending the President's brother to
any country to carry out foreign policy, particularly Libya.18
Since self-interest was the admitted chief motivator
of the Congressional mavericks, it is not surprising that
confrontation was implicit within their rhetoric, while at
other times this strategy was more explicit; Mr. Barnes'
description of continuing revelations of Billygate as
"Chinese water torture" was a less-than-subtle stab at the
19
.
Strategy o f Con f rontation.

The Strategy of Viability was cultivated in order to
portray other candidates as acceptable.

Some of the spokes-

persons were discreet, while others were blunt and uncompromising.
For instance, at his May new conference, Carey said:
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I have suggested that it would be far
more preferable this year for the candidates to ask for an "open" convention where the delegates would be free
to close ranks behind the best person,20
typifying the strategy.
In an effort to maintain a discreet distance from the
plummeting popularity of President Carter, Senator Byrd
said he could support either Carter or Kennedy as the Democratic nominee, 21 which put him in practice of the Strategy
of Viability.
New York's Mayor Ed Koch participated in the Strategy
of Viability only by implication, hinting that continued
faux-pas' on the Administration's part would push him to
support some other candidate. 22
After a June interview,
Underscoring his refusal to withdraw
from the 1980 Presidential race,
Senator Edward M. Kennedy dispatched
two-dozen special delegate hunters
across the country today, then hit
the campaign trail once more • • • Mr.
Kennedy kept his long-shot challenge
prominently in public view through
a series of speeches, Congressional
hearings, and appearances • • • 23
portraying his candidacy as viable.
"'What we're looking for is an alternative to both'
(Carter and Kennedy), said Representative Jerome A. Ambro
of Long Island, one of the Democrats uncommitted in the
" 24
P resi·dent 'ia 1 race, ••••
~I'm very concerned about the possibility of a Reagon Presidency',
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said Representative Barnes.
'Jimmy
Carter couldn't beat Reagan today.
Conceivably he (Carter) could win
eventually. But I think there are

other candidates who could win much
more readily•.25
In his next breath, Mr. Barnes named Muskie and Mondale as
two possible "other" candidates, 26 thus illustrating Thwarting and Viability.

Mr. Ambro contended that the President

"might make it on the first ballot" even at an open convention, but if he did not, both he and Kennedy would be rejected for a third candidate. 27
The Strategy of Unity was practiced by several
spokespersons within the movement.

For instance, Governor

Carey said he felt assured that an open convention would
allow the Democratic candidate to have "the party clearly
united behind him ••• 1128
Governor Grasso, a staunch Carter supporter, said:
I think the President, since he is
the front runner, is the obvious
one to make the gesture (to free his
delegates) so we don't have a bloodbath, so we don't have bitterness,
so we emerge from the convention
united.29
Mrs. Grasso said at her news conference that she continued to support the President, and believed he would prevail even if the convention adopted a rule releasing delegates from voting for candidates to whom they are now
pledged on the first ballot.JO

To avoid even the appear-

ance of criticism of the Carter Administration, the Gover-

146

nor added she "would vote for the convention rule supported
by the Carter campaign, to bind delegates on the first
ballot". 31 She said her proposal was only an attempt to
unify the Convention.
In a similar tone, Senator Byrd, speaking on August
2, endorsed an open convention and said:
The President would have a stronger
mandate, a deeper vote of confidence,
if the nomination were secured on the
basis of the personal preference of
delegates, based on current circumstances at the time of the convention •
• • It's the democratic way, with a
smal 1 • d ' • 32
Thus, we have two prominent Carter supporters (Grasso and
Byrd) both practicing the Strategy of Unity, with Mr. Byrd
also practicing the Strategies of Confrontation, Thwarting,
Viability and Self-Esteem.
Governor Carey utilized the Strategy of Precedence
when he def ended his proposal for an open convention as
being neither unfair nor ruinously divisive, but provided
.
f or in
current party gui"d e l"ines. 33

Similarly, both Kennedy and his aides had applied the
Strategy of Precedence by appealing to the delegates via
the Democratic Party charter.
The party charter, in a clause relied on by the Kennedy camp, prohibits the party from requiring
any delegate to vote against the
dictates of his or her conscience.34
Mr. Shanker's article, "Where We Stand", illustrated
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the Strategies of Precedence, Principle, and Self-Esteem.
From first line:
A little paragraph tucked into the
temporary convention rules that have
been proposed by the Democratic
National Committee could reduce the
Democratic Party's convention to a
deliberative body with little more
to deliberate than delegates do at
the Supreme Soviet.35
To last:
If the delegates in New York two
weeks from now vote to accept the
proposed rule change, they will be
voting not only to 'bind' themselves~ but to gag themselves as
well.3
"Where We Stand" systematically attacked and refuted the
proposed rule.

No where in his article does Mr. Shanker

criticize the President directly, suggest the viability of
another candidate, or even suggest that President Carter
might not recapture the Democratic nomination.

His rhetor-

ical significance lies entirely in the Strategies of Precedence, Principle and Self-Esteem.
The commission on party rules ••• found
a rich history of 'bound' delegates
switching their votes, and of the nominating conventions recognizing that
right. In 1952, for instance, delegates selected under the terms of
Oregon state law were 'bound' to support Estes Kefauver, ••• But an Oregon
delegate ended up voting for Adlai
Stevenson. Or take the 1924 convention, which required 103 ballots to
pick its candidate.37
The Strategy of Principle was alluded to by Governor
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Carey, and developed by Albert Shanker.

For instance, in

his article entitled "An Open Convention", the Governor insisted that "it is because of _my deep commitment to the
Democratic Party, and to the principles for which it
stands, 1138 that he would continue to press the issues.
Mr. Shanker illustrated the principle in his article
by asserting:
This dilemma is best described by the
British philosopher and legislator
Edmund Burke in 1774. Burke acknowledged his duty to his own constituents,
whose "wishes ought to have great
weight with him: their opinion high
respect; their business unconunitted
attention". But, he added, "Your representative owes you not his industry
only, but his judgment, and he betrays
instead of serving if he sacrifices it
to your opinion 11 .39
Finally, many spokespersons practiced the Strategy
of Self-Esteem, appealing to the delegates to choose their
own roles at the Convention.

For instance, as chairman of

the Cormnittee to Maintain an Open Convention, Edward Bennett Williams led the Congressional mavericks in the practice of this singular strategy, when he declared that the
binding rule would undo "148 years of Democratic history
and reduce the (delegates) to nothing more than robots or
automatons. 1140 He insisted that the movement wished only
to see the delegates vote their own will, and not be "led
like lemmings to the sea. 1141
Richard Stearns, Kennedy's chief delegate-hunter
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explained:
What we'll argue ·with the Carter delegates is that they have to think not
only about their previously expressed
affinity for the President but also
the role of a national party. We have
to convince them that they are not
going to New York just to ratify an
earlier decision but to set an agenda
for the next four years and pick someone who can carry it out.42
When Governor Carey declared that
delegates to a Presidential convention
should not be herded, like branded
sheep, into a pen where they are expected to perform in a predictable
manner,43
he was practicing the Strategy of Self-Esteem very clearly.
In this same article, he contended:
This year, a managed convention,
merely anointing a prearranged
winner, may adequately express the
Republic Party's vision of America,
but the main event for Democrats
••• must not be a simple coronation.44
Events, he contended, changed so fast that
a narrow majority, culled in a
checkered process, no longer represented the will of the party,
but delegates should have the
choice of selecting a candidate who
currently reflected the will of the
people.45
In his article, Mr. Shanker also expounded this
strategy when decrying:
The proposed rule change would be
an affront to every delegate.
These are people, after all, who
have long paid their dues to the
party, not merely with money but
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time, often over many years, doing all
the chores necessary to help the party's
candidates and its platforms. They
know what politics is about ••• they are
not going to change their votes merely
because of some passing whim. But they
do have minds. They are not children.
If the Democratic National Committee is
determined to treat them like children,
ready to yank delegates suspected of
misbehaving, why have them there to
participate in the presidential nominating process at all? If the delegates
in New York two weeks from now vote to
accept the proposed rule change, they
will be voting not only to 'bind' themselves but to gag themselves as wel1.46
It should be noted here that only Senator Kennedy
systematically developed these rhetorical strategies over a
period of time, assembling them much like building blocks.
While Governor Carey had the time to do likewise, he chose
to trumpet the Strategies of Thwarting, Confrontation,
Unity, Viability, and Self-Esteem simultaneously. 47 The
other spokespersons were required, by time constraints, to
shotgun their way onto the rhetorical scene.
THE RHETORICAL THEMES
To understand which, if any, rhetorical themes repeat
themselves in movement rhetoric, we must remind ourselves
that we are looking for recurring topics in the rhetoric of
the Open Convention Movement.

These recurring themes may

concur, at times, with our rhetorical strategies, but they
are not limited to that scope.

As discussed in Chapter One,

these two concepts over-lap, thus making a discrete defini-
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tion and distinction between them virtually impossible.
True, we have said that "strategies" help us to understand
how the spokespersons presented their rhetoric, while "rhetorical themes" demonstrate what topics recur in the rhetoric of the movement.

These rhetorical themes are the prod-

uct of a movement propelled by a unique rhetorical situation,
and composed of a conglomerate of loose-knit participants,
most of whom were elected officials.
In light of the movement's primary purposes, it might
be expected that appeals to release the delegates from the
binding rule would be prominent in the rhetoric of the Open
Convention Movement.

Governor Carey called upon President

Carter and Senator Kennedy to "release all their delegates
and hold a totally open convention 48 In the same inter11

•

view, he asserted that events had changed many peoples'
minds since the New Hampshire primary in February, and
"delegates to the convention should be able to reflect that
change of mind in their votes". 49 The Governor later asserted his preference for "an open convention where the
delegates would be free to close ranks behind the best
person". 50 Bella Abzug called for "an open convention, in
which delegates would be released to vote for the candidate
of their choice on the first ballot". 51 Richard Stearns, a
Kennedy aide, said of the delegates: "we have to convince
them that they're not going to New York just to ratify an
earlier decision.

.. 52

Governor Carey said he would
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"lend his name and office to the 40 Congressmen campaigning
for an open convention, (where) delegates would be free to
53
choose a nominee other than President Carter"."
Senator
Byrd endorsed an open convention, and urged delegates to
reject the binding rule, saying,
The President would have a stronger
mandate • • • if the nomination were
secured on the basis of the ~ersonal
preference of delegates. • • 4
This conunon thread runs through the rhetoric of spokespersons for the Open Convention Movement, but opposition to
the proposed rule was predicated upon certain other factors.
One factor was a disbelief in the leadership abilities of President Carter, and this attitude took two primary forms of expression.

The first often attacked the

President's handling of the economy, as when Senator Kennedy said:
For the families of Chicago, an 18
percent rate of inflation is more
than a statistic • • • for the elderly,
inflation means cruel choices between
enough heat for their apartments and
enough food on their tables • • • for
workers, inflation means wages declining in purchasing power • • • for
middle-class families, inflation
means increased costs for college. •
.and for the poorest among us, inflation means an impoverishment of the
already bleak bareness of their lives
• • .our highest officials now admit
that we confront an economic crisis.SS
Senator Kennedy called President Carter a "pale carbon copy" of Ronald Reagan,56 charging that Carter's pro-
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posed budget cuts would work "great hardship on the poor but
would not significantly curb inflation 11 • 57

Governor Carey

cited "The interest rates, the discharge of auto workers,
the near collapse of the economy on the housing side, unemployment raging upwards, skyrocketing inflation.

.. 58 in

arguing against Carter economic policies.
The second expression of dissatisfaction with Carter
attacked the President's approach to foreign policy, and was
epitomized by the Billy Carter affair with Libya.

By late-

July, Mayor Koch threatened to withdraw his s.upport of
Carter because of "Billygate" (a Republican-coined term). 59
In the same interview, Governor Carey described the Billy
Carter affair as "damaging to the Presidency 11 • 60 Senator
Byrd criticized the President's "rather amateurish conduct
of foreign policy" by asserting that
I don't believe in family diplomacy to
start with. I think it was an act of
rather poor judgment to even think of
sending the President's brother to any
country to carry out foreign policy,
particularly Libya.61
Another factor involved in opposition to the proposed
rule was the argument that Party unity would be hindered by
the rule.

Governor Carey argued that an open convention

"with an element of genuine risk would be the best way to
drive the Democrats together behind one candidate 11 • 62 The
Governor later asserted that his call for an open convention would ensure "that the Democratic candidate has the
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party clearly behind him • • • " 63

The original letter

drafted by the freshmen Congressmen, and addressed to both
Carter and Kennedy,

emphasize~

"that for the sake of unity

necessary for a Democratic victory in November, the convention be permitted to make its decision in an open manner".64
Of course, both Governor Grasso and Senator Byrd publicly
pleaded for Party unity, and this was the only cause espoused by the Governor. 65
While establishing an historical precedence for an
open convention, Governor Carey, Senator Kennedy and Mr.
Shanker all acclaimed the current Party charter as clearly
permitting the delegates to vote "their own conscience 66
11

•

These three were named in Chapter Five as the most significant spokespersons in the movement, and one common thread
throughout their rhetoric is this appeal to the Party charter.
DIVERGENT INFORMATION AND DETAILS
While we may observe from the above that certain
rhetorical patterns do indeed repeat themselves in movement
rhetoric, it should be noted that not all the rhetoric of
the Open Convention Movement was repetitive.

Scattered

throughout the rhetoric of the movement were examples of
information and details which was unique and unassociated
with the mainstream of rhetorical strategy.
For instance, on May 21, 1980, Governor Carey criti-
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cized the current primary system as a causal factor in the
need for an open convention.
Deep changes and movements inside and
outside the United States are calling
into serious question the efficacy of
the drawn-out primary process • • • we
live in an era when voters can be manipulated by news media coverage of
manipulated events; when events of
major significance occur with terrible
rapidity.67
This singular pronouncement by a spokesperson within the
movement led to Carey's own suggestion of a possible solution:
eliminate the existing system of
local primaries, replacing it with a
regional or national selection for
each party just prior to a limited
campaign period.68
Carey was not the only person to make such a suggestion, 69
but he was the only spokesperson within the movement to
publish this view.
In a joint interview with Iris Mitgang (National wornen's Political caucus), Bella Abzug, President of Women,
U.S.A., said that women "would unite around issues this
year, rather than automatically endorsing the Democratic
nominee", as feminists had done in the past. 70 While it
was threatened that women might support the independent
candidacy of Representative John B. Anderson in protest
against President Carter, 71 this was the first time a block
of voters, personified by a movement participant, threatened to rally around a set of issues as opposed to support-
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ing a given candidate.
The rhetorical style of the freshman Congressman was
peculiar to their sub-group, and predicated upon political
self-interest.

This was the only group to seek "an alter-:
native to both" Carter and Kennedy, 72 thus inextricably
tying these two political adversaries together, dealing
with them as one undesirable entity.

Later, Representative

Ambro explained the group psychology by saying that, "Survival is a natural instinct of all politicians 72 for the
11

,

first time enunciating his reason for involvement in the
movement.

This reasoning seemed to characterize most mem-

bers of the Committee To Maintain

An

Open Convention, but

it was enunciated only this one time.
While political rhetoric is often characterized by
verbal opposition to the opposing party's candidate, the
rhetoric of the Open Convention Movement is conspicuous by
its lack of attacks on Republican Ronald Reagan.

In his

concession speech, however, Senator Kennedy repeatedly attacked Reagan (which he had done earlier in speeches, but
not to this degree or with this singular vehemence).

The

overwhelming quantity of rhetoric published and recorded
by the movement was directed at opposition to the proposed
rule, and/or opposition to the renomination of Jimmy Carter.
Citing numerous remarks by Mr. Reagan (some of which he
labeled "preposterous"), 74 the Senator accused the Republican nominee of being "no friend of labor, • • • no friend of
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our great urban centers, • • • no friend of the senior
75
citizen, • • • (and) no friend of the environment 11 •
These examples of original and unique data generated
by the Open Convention Movement, help us to understand the
participants and their noval concerns.

These data were

not part of the rhetorical themes, nor necessarily concurrent with our seven rhetorical strategies, but it did
present a fresh breath in the political atmosphere in 1980.
SUMMARY
While the "stump" speech may characterize political
rhetoric, the Open Convention Movement was typified by
press conferences, and because of this, nine interviews,
two speeches, two articles, and one statement were chosen
as representative of the rhetorical output of the movement.
The Strategy of Confrontation was the most frequently
used rhetorical strategy, being used 11 times on 8 different occasions.

The Strategy of Precedence was the least

used strategy.
Certain rhetorical themes were demonstrated to repeat themselves within the rhetoric of the Open Convention
Movement, as might be expected in a movement in which
persons were drawn

t~gether

in response to a commonly

perceived problem.
Inspite of this redundancy, certain information and
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details were unique, such as G.overnor Carey's call for a
national primary, and Bella Abzug's threat that women
might unite around issues, as opposed to a particular
candidate.
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CHAPTER VII
THE PURPOSE
OPPOSITION TO PROPOSED RULE F(3) (C)
Having already looked at what took place during the
1980 Democratic campaign for the Presidential nomination,
the background against which it was set, and who did what
to whom, we at last come to the point where we ask, Why?
In this chapter we shall investigate:

the primary and

secondary purposes for which the movement existed; some
of the consequences of the delegate decision on F(3) (C);
and finally, the impact of the rhetorical medium on the
delegate decision.
THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY PURPOSES
Again it must be said that the primary purpose of
the Open Convention Movement was to present, through
symbolic acts, opposition to Proposed Rule F(3) (C).

This

is the common ground upon which all the participants
stood; it is the thread which binds this unlikely band
together.

Whatever divergent goals, cross ambitions or

opposing philosophies they may have possessed, upon this
one objective they could all agree - Proposed Rule
F(3) (C) must not bind the delegates.
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Conceived in 1978 by the Democratic Rules Committee,
it was approved for delegate consideration at the 1980 Convention, as follows:
F. Voting
3) Roll Call Votes
(C) All delegates to the National Convention shall be bound to vote for the
Presidential candidate whom they were
elected to support for at least the
first convention ballot, unless released in writing by the Presidential
candidate. Delegates who seek to violate this rule may be replaced with an
alternate of the same Presidential
preference by the Presidential candidate or that candidate's authorized
representative(s) at any time up to
and including the Presidential balloting at the national convention.!
The original intent was to stabilize the delegates
representing a minority candidate, where a Convention "stampede" to a favorite candidate might deprive the minority
candidates of their first-ballot opportunities. 2

What

developed in 1980 was quite nearly the reverse, with the
favorite candidate seeking to implement the rule to avoid
erosion of his delegate strength on the first ballot.
There were two secondary purposes, which broke down
along political lines.

One purpose was identified as the

"dump Carter" drive (represented by the numerically largest
faction).

This group included a variety of figures, from

Senator Kennedy and Governor Carey, to Representatives
Ambro and Barnes, among others.

For several reasons this

group did not want Jimmy Carter to recapture the Democratic

167
nomination and, as we have seen, some were quite vocal
3
about their intent.
An additional secondary purpose was to seek Democrat-

ic Party unity, probably desired by most if not all participants in the movement but espoused by only a minority,
the most conspicuous being Governor Grasso and Senator
Byrd.

Basically, these "Carterites" within the movement

advocated unity because, they said, it would help lead the
Party to victory in November without alienating the Kennedy
forces. 4 The presence of independent candidate John B.
Anderson was a source of concern to Democratic politicos,
who worried that Anderson might appear an attractive alter5
native should Kennedy not win the nomination.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE DECISION
The consequences of the delegate vote on F(3)(C) may
be viewed as producing inunediate and long-term results.
The immediate results on the Convention were quite obvious.
The rhetorical strategies of the movement influenced approximately 20 percent of the Carter supporters: thus, when the
vote was taken on August 11th, the count was 1,936.4 favoring the rule and 1,390.6 against.

With that the delegates

bound themselves to their respective candidates on the
first ballot and Jinuny Carter easily captured the renomination of the Democratic Party.

In fact, after the vote on

the rule, Senator Kennedy withdrew his candidacy and in-
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structed his staff that he wanted the Presidential balloting to be unanimous.
The long-term effects of the movement on the Convention and its decision are more subtle, and subject to
greater individual interpretation.

The over-all effect of

the rhetorical strategies of the movement was divisive;
rather than arrive at consensus, or maximize Identification,
the rhetoric of the spokespersons deepened the rift in the
Democratic Party. 6 The two major factions were crystallized, actually diminishing the level of unity and, therefore, contributing to the defeat in November, though one
cannot categorically lay the defeat of the Carter-Mondale
ticket at the door of the Open Convention Movement without
first recognizing other factors operating on the rhetorical
situation.
The apparent mis-communication between the Carter and
Kennedy staffs caused the Senator to arrive at Madison
Square Garden much later than the President had wanted;
after his acceptance of the nomination, Carter wanted Kennedy to join him on the podium for the traditional show of
unity, while the delegates danced in the aisles.

Instead,

Kennedy did not leave his hotel suite until the Carter
celebration had ended.

Kennedy expected to be on the po-

dium with only the Carter family, but found himself one of
many celebrities on a very crowded podium; miffed, he left
quickly and unceremoniously. 7
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The independent candidacy of John Anderson possibly
drew added support from previous Kennedyites after the
Democratic National Convention.

Statistics do not appear

to be readily available, examining the percentage of support which the Anderson campaign received from the Kennedy
element.

However, from his seven percent showing in the

November election, it may be reasonably assumed that no
large defections took place.
Jimmy Carter had always been an "outsider" to the
Senators and Congressmen on the Hill. 8 Whereas an incumbent President has a great deal of political power to exercise, Carter's poor relationship on the Hill severely inhibited his ability to campaign effectively.

This, coupled

with the fact that his level of acceptance among voters had
plununeted to 22 percent, created an enormous election obstacle. 9
These factors must be coupled with voter disaffection
over escalating unemployment, spiraling inflation, the
Billy Carter escapade, and continuing frustration over the
Iranian hostage situation and the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan. 10 Therefore, the rhetoric of the Open Convention Movement may be considered as one of many contributing factors to the Carter loss in November.
The longest-term ramifications of the movement can
only be imagined.

There was indeed both an historical prec-

edent and a philosophical basis for an open convention.
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However, as most of the spokespersons developed their
rhetoric within the aforementioned strategies, they were
perceived by the delegates as partisan rhetors.
The decision of the delegates to bind themselves
established a new precedent and, perhaps, a new ritual
for future Democratic Conventions.

While several persons

have advanced the concept of a national primary as one
new reform, as of this writing nothing has seriously been
proposed.

Therefore, one must assume future delegates

will perform roles more closely allied to that of the
Electoral College than their former roles as political
"king-makers". 11
THE IMPACT OF THE RHETORICAL MEDIUM
By rhetorical medium we mean an intervening element
through which rhetoric is transmitted and an effect produced.

Hence, speeches and interviews may be considered

as medium, but it would also be possible to think of the
transmitter of these as a medium.
would be the mass media.

In this case, that

We shall therefore look at both

these elements as we seek to understand the impact of the
rhetorical medium.
An inspection of our fourteen rhetorical samples

from the Open Convention Movement reveals that news conferences and interviews (totalling nine) were by far the
most often used avenue of· the spokespersons.

To be sure,
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we are left with two spe.eches, two articles, and one brief
statement, but inasmuch as the mass media was readily available, spokespersons for the movement were not reluctant to
make use of it.
Rhetorically, spokespersons for the Open Convention
Movement operated through numerous medium to reach the
delegates to the Democratic National Convention.

Daily

news reports on television and in print from late-June
onward, weekly articles in news magazines from mid-May,
as well as many guest appearances on syndicated television
programs such as Meet The Press and Issues and Answers,
all combined to provide avenues for these spokespersons.
Indeed, we have suggested earlier that the Open Convention
Movement might be described as a media event.
Only Mr. Shanker related to the delegates as an informed and concerned citizen.

The other seven spokespersons

were elected officials, and were perceived as partisans.
Two final assumptions need to be stated here:
1.

Mass Communication ordinarily does not serve
as a necessary and sufficient cause of audience
effects, but rather functions through the nexus
of selective exposure, perception, and re12
.
en ion.
t

2.

t

The ge·neral ·e·ffect of mass communication is to
reinforce existing attitudes, beliefs and per.

ceptions.

13.
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In other words, "good Democratic propaganda" makes
better Democrats and stronger Republicans.
to 1980, the spokespersons

wer~

With respect

able to crystallize Carter

antagonists and also attracted Carter supporters whose
political commitment was somewhat weak.

However, among

strong Carter supporters, these delegates were crystalized
in support of the President and Proposed Rule F(3) (C).
By early-June, Senator Kennedy and his staff developed an operating strategy whereby they would seek to
contact and influence delegates by phone and personal
contact. 14 This was developed at the conclusion of the
"primary season", and while it was decided not to abandon
the traditional avenues of speeches, interviews, and press
releases, this additional step was undertaken.

This ap-

preach was unique for two reasons:
1.

It was unprecedented, especially in the
development of the Open Convention Movement.

2.

It was unduplicated by other participants in
the movement.

This last fact is noteworthy because the Kennedy
forces made no effort to conceal this new strategy, but
rather announced it publicly. 15 This "personalized" appreach could have filtered the exposure of

del~gates

to

the message, making them more receptive and ultimately
altering

th~ir

perception and response.

Therefore, what we find are rhetorical strategies
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used by spokespersons to appeal to the delegates on immediate issues of Party politics.

With the single excep-

tion of Albert Shanker's appeal to the delegates on philosophical grounds, drawing upon the illustration of Edmund
Burke, the other spokespersons chose not to appeal to the
highest nature of the delegates.

While appeals could have

been made which transcended current political issues, no
such course was followed in any of the published rhetoric
of the movement.
The medium of interviews and speeches and articles
was often transmitted to the delegates through the mass
media.

This served to crystallize the delegates into two

philosophical camps, as their existing ideas and beliefs
were reinforced.

The extensive use of the media, coupled

with external factors such as the national economy, the
fate of the hostages in Iran, and the political power of
an incumbent President, precluded the achievement of
Identification, and the desired defeat of Proposed Rule
F(3) (C).

SUMMARY
The primary purpose of the Open Convention Movement
was to present,

thro~gh

proposed rule.

Secondarily, some participants sought to

symbolic acts, opposition to the

"dump" President Carter, while others attempted to_ generate
party unity.
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The immediate consequences of the decision was the
acceptance of the proposed rule, which bound the delegates
on the first ballot.
The longer-term effects of the movement on the Convention are more subtle.

The over-all effect of the

rhetoric was divisive; rather than achieve Identification
(thereby maximizing consensus) , the rift between the two
major factions (Kennedyites and Carterites) was deepened.
It is probable that the rhetoric of the movement was contributory to the November defeat of the Carter-Mondale
ticket.

The decision to bind themselves has set a new

precedent for the delegates to the Democratic National
Conventions of the future, altering their roles.
Finally, the mass media probably contributed to the
lack of Identification, as we have assumed that the general
effect of mass communication is to reinforce existing
beliefs and attitudes.

With a 2-to-l edge for the Car-

terites, this approach crystallized both camps, resulting
ultimately in a Carter victory.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS
Webster has defined Conclusion as a "judgment, decision or opinion formed after an investigation or thought".
Having undertaken the task of investigating and analyzing
the rhetoric of the Open Convention Movement, the time has
come to return our attention to the purpose of the study,
enunciated in Chapter One.

Do

we now understand the rheto-

rical strategies of the movement?

Do certain rhetorical

themes repeat themselves in movement study?

Was Identi-

fication possible in this context, in light of internal and
external factors?

Having considered a response to these

questions, we must also ask, were the rhetorical efforts of
the movement worth doing?

The criteria of McBurney and

Wrage will be utilized in responding to this question, including the Results, Ethical, Truth, and Artistic Theories.
Finally, we shall catalog what we learned from doing this
study, seek to determine what we did wrong, and endeavor to
explain what needs to be looked at next.
In Chapter One we catalogued seven rhetorical strategies, which we noted had evolved quite naturally after
prolonged exposure to the rhetoric of the movement.

These

strategies seem to cover the major concerns of participants,
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as they voiced their worries over time.

Not every utterance

fits snugly into one of our seven "boxes" (i.e., Governor
Carey's suggestion for a national primary), but the majority of rhetorical concerns do seem to apply to one or another of the categories.
One must ask at some point, did the Burkean method
create the strategies, or were they generated by the movement and merely glimpsed by the method?

A perusal of the

published rhetoric of the Open Convention Movement would
seem to indicate the latter.

For instance, a recurring

theme in the rhetoric is opposition to the continued leadership of Jimmy Carter, both on the grounds of his inability to manage the office of the Presidency, as perceived by
some participants, and his diminishing political popularity
with the electorate, as perceived by other participants.
Another recurring theme is the drive for Party unity, advocated by a member of participants.

Whatever method of

analysis had been chosen, and whatever titles were "hung"
on these strategies, these recurring themes were a reality
of the rhetoric of the Open Convention Movement.
We have expressed as our purpose for this study "to
analyze the rhetorical strategies of the Open Convention
Movement".

By questing for "rhetorical strategies", our

study has established a Burkean premise, since Strategy is
a key term and concept of Burke.

Therefore, it would seem

that both the purpose and the method are inextricably tied
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together.
As mentioned in Chapter Six, certain rhetorical
themes did repeat themselves in the rhetoric of the Open
Convention Movement.

The rhetorical situation which gives

rise to socio-political movements would have a tendency to
draw people together "in response to a particular crisis",
uniting them behind a conunon cause.

This would tend to

produce "recurring themes", though further study needs to
be done in this area before this conclusion can be universally verified.

As a unique political movement, the Open

Convention Movement did produce certain repeating rhetorical themes.
When pondering the possibility of achieving Identification, internal factors inherent in the movement as well
as external factors must be considered.

Internally, we

have seen that the participants in the movement divided
into four distinct sub-groups, including Candidates, Supporters, Carterites, and Mavericks.

These four groups dis-

played diverse goals and ambitions, as well as differing
levels of Identification among themselves.

Identification

among the Candidates, Supporters and Carterites was high,
while among participants in the Mavericks sub-group it was
moderate.

However, between the Mavericks and other sub-

groups the level of Identification was low.

The level be-

tween the three other sub-groups was generally high as they
related to one another, but only low-to-moderate as they
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related to the Mavericks.

These factionalized participants

sought to achieve Identification among the delegates, and
to defeat Proposed Rule F{3) {C).
Additionally, only two spokespersons {Kennedy and
Carey) advocated an open convention for three months or
longer, while many participants became involved during the
summer months, only weeks before the Convention.

Thus the

movement became a prisoner of the deadline it faced, and
rhetoric to unite the participants did not appear and apparently was not produced.

The little time that was avail-

able was used to reach the delegates, sometimes through
generating public support.
Unlike social movements which seek public involvement, the Open Convention Movement was concerned with the
political opinions of elected delegates to a national convention.

Some of these delegates felt a keen sense of

loyalty to the candidate they represented in their local
primaries, while others felt that to change their minds
was tantamount to changing rules in the middle of the game,
thus betraying their constituency back home.

This bifur-

cated sense of loyalty compounded the task of those in the
movement, who were already hampered by time constraints.
Most of the spokespersons were politicans by profession.

They were accustomed to holding new conferences

and interviews, but this format created the air of a media
event.

This, coupled with ·the fact that many participants
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were perceived as partisan politicans, served to enhance the
adversarial perception of many of the delegates - an "us"

and "them" attitude, which probably did not contribute to
Identification.

Only Senator Kennedy consistently used

speeches as a rhetorical format, while apparently only he
and Governor Carey made any significant attempts at developing interpersonal contacts with the delegates - the
majority of participants used a media approach.
Externally, three considerations must be borne in
mind.

First, we have expressed an assumption in Chapter

Seven which said that "the general effect of mass communication is to reinforce existing attitudes, beliefs and perceptions".

To paraphrase, "good Kennedy propaganda" tends

to strengthen Kennedy supporters behind him while securing
Carter support from his supporters.

Research would seem to

substantiate this polarizing effect, and yet many professional politicans tend to use this approach when trying to
alter public opinion.

However, if this assumption is sound,

it would have been virtually impossible to sway delegate
opinion by relying so heavily on mass communication.
Next, the power of an incumbent President must at
least be noted here.

While a study of Presidential power

constitutes a research project in itself, it can be generally stated that the level of influence, power, and control
available to a President are very great. 1 Inspite of diminishing popularity, and an air of being an "outsider",
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Jimmy Carter still possessed considerable influence and
power.

The fact remains that no President, in the past one

hundred years, who has desired the renomination has ever
been denied by his Party.
Finally, the national delegates have a history of
functioning as "king-makers".

They may have been chosen by

Party officials at some sequestered location, but having
emerged from those "smoke-filled rooms" they descend on the
national convention with the knowledge that their one vote
is as powerful as anyone else's.

To be sure, they were

supposed to nominate Estes Kefauver but, when the balloting
was done, they had re-chosen Adlai Stevenson.

To be sure,

he allowed them to pick his Vice-Presidential running mate,
expecting that to be John Kennedy of Massachusetts, but they
c.hose Estes Kefauver, instead.

In 1980, the majority of

delegates (by a 2-to-l margin) were not only chosen to represent Jimmy Carter, but they appear to have devoutly
wanted him.

The movement convinced delegates that they

could exercise their own free will, but then it polarized
them into two distinct factions.

The delegates chose their

"king" when they voted on F(3} (C).
Still we must ask, was it all worth doing?

As dis-

cussed in Chapter One, McBurney and Wrage have delineated
four criteria which shall briefly be considered here, even
though these two authors prefer the Artistic theory alone.
When one considers the rhetorical efforts of the Open
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Convention Movement in light of the Results theory, one
must conclude that it did not succeed.
divisive - first among

Generally, it was

the delegates, and later it contrib-

uted to Party divisions in November.

It did not secure the

votes needed to defeat Proposed Rule F{3) {C) but rather, in
the end, saw the passage of the rule and the renomination
of Jimmy Carter.
The Ethical theory would have us consider a speaker's
motives and credibility.

As most of the participants in

the movement were elected officials, their level of credibility among the delegates was generally high.

Senator

Kennedy and Governor Carey were perceived as having personal
designs on the nomination, and this doubtless lowered their
credibility among staunch Carter supporters.

On the other

hand, Senator Byrd and Governor Grasso were perceived as
unifying agents, and both appear to have very high credibility.

The "mavericks", including Representative Ambro

and Barnes, had only low-to-moderate credibility, due to
their opposition to both carter and Kennedy.

Their motiva-

tion, they had said, was political survival, and this did
little to enhance their reputations among the delegates.
Therefore, though our sampling indicates a diversity of
motives and credibility-levels, generally the movement
would score highly in this category.
The Truth theory seeks to measure effective speech by
its concurrance with the truth, as it can· be kn·o'Wll.

Ob-
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viously at this juncture one must ask, did they know the
truth, and did they speak it?

Subjective appraisals are

called for here, and it must be clearly stated that subjective conclusions have been drawn.

When citing historical

precedence and the Democratic Party charter to fortify their
argument for an open convention, it would appear that speakers such as Kennedy, Carey and Shanker were speaking the
truth, as they knew it.

When pleading for Party unity,

spokespersons such as Grasso, Byrd and Koch appear to be
speaking the truth.

On the other hand, terms such as "ro-

bots", "lenunings", and "the Supreme Soviet" seem to be selected solely to inflame passions, regardless of their
basis in fact.

When Senator Kennedy spoke specifically of

inflation, and when Governor Carey spoke of the housing
slump and unemployed auto workers, it seems reasonable to
assume that they were dealing with truth as they saw it.
However, when Kennedy called Carter a "clone" of Ronald
Reagan, he had digressed from fact to name-calling.

Gen-

erally, albeit with some exceptions as noted, the movement
was moderately successful by this criteria.
Finally, the Artistic theory asserts that rhetoric is
an art, reducible to principles.

We have already stressed

the media-flavor of the movement, however, and noted that
the three most significant rhetorical products were Kennedy's speech, and the articles by Shanker and Carey.

Of

these three, the most outstanding was the Kennedy oration,
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as evidenced by earlier testimony.

Rich in language, in-

ventive and persuasive, the Senator wove ethos, pathos, and
logos to produce "the speech" of the campaign.

However,

most spokespersons used the media as a medium, and the
"tongue" of the common man, to convey their message.

They

tended to emphasize immediate political concerns, as opposed
to universal principles, and by so doing they achieved few
artistic successes.
What shall we say of the movement, rhetorically?
There were at least three shining moments (cited above) when
the arguments and the words were above the ordinary.

There

were at least two spokespersons (Kennedy and Carey) who
broke the media-mold, and in so doing established personal
ties to the delegates.

There were isolated calls to higher

principles and loftier ideals, but they were the exception,
not the rule.

The rule, it seems, was to appeal to the im-

mediate political concerns of what proved to be a minority
of the Democratic Party.

The rule, it seems, demanded ex-

tensive use of the media, inspite of other avenues of communication.

The movement, it seems, had very limited suc-

cess rhetorically, while being responsible, in part, for
the institution of a new tradition among national delegates.
The movement, finally, was contributory to the November
defeat of the Carter-Mondale ticket.
Having critiqued the movement thus far, it seems appropriate that we also critique this study.

Three points
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need to be made in honest evaluation.

First, it would

appear that Burke's Dramatistic Pentad can be a valuable
tool for analysis of movement rhetoric.

Though many new

methodologies are currently arising on the horizon (and
certainly some of these deserve closer inspection and consideration) Burke's pentad is so fluid and adaptable that
it readily lends itself to this type of application.
Second, it appears that certain rhetorical themes
were repeated in the rhetoric of the Open Convention Movement.

On the basis of the rhetorical situation which gives

rise to movements-in-general, it might be argued that this
would often be the case when studying other movements.
However, because of the uniqueness of the Open Convention
Movement, further study needs to be conducted with this
hypothesis before this conclusion can be universally accepted.
Third, much has recently been said about the effects
of mass communication on attitude-change.

It is asserted

that a heavy reliance on the media was one reason for the
low-level of success achieved by the Open Convention Movement. Numerous studies have been conducted, 2 and while
this writer subscribes to one set of conclusions (based
upon statistical studies in the field), 3 it would be noted
that some studies still tend to support an opposing view. 4
Due to the influence of the media on the movement, however,
it was necessary to take a stand on this issue.
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Hindsight also provides us the opportunity of asking,
what did we do wrong in this study?

One area of weakness

involves a definition of terms - a discreteness never obtained between the terms "rhetorical strategies" and
"rhetorical themes".

Though Burke defines Strategy as

"a method or plan of attack" (and we have used this to
determine how the spokespersons categorized the rhetorical
choices which they presented), we have said that "rhetorical
themes" were recurring topics and arguments in the rhetoric of the movement (seeking to determine what was said).
As discussed in Chapter One, when considering rhetorical
strategies, a Strategy of Unity was developed, and this
strategy was illustrated by quoting spokespersons within
the movement.

This strategy was then manifested as a

theme in a number of addresses illustrated.
Finally, there are several areas that should be
looked to in future studies.

As mentioned earlier, the

hypothesis that certain rhetorical themes repeat themselves in movement rhetoric needs to be replicated.

This

can hopefully be accomplished by several studies, which
should include a "conventional'' (less unique) movement.
Another area should include a study of the influence
of the media on both the audience and the movement.

Can

mass communication alter beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions?

Does the media, by its influence, alte·r the qua-

lity and/or type of rhetoric produced?

Does the media
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create its own rhetoric?
Additionally, an investigation of the Open Convention
Movement using another methodology (and here we are thinking
of either a Situational approach, or the Confrontational
method of Cathcart} could yield additional insights not
yet discerned.

It might even be feasible to attempt a

Nee-Aristotelian investigation of the two articles by Carey
and Shanker.
Lastly, deeper consideration needs to be given to the
philosophical basis for the movement.

Could an appeal have

been made which transcended pragmatic political concerns?
In light of the Artistic theory, how good was the rhetoric
of the Open Convention Movement, and how could it have been
better?
With the August 11th vote on the floor of the Convention, and the adoption of Proposed Rule F(3} (C}, the
Open Convention Movement came to an end.

It may be over,

but the lessons we can learn continue on long past its
final days.
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APPENDIX A
"AN OPEN CONVENTION" - Governor Hugh Carey
The New York Tim.es·, Wedn·esday, May 21, 1980
Prolonged Presidential primaries were once considered
a wise expression of public opinion and a safeguard of the
political well-being of our people.

But deep changes and

movements inside and outside the United States are calling
into serious question the efficacy of the drawn-out primary
process.

There are fundamental differences in our society

today that must be recognized in devising a system to
select Presidential candidates.
We live in an era when voters can be manipulated by
news-media coverage of orchestrated events, when events of
major significance occur with terrible rapidity.

Yet in

the early primaries, voters must make a binding commitment,
more than six months before a convention, while in the
later primaries rather than being permitted to consider
options, voters are told that their choices have vanished
in a momentum built on earlier elections.
A primary system originally conceived as a chance
for candidates to of fer meaningful choices to the Democratic Party now ends without any great debates having
take·n place.

The discussion of critical issues seems
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less important to the candidates than 10 seconds of coverage
on the evening television news.

Does this process of po-

litical ratification, which culminates in an empty ritual
perversely called a convention, reflect the pragmatic genius
of American democracy?

I think not.

I have declared that I will not be a delegate to the
Democratic National Convention in August because I could be
denied the right to vote the way my conscience dictates.

I

do not believe it is in the best interest of this nation to
limit our political options without full and open deliberation.

Delegates to a Presidential convention should not

be herded, like branded sheep, into a pen where they are
expected to perform in a predictable manner.
I have suggested that it would be far more preferable
this year for the candidates to ask for an "open" convention where the delegates would be free to close ranks behind the best person.

That call has been branded "bizarre",

"divisive", and "self-serving" and prominent political
operatives threaten to "yank any delegate off the convention floor" who differs with their set script - creating a
rather grim image of the future of free expression in the
Democratic Party, the traditional home for Americans who
treasure our diversity and seek unity through debate.
The issues that trouble a nation will not evaporate
in abuse, and it is the issues that will determine the
election next November.

It is because of my deep commit-
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ment to the Democratic Party, and to the principles for
which it stand, that I shall continue to stress the issues.
With such an approach, the Democratic Party can win back
the disenchanted, the minorities, the independents and
those who have crossed over to other candidacies out of
frustration and confusion.

Only with their support can

the Democratic Party win in November.
My call for an open convention in New York City this
August is to ensure that the Democratic candidate has the
party clearly united behind him on the issues.
the party is divided and unsure of itself.

At present,

Democrats'

best interests are not served by ignoring this political
fact of life, for the urgency of the issues will not be
mitigated by Democrats' choosing to suffer in silence.
What I propose is, in fact, neither unfair nor apt
to lead to ruinous division in the party.

It is provided

for in current party guidelines and would be permissable
under such rules as might be adopted by the convention.
It recognizes that the velocity of events requires that
we devise a system for selecting candidates that offers
a choice based on the maximum amount of information possible.

Furthermore, it recognizes that a narrow majority

called in a checkered process that began months earlier
may no longer represent the will of the party.
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An eventual solution

m~ght

be to eliminate the ex-

isting system of local primaries, replacing it with a
regional or national selection for each party just prior
to a limited campaign period.

This would not only permit

the electorate in each party to select candidates openly
on the basis of the most up-to-date information possible
but also would obviate the costly and wasteful system of
constant campaigning that adversely influences policy
decisions and effectively denies the public the services
of those they elect and support.
Silence is the politican's pet chameleon and can be
made to blend into any background.

Discretion may dictate

caution at this moment but there are times when a cause is
better served with plain talk - whatever the risks.
This year, a managed convention, merely anointing a
prearranged winner, may adequately express the Republican
Party's vision of America, but the main event for Democrats at Madison Square Garden in August must not be a
simple coronation.

Among the most important political

rights we possess are the selection of Presidential candidates and the development of platforms.

We cannot afford

to abandon them to those who view this exercise merely as
a number game.

The American people deserve a clear choice.

APPENDIX B
"WHERE WE STAND" - Mr. Albert Shanker
The New York Times·, Sunday, July 27, 1980
A little paragraph tucked into the temporary convention rules that have been proposed by the Democratic
National Conunittee could reduce the Democratic Party's
convention to a deliberative body with little more to
deliberate than delegates do at the Supreme Soviet.

Pro-

posed Rule F(3) (C) is a stunning departure from the past:
It would empower a presidential candidate to remove any
delegate who once expressed a preference for him but whose
vote the candidate might no longer feel confident of getting.

In other words, if President Carter - or, for that

matter, Senator Kennedy - even thought that some delegates
in their columns might change their minds during the balloting in New York, they could simply boot them out and
replace them.
Proposed Rule F(3) (C) states:

"All delegates to the

National Convention shall be bound to vote for the presidential candidate whom they were elected to support for
at least the first Convention ballot, unless released in
writing by the presidential candidate.

Delegates who seek

to violate this rule may be replaced with an alternate of
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the same presidential preference by the presidential candidate or that candidate's authorized representative{s) at
any time up to and including the presidential balloting at
the National Convention."

This is the same paragraph that

was proposed as early as 1977 by a Carter operative and
adopted then by the party's Conrrnission on Presidential Nomination and Party Structure as one of the party's delegate
selection rules.
But the simple fact is that neither delegate selection
rules nor state laws nor state party rules have ever dictated the votes of delegates to national Democratic Party
conventions since the first one was held in Baltimore in
1832.

While such provisions surely carry important weight,

they have not prevented delegates from voting for whichever
presidential candidate they deemed best for the party and
the country, whether on the first ballot or any other.

The

attempt to bind the delegates - with eviction from the convention as the penalty for disloyalty - represents a
startling effort by the incumbent to overturn Democratic
Party history.
The commission on party rules which I headed from
1969 to 1972 found a rich history of "bound" delegates
switching their votes and of the nominating conventions
recognizing that right.

In 1952, for instance, delegates

selected under the terms of Oregon state law were "bound"
to support Estes Kefauver, the winner of the Oregon primary.
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But an Oregon delegate ended up voting for Adlai Steveson.
Or take the 1924 convention, which required 103 ballots
to pick its candidate.

A Florida delegate was "bound" by

both state law and state party rules to support the winner
of Florida's primary, William Gibbs McAdoo.
Al Smith.

He voted for

In his ruling on the 1924 switch, the chairman

of the convention, Senator Tom Walsh of Montana, succinctly
stated the Democratic Party's position on this difficult
issue: that "it is a matter for the delegate and his constituents as to whether he did or did not violate his instructions."
In other words, delegates essentially are in the same
position as members of Congress or other representatives
who commonly face conflicts between constituent wishes and
their own conclusions.

This dilemma was perhaps best des-

cribed by the British philosopher and legislator Edmund
Burke in 1774.

Burke acknowledged his duty to his own

constitutents, whose "wishes ought to have great weight with
him; their opinion high respect; their business uncommitted
attention."

But, he added, "Your representative owes you,

not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays instead of serving if he sacrifices it to your opinion."
Any legislator who goes against his constituents'
desires, of course, will be taking his chances when he goes
back home.

So will "bound" delegates who change their

votes at national party conventions.

But as to the dele-
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gates' historic right to do this there is no question.
That history was embodied in the rule adopted by both the
1972 and 1976 conventions, which said that any challenges
to a state delegation's vote, " • . • the votes of that
delegation shall then be recorded as polled without regard to any state law, party rule, resolution or instruction binding the delegation or any member thereof
to vote as a unit with others or to aast his vote for or
against any aandidate or proposition (italics added)."

That the convention had and has a right to make such
a rule - to be its own highest authority - was affirmed by
the U.S. Supreme Court in its 1975 decision in Cousins vs.
Wigoda.

The high court ruled that actions by national

party conventions supersede state statutes.

And national

Democratic Party conventions have traditionally recognized
that delegates sometimes must make painful choices between
conflicting obligations, that what was true in the snows
of a winter primary may no longer be true in the heat of
a summer convention, that circumstances, people and opinions
change.
The proposed rule change would be an affront to every
delegate.

These are people, after all, who have long paid

their dues to the party, not merely with money but with
time, often over many years, doing all the chores necessary
to help the party's candidates and its platforms.
know what politics is about.

They

They know the people in their
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own neighborhoods and towns and counties and parties.

If

they are bound by state provisions, they are not going to
change their votes merely because of some passing whim.
But they do have minds.

They are not children.

If the

Democratic National Conunittee is determined to treat them
like children, ready to yank delegates suspected of misbehaving, why have them there to participate in the presidential nominating process at all?
If the delegates in New York two weeks from now vote
to accept the proposed rule change, they will be voting
not only to "bind" themselves but to gag themselves as
well.

APPENDIX C
"TRANSCRIPT OF KENNEDY·1 S SPEECH TO THE
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION"
The New York ·Times, Wednesday, ·August 13, 1980
FolloUJing is a transaript of the a.dd.ress by Senator

E~ard

M.

Kennedy to the Demoaratia National Convention last night:

I thank you for your eloquent introduction.

Well,

things worked out a little different from the way I thought,
but let me tell you, I still love New York.
My fellow Democrats and my fellow Americans.
I have come here tonight not to argue as a candidate
but to affirm a cause.
I'm asking you to renew the commitment of the Democratic Party to economic justice.

I am asking you to renew

our commitment to a fair and lasting prosperity that can
put America back to work.
This is the cause that brought me into the campaign
and that sustained me for nine months, across a hundred
thousand miles in 40 different states.

We had our losses,

but the pain of our defeat is far, far less than the pain
of the people that I have met.

We have learned that it is

important to take issues seriously, but never to take ourselves too seriously.
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The serious issue before us tonight is the cause for
which the Democratic Party has stood in its finest hours,
the cause that keeps our party young and makes it, in the
second century of its age, the largest political party in
this republic and the longest lasting political party on
this planet.
Our cause has been, since the days of Thomas Jefferson, the cause of the common man and the conunon woman.

Our

commitment has been, since the days of Andrew Jackson, to
all those he called "the humble members of society - the
farmers, mechanics and laborers."

On this foundation we

have defined our values, refined our policies and refreshed
our faith.
Now I take the unusual step of carrying the cause
and the conunitment of my campaign personally to our national
convention.

I speak out of a deep sense of urgency about

the anguish and anxiety I have seen across America.

I

speak out of a deep belief in the ideals of the Democratic
Party and in the potential of that party and of a President
to make a difference.

And I speak out of a deep trust in

our capacity to proceed with boldness and a common vision
that will feel and heal the suffering of our time and the
divisions of our party.
The economic plank of this platform on its face concerns only material things, but it is also a moral issue
that I raise tonight.

It has taken many forms over many
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years.

In this campaign, .and in this country that we seek

to lead, the challenge in 1980 is to give our voice and our
vote for these fundamental democratic principles:
- Let us pledge that we will never misuse unemployment,
high interest rates and human misery as false weapons against inflation.
- Let us pledge that employment will be the first
priority of our economic policy.
- Let us pledge that there will be security for all
those who are now at work.

And let us pledge that

there will be jobs for all who are out of work.
And we will not compromise on the issues of jobs.
These are not simplistic pledges.
are the heart of our tradition:

Simply put, they

and they have been the

soul of our party across the generations.

It is the glory

and the greatness of our tradition to speak for those who
have no voice, to remember those who are forgotton, to respond to the frustrations and fulfill the aspirations of
all Americans seeking a better life in a better land.
We dare not forsake that tradition.

We cannot let

the great purposes of the Democratic Party become the
bygone passages of history.

We must not permit the Re-

publicans to seize and run on the slogans of prosperity.
Recalls ;Roos·ev·elt ·Rejoinder
We heard the orators at their convention all trying
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to talk like Democrats.

They proved that even Republican

nominees can quote Franklin Roosevelt to their own purpose.
The Grand Old Party thinks it has found a great new trick.
But 40 years ago, an earlier generation of Republicans attempted the same trick.

And Franklin Roosevelt himself

replied:
Most Republican leaders have bitterly
fought and blocked the forward surge
of average men and women in their pursuit of happiness. Let us not be
deluded that overnight those leaders
have suddenly become the friends of
average men and women. You know,"
he continued, "very few of us are
that gullible."
And four years later, when the Republicans tried that trick
again, Franklin Roosevelt asked:
Can the Old Guard pass itself off
as the New Deal? I think not. We
have all seen many marvelous stunts
in the circus, but no performing
elephant could turn a handspring
without falling flat on its back.
The 1980 Republican convention was awash with crocodile
tears for our economic distress, but it is by their long
record and not their recent words that you shall know them.
The same Republicans who are talking about the
crisis of unemployment have nominated a man who once said,
and I quote, "Unemployment insurance is a prepaid vacation
plan for free-loaders."

And that nominee is no friend of

labor.
The same Republicans who are talking about the
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problems of the inner cities have nominated a man who said,
and I quote, "I have included in my morning and evening
prayers every day the prayer that the Federal Government
not bail out New York."

And that nominee is no friend of

this city and our great urban centers across the nation.
The same Republicans who are talking about security
for the elderly have nominated a man who said just four
years ago that participation in Social Security "should
be made voluntary."

And that nominee is no friend of the

senior citizen of this nation.
The same Republicans who are talking about preserving
the environment have nominated a man who last year made the
pre-posterous statement, and I quote:

"Eighty percent of

air pollution comes from plants and trees."

And that nomi-

nee is no friend of the environment.
And the same Republicans who are invoking Franklin
Roosevelt have nominated a man who said in 1976, and these
are his exact words:
New Deal."

"Facism was really the basis of the

And that nominee, whose name is Ronald Reagan,

has no right to quote Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
The great adventure which our opponents offer is a
voyage into the past.
theirs.

Progress is our heritage, not

What is right for us as Democrats is also the

right way for Democrats to win.
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Fairness and Compassion
The commitment I seek is not to outworn views, but
to old values that will never wear out.

Programs may some-

times become obsolete, but the ideal of fairness always endures.

Circumstances may change, but the work of com-

passion must continue.

It is surely correct that we cannot

solve problems by throwing money at them, but it is also
correct that we dare not throw out our national problems
onto a scrap heap of inattention and indifference.

The

poor may be out of political fashion, but they are not without human needs.

The middle class may be angry, but they

have not lost the dream that all Americans can advance together.
The demand of our people in 1980 is not for smaller
government or bigger government but for better government.
Some say that government is always bad and that spending
for basic social programs is the root of our economic evils.
But we reply, the present inflation and recession costs
our economy $200 billion a year.

We reply, inflation and

unemployment are the biggest spenders of all.
The task of leadership in 1980 is not to parade
scapegoats or to seek refuge in reaction but to match our
power to the possibilities of progress.
While others talked of free enterprise, it was the
Democratic party that acted - and we ended excessive regulation· in the airline and trucking industry.

We restored
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competition to the marketplace.

And I take some satis-

faction that this deregulation legislation that I sponsored
and passed in the Congress of the United States.
As Democrats, we recognize that each generation of
Americans has a rendevous with a different reality.

The

answers of one generation become the questions of the next
generation, but there is a guiding star in the American
firmament.

It is as old as the revolutionary belief that

all people are created equal, and as clear as the contemporary condition of Liberty City and the South Bronx.
Again and again, Democratic leaders have followed that
star and they have given new meaning to the old values of
liberty and justice for all.
We are the party of the New Freedom, the New Deal,
and the New Frontier.
hope.

We have always been the party of

So this year, let us offer new hope - new hope to

an America uncertain about the present but unsurpassed in
its potential for the future.
To all those who are idle in the cities and industries
of America, let us provide new hopes for the dignity of useful work.

Democrats have always believed that a basic civil

right of all Americans is their right to earn their own way.
The party of the people must always be the party of full employment.
To all those who doubt the future of our economy, let
us provide new hope for the reindustrialization of America.
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And let our vision reach beyond the next election or the
next year to a new generation of prosperity.

If we could

rebuild Germany and Japan after World War II, then surely
we can reindustralize our own nation and revive our inner
cities in the 1980's.
To all those who work hard for a living wage, let us
provide new hope that their price of their employment shall
not not be an unsafe work place and a death at an earlier
age.
To all those who inhabit our land, from California to
the New York island, from the Redwood forest to the Gulf
Stream waters, let us provide new hope that prosperity
shall not be purchased by poisoning the air, the rivers
and the natural resources that are the greatest gift of
this continent.

We must insist that our children and

grandchildren shall inherit a land which they can truly
call America the Beautiful.
To all those who see the worth of thier work and
their savings taken by inlfation, let us offer new hope
for a stable economy.

We must meet the pressures of the

present by invoking the full power of government to master
increasing prices.

In candor, we must say that the Federal

budget can be balanced only by policies that bring us to a
balanced prosperity of full employment and price restraint.
And to all those overburdened by an unfair tax
structure, let us provide new hope for real tax reform.
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And let our vision reach beyond the next election or the
next year to a new generation of prosperity.

If we could

rebuild Germany and Japan after World War II, then surely
we can reindustralize our own nation and revive our inner
cities in the 1980's.
To all those who work hard for a living wage, let us
provide new hope that their price of their employment shall
not be an unsafe work place and a death at an earlier age.
To all those who inhabit our land, from California to
the New York island, from the Redwood forest to the Gulf
Stream waters, let us provide new hope that prosperity
shall not be purchased by poisoning the air, the rivers
and the natural resources that are the greatest gift of
this continent.

We must insist that our children and

grandchildren shall inherit a land which they can truly
call America the Beautiful.
To all those who see the worth of their work and
their savings taken by inlfation, let us offer new hope
for a stable economy.

We must meet the pressures of the

present by invoking the full power of government to master
increasing prices.

In candor, we must say that the Federal

budget can be balanced only by policies that bring us to a
balanced prosperity of full employment and price restraint.
And to all those overburdened by an unfair tax
structure, let us provide new hope for real tax reform.
Instead of shutting down classrooms, let us shut off tax
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subsidies for expensive business lunches that are nothing
more than food stamps for the rich.
The tax cut of our Republican opponent takes the name
of tax reform in vain.

It is a wonderfully Republican idea

that would redistribute income in the wrong direction.

It's

good news for any of you with incomes over $200,000 a year.
For the few of you, it offers a pot of gold worth $14,000.
But the Republican tax cut is bad news for the middle-income
families.
a year.

For the many of you, they plan a pittance of $200
And that is not what the Democratic Party means

when we say tax reform.
The vast majority of Americans cannot afford this
panacea from a Republican nominee who has denounced the
progressive income tax as the invention of Karl Marx.

I

am afraid he has confused Karl Marx with Theodore Roosevelt, that obscure Republican President who sought and
fought for a tax system based on ability to pay.

Theodore

Roosevelt was not Karl Marx, and the Republican tax scheme
is not tax reform.
Health Insurance in a· Fair Society
Finally, we cannot have a fair prosperity and isolation from a fair society.
So I will continue to stand for a national health
insurance.

We must - we must not surrender - we must not

surrender to the relentless medical inflation that can
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bankrupt almost anyone, .and that may soon break the budgets
of governments at every level.
Let us insist on real controls over what doctors and
hospitals can charge.

And let us resolve that the state

of a family's health shall never depend on the size of a
family's wealth.
The President, the Vice-President, the members of
Congress have a medical plan that meets their needs in full.
And whenever Senators and Representatives catch a little
cold, the Capitol physician will see them inunediately,
treat them promptly, fill a prescription on the spot.
do not get a bill even if we ask for it.

We

And when do you

think was the last time a member of Congress asked for a
bill from the Federal Government?
And I say again as I have said before:

If health

insurance is good enough for the President, the VicePresident, the Congress of the United States, then it's
good enough for you and every family in America.
Pride in the Democratic Heritage
There were some - there were some who said we should
be silent about our differences on issues during this convention.

But the heritage of the Democratic Party has

been a history of democracy.

We fight hard because we

care deeply about our principles and purposes.
flee this struggle.

We did not

We welcome the contrast with the empty
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and expedient spectacle last month in Detroit where no nomination was contested, no question was debated and no one
dared to raise any doubt or dissent.
Democrats can be proud that we chose a different
course - and a different platform.
We can be proud that our party stands for investment
in safe energy instead of a nuclear future that may
threaten the future itself.

We must not permit the neigh-

borhoods of America to be permanently shadowed by the fear
of another Three Mile Island.
We can be proud that our party stands for a fair
housing law to unlock doors of discrimination once and for
all.

The American house will be divided against itself so

long as there is prejudice against any American buying or
renting a home.
And we can be proud that our party stands plainly
and publicly, and persistently for the ratification of the
equal right amendment.

Women hold their rightful place

at our convention, and women must have their rightful place
in the Constitution of the United States.

On this issue,

we will not yield, we will not equivocate, we will not
rationalize, explain or excuse.

We will stand for E.R.A.

and for the recognition at long last that our nation was
made up of founding mothers as well as founding fathers.
A fair prosperity and a just society are within
our vision and our grasp.

And we do not have every answer.
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There are questions not yet asked, waiting for us in

t~e

recesses of the future.
But of this much we can be certain, because it is the
lesson of all of our history:

together a President and the

people can make a difference.

I have found that faith

still alive wherever I have traveled across this land.

So

let us reject the counsel of retreat and the call to reaction.

Let us go forward in the knowledge that history

only helps those who help themselves.
There will be setbacks and sacrifices in the years
ahead.

But I am convinced that we as a people are ready

to give something back to our country in return for all
it has given to us.

Let this - let this be our connnitment:

whatever sacrifices must be made will be shared - and
shared fairly.

And let this be our confidence at the end

of our journey and always before us shines that ideal of
liberty and justice for all.
Looking Back on 1980 Campaign
In closing, let me say a few words to all those that
I have met and all those who have supported me at this convention and across the country.
There were hard hours on our journey.
sailed

~gainst

And often we

the wind, but always we kept our rudder true.

And there were so many of you who stayed the course and
shared our hope.

You gave your help; but even: more, you
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gave your hearts.
happy campaign.

And because of you, this has been a
You welcomed Joan, me and our family into

your homes and neighborhoods, your churches, ,your campuses,
your union halls.

And when I think back on all the miles

and all the months and all the memories, I think of you.
And I recall the poet's words, and I say:

"What golden

friends I had."
Among you, my golden friends across this land, I have
listened and learned.
I have listened to Kenny Dubois, a glass-blower in
Charleston, West Virginia, who has 10 children to support
but has lost his job after 35 years, just three years short
of qualifying for his pension.
I have listened to the Trachta family, who farm in
Iowa and who wonder whether they can pass the good life and
the good earth on to their children.
I have listened to the grandmother in East Los
Angeles - in East Oakland - who no longer has a phone to
call her grandchildren, because she gave it up to pay the
rent on her small apartment.
I have listened to young workers out of work, to
students without the tuition for college and to families
without the chance to own a home.

I have seen the closed

factories and the stalled assembly lines of Anderson,
Indiana, and Southgate, California.

And I have seen too

many - far too many - idle men and women desperate to work.
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I have seen too many - far too many - working families
desperate to protect the value of their wages from the
ravages of inflation.
Yet I have also sensed a yearning for new hope among
the people in every state where I have been.
felt it in their handshakes:
I

And I have

I saw it in their faces.

And

shall never forget the mothers who carried children to

our rallies.

I shall always remember the elderly who have

lived in an America of high purpose and who believe that
it can all happen again.
Tonight, in their name, I have come here to speak for
them.

And for their sake I ask you to stand with them.

On

their behalf I ask you to restate and reaffirm the timeless
truth of our party.
I congratulate President Carter on his victory here.
I am confident that the Democratic Party will reunite on
the basis of Democratic principles - and that together we
will march toward a Democratic victory in 1980.
And someday, long after this convention, long after
the signs come down, and the crowds stop cheering, and
the bands stop playing, may it be said of our campaign
that we kept the faith.

May it be said of our party in

1980 that we found our faith again.

And may it be said of us, both in dark

pass~9es

and

in bright days, in the wo.rds ·of Tennyson that my br.others
quoted and loved and that have special meaning for me now:
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am a part of al'l that I have met,
Tho' much is taken, much abides
That which we are, we are One equal temper of heroic heart strong in tiJill
To strive, to seek, to find and not to yield.

I

For me, a few hours ago, this campaign came to an
end.

For all those whose cares have been our concern,

the work goes on, the cause endures, the hope still
lives and the dream shall never die.

